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My study of the early Chinese view of sense discrimination
began with dissertation research at the University of Chicago. The
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readings by Anthony Yu, Chad Hansen, and Paul Griffiths. The
work also profited immensely from the advice and encouragement
of Henry Rosemont Jr. I have benefited more from these
colleagues' insights than I can adequately acknowledge.
I am thankful to a variety of people who generously helped
with the completion of the final draft, especially Lam Ling Hon,
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Brinkman for her careful copy editing, George Hardy for
repeatedly adjusting the workings of my computer, and Keith
Leber for kind and efficient editorial advice. In addition, I would
like to thank the anonymous readers from the University of
Hawai'i Press. I am also grateful to Dan Robins and Chris Fraser for
many fruitful discussions on questions of translation and
interpretation. Although I tried to incorporate improvements
suggested by these people, the mistakes that remain are soley my
responsibility.
Unless otherwise noted, the translations contained herein
are my own. Nevertheless, I am inevitably indebted to the
following translations, which are doubtlessly reflected in my own:
A. C. Graham's Ch'uang-tzu: the Inner Chapters (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1981); James Legge's The Works of Mencius
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895. Reprint, New York: Dover
Publications, 1970); W. K. Liao's The Complete Works ofHan Fei
Tzu (London: A. Probsthain, 1935-59); John Knoblock's Xunzi:A
Translation and Study of the Complete Works (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1994); Burton Watson's Hsun-tzu:Basic Writings
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); YP. Mei's The
Ethical and Political Works ofMo Tse (London: A. Probsthain.
1929); D. C. Lau's Mencius (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970) and
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Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books,
1963); and Robert Henricks' Lao-Tzu Te-Tao Ching: A New
Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Ma-Wang-tui Texts
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1989). (I use the Mawangdui
edition of the Laozi, following Henricks in providing the reader
with the more familiar Wang Bi chapter numbers. Occasionally, in
cases where software incapacities or matters of interest make the
Wang Bi edition more appropriate, 1 use that edition and note the
change.)
1 am thankful to the University of Richmond for its
generous support in the preparation and publication of this book.
Introduction
This monograph is about sense discrimination in the
classical period of Chinese thought.! It focuses on the ordinary
functions of the human senses, as presented in philosophical texts
of the Warring States era (roughly dating from the fifth to third
century B.C.E.). As the title suggests, the main senses under
consideration are hearing and sight, particularly in relation to the
function of the heartmind.2 A culture's understanding of the
physical senses may reveal implicit features of its world view. With
that in mind, this work attempts to identify the views on sense
discrimination in these texts and subsequently tries to detennine
what such views imply about the construction of reality in Warring
States thought.
This work may have significance for a controversial topic.
The results of this analysis seem to corroborate a particular
interpretation of early Chinese cosmology--one that views it as
distinctive and as having great value.3 Many features of early
Chinese cosmology have been used to argue for its distinctiveness.
In this Introduction, I will focus on two of them: its holism and its
appreciation of change. The distinctiveness of these features may
be highlighted by means of a contrast to the history of western
metaphysics.4 I will outline that contrast in order to explain how
my analysis may' be used to advance the argument for the
distinctiveness of early Chinese cosmology. Then I will describe
how the view of sense discrimination in Warring States China
supports th~ contention that early Chinese cosmology is indeed
holistic and rooted in change.
Warring States China
A brief historical overview may help situate the texts used in this
study. This work is based on the classics of Chinese philosophy,
written during what is known as the Warring States period (480-
1
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221 RC.E.). The Warring States refers to a succession of civil wars
among competing territorial states, which took place as a result of
the disintegration of the Zhou Dynasty (ca. 1050-256 RC.E.). The
Warring States period ended with the unification of the empire
under the Qin, 221-206 RC.E. Both before and during the Warring
States period, a variety of important changes occurred. Within this
period, there were significant changes in standards of living: the use
of iron developed, especially in agricultural use, and farming
replaced hunting as the primary means of sustenance. At the
political level, something like a feudal system, based on a
hereditary nobility, was replaced by a proliferation of small
competing political units, in which power was concentrated in the
hands of local. monarchs. Through direct taxation on land
controlled by the military and hereditary elite, the monarchs
effectively eliminated the earlier manorial management system.
The result was an increase in social mobility in the form of an
opportunity for official court appointments not based on kin
relations. In this context, a lower order of artisans emerged and
vied for jobs at court. The competition among the states
themselves also helped foster an environment in which capable
individuals could take on roles that were previously hereditary.
These developments contributed to the rise of a cultural
elite that interpreted social ideals. This cultural elite passed on
their instruction through disciples, who normally paid a token fee
for instruction. Those who were educated could sell their services
to territorial states as specialists in things like ritual or even
warfare. They often traveled from state to state, in search of an
audience for their recommendations regarding social reform.
Certain territorial states in particular "collected" some of the most
sought-after scholars, giving them titles and stipends, in an effort
to enhance their state's reputation. In this role, scholars might
have had some small effect on matters of state. More significantly,
some of these scholars' words were gathered and written down,





As a particular tradition was passed down from master to disciples,
one might speak of "schools of thought" developing in Warring
States China.5 The texts discussed here are later considered to
belong to three schools: Confucianism, Mohism, and Daoism.
However, because organizing texts into schools of thought was not
significant in the Warring States period, it is best not to think of
these texts in such terms.6
Given modern developments in the field of sinology, it is
no longer possible simply to treat Warring States texts as the
products of individual authors.7 Thus, the six texts drawn from
here should not be taken as authored by Confucius (d. 479 RC.E.),
Mozi (ca. 480-390 RC.E.), Mencius (ca. 382-300 RC.E.), Zhuangzi
(ca. 365-280 RC.E.), Xunzi (ca. 310-215 RC.E.), or Laozi (dates
unknown). Rather, it is probably safest to assume that all of these
texts are compilations by a number of authors (of more or less
similar persuasion) written over extended periods of time. In other
words, we should probably think of these books as layers of texts.
Nevertheless, the multilayered nature of these texts need
not undermine the main arguments proffered here. The claims I
make should be taken as either claims about the philosophical texts
of the Warring States period in general or claims about tendencies
specifically located within one or another of these texts. (While
the latter type of claim involves positing some minimal amount of
consistency in the philosophical position represented in a given
text, it by no means requires that the texts be the product of single
authors.)8 At this point in the development of sinology, it does
not seem possible to do more than make tentative general claims
about the view of sense discrimination within the period and within
the individual texts. There is barely enough information about
sense discrimination in these texts to support even that goal.
Given the dearth of data, it is not yet possible to identify nuanced
changes in the function of sense discrimination terminology over
the course of the Warring States period. If such a thing can ever
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occur, it must wait until sinology arrives at a greater state of
confidence and precision regarding the dating of the layers in these
texts. In the meantime, studies like this one may be of use in
depicting a particular aspect of the historical period as a whole or
trends in individual texts.
There is a reason why this analysis of sense discrimination
focuses on philosophical texts, from among the dozens of received
texts of the Warring States period. The texts I have chosen are
philosophical in a sense that does not necessarily accord with the
standards of modem western philosophy. That is, they are
philosophical insofar as they employ arguments that have "depth
and intricate implicit structure" to engage the subject of ethical and
political reform ..9 Because of the deep structure of the arguments in
these texts, focusing on them presents a double opportunity. It
allows me not only to suggest the current predominant view of
sense discrimination, but also to test that hypothesis. In other
words, after establishing what I take to be the overarching view of
sense discrimination from these texts as a whole, I can also use the
individual texts to check the validity of my thesis, by showing how
the overarching view functions differently in the deep structure of
competing arguments.
The main body of the work describes the predominant view
of sense discrimination. The first chapter introduces some general
ideas about the senses as a group. The second and third chapters
attempt to explain the significance of hearing and sight, as well as
their relation to the heartmind. The fourth chapter develops the
discussion in relation to a polarity that is particularly important in
determining how these texts represent a world view. Finally, the
last chapter aims to establish the validity of what I identify as the
overarching view of the senses by providing some examples of how
that view is put to different uses. The final chapter describes how
the shared view of sense discrimination actually functions to





In a work of this sort, comparison and contrast are unavoidable.
My ability to understand sense discrimination in the Warring States
depends in crucial ways on how I see it in relation to my own
tradition. Throughout the work, I explicitly use elements of the
tradition more familiar to me to explain what I think is
noteworthy about the views represented in the Warring States
texts. I presume similarity in the process of selecting the items I
think can be compared.! 0 But of course I also presume difference,
because there is no sense in comparing things that are identical.!!
In my attention to difference. I do not mean to fall into the
Orientalist trap of implying that Warring States thought is merely
remarkable for its contrast to "the West." As far as possible, this
study endeavors to present the intricacies and internal dynamics of
Warring States views on its own terms. I hope my determination
to do that conveys my conviction that Warring States China has a
subjectivity of its own. Still, the best justification for the
legitimacy of the comparative elements in this work may be its
results. As Ben-ami Sharfstein puts it,
The question is not whether the differences exist. because
they do. but what we should make of them; and the answer
often lies in the conscious or unconscious decision to pay
no attention to the context, or, more accurately, to make
use of only the criteria that fit our need at the time, that
is, to intuit or hypothesize or discover the context that is
most pertinent to our need.12
To that extent, the value of this work may depend on whether I
can put these things I have compared into a meaningful context.
Especially for non-sinologists, that comparative context may be
the most important implication of this study.
6The History ofWestem Metaphysics
On the Epistemology of the Senses
The search to identify a permanent substrate of reality was a
shared problematique in ancient Greek philosophy. The ancient
Greeks considered a variety of candidates for this role. For
instance, Thales (c. 640--546 RC.E.) contended that everything was
composed of water; Anaximenes (c. 611-547 RC.E.) argued for the
primacy of air. When single elements seemed insufficient, other
thinkers proposed combinations, like earth and water, or earth, air,
fire, and water.B Even Heraclitus (c. 500 RC.E.), famous for the
claim that "everything is becoming," still posited something-
fire-as a fundamental eternal substance. Starting with Pythagoras
(fl. 540--510 RC.E.) and his theories of numbers, determining the
permanent substrate could also capitalize on the notion of a super-
sensible, intelligible world. Hence, in spite of his mistrust of sense
perception, Plato (c. 428-348 RC.E.) could find solace in the
clarity with which the intellect knows things like the super-sensible
form of the Good. Likewise, Aristotle's (384-322 RC.E.)
confidence lay in a purely formal and unchanging God and the idea
that, as matter decreased in proportion to form, things became
increasingly stable and knowable. The sensory world of flux and
becoming could be transcended in favor of a permanent and eternal
foundation. Thus, in various ways, the Greeks managed to identify
the permanent foundation of reality.
Underlying their project was the belief that the eternal
alone is real. The idea is expressed in its most extreme form by the
Eleatic school, which denied the reality of change. Parmenides (fl.
5th cent. RC.E.) argued that there is no such thing as change, and
Zeno (fl. 5th cent. RC.E.) defended this with various arguments
against motion.
The critique of the heritage of this conviction is well
known. As Jacques Derrida describes it, the subsequent history of
metaphysics perpetuates a particular contradiction.14 It constructs
its notion of presence on the basis of a metaphor of perceptual
presence-the moment, or "now." But the now itself is a form of
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absence, because it is defined by what it is not (the past and the
future). If reality is understood on the basis of being present in the
moment, then it must in some way be absent. According to
Derrida, this language of presence spawns a string of metaphysical
oppositions, like intelligible and sensible, soul and body, that are
always haunted by the absence of full-presence. Thus, regarding the
history of western metaphysics, he says,
Its matrix.. .is the determination of Being as presence in all
senses of this word. It could be shown that all the names
related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center
have always designated an invariable presence eidos, arche,
telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance,
subject), aletheia, transcendentality, conscious-ness, God,
man, and so forth. 15
Derrida surveys the later history of western metaphysics, noting
how such names for fundamentals continue to designate invariable
presence. He identifies "Being as full-presence" as the foundation
for the Cartesian cogito. He also finds appeals to a similar
grounding in Kant (in the transcendental unity of apperception,
which is the noumenon beyond the flux). He uncovers it as well in
Hegel's use of self-consciousness. (This condition of all
consciousness, Derrida argues, depends on a notion of Being as pure
presence.) Likewise, Derrida contends that, in spite of Heidegger's
desire to think presence differently than the Greeks, he too
presumes that something that is must be identical to itself.
All of this, Derrida argues, inherits the Greek conception
of eternal self-presence, which is rooted in a metaphor tainted with
absence. The language Derrida uses to express this absence is
differance-difference and deferment. But for the purpose of
comparison to early Chinese metaphysics,16 this might be phrased
in terms of change. At the risk of oversimplifying, Derrida's point
could be taken as saying that the history of metaphysics succeeds
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only by repressing change-because change is the difference
between the past, the present, and the future. The Greek denial of
change (a denial frequently associated with a rejection of the
senses) contributed a persistent problem to the history of western
metaphysics. According to one interpretation of early Chinese
metaphysics, this is a problem that the Chinese of the time did not
share.
Metaphysics in Wa"ing States China
The search for something permanent is one of the deepest of the
instincts leading men to philosophy.
-Bertrand Russell I 7
At least according to some sinologists, Russell might have
found Chinese thinkers to be lacking in a basic philosophical
instinct. By contrast to the Greeks, the Warring States Chinese
showed no apparent interest in identifying a permanent substrate
of reality. Their cosmos was continuous and holistic (in the sense
that the parts had to be understood in relation to the whole). It was
also subject to a continual process of change.I8 Its philosophers
sought only order (rather than Russell's permanence), and the
cosmology merely presented a variety of forms of constancy
amidst change.
Holism and change are only part of what has been called
the "organismic" nature of the early Chinese cosmos.I 9 Many
additional signs of early Chinese organicism have been highlighted
by sinologists. As Donald Munro points out, the application of the
term organismic to early China dates back to the work of Joseph
Needham, for whom organicism meant, among other things,
having developmental patterns like an organism.20 The idea of
organicism is taken up by Frederick Mote, who argues that
organicism is evident in the dearth of early Chinese creation
myths. Like an organism, he argues, the early Chinese cosmos is
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not presented as something created ex nihilo. Instead, he contends,
it is a spontaneous self-generating process.21 Although Tu Wei-
ming disagrees with Mote's claim about the absence of creation
myths, he views early Chinese creation myths as still confonning
to the framework of organicism. Tu identifies this framework as
having three features: continuity, wholeness, and dynamism.22 The
notion that organicism means continuity is elaborated by Kwang-
chih Chang. Chang understands the early Chinese cosmos to be
organismic in the sense that it posits no rupture between humanity
and its natural resources. Chang's interpretation of organicism
suggests (although it does not say so explicitly) that even the
nature/culture divide was not fundamental to the fonnation of
early Chinese thought.23 While all of these understandings of
organicism may be valid, in this Introduction I will focus only on
holism and change. My purpose will be to show that these two
organismic features are also characteristic of the view of sense
discrimination in Warring States philosophical texts.
Determining the nature of Warring States cosmology is
difficult, because it is neither as overt nor as systematized as it
later becomes. When cosmological speculation is fully synthesized
(perhaps as early as the end of the Warring States, but certainly by
the first century RC.E.), the cosmos is seen as being composed of qi
~, which appears in two main aspects: as yinqi ~ ~ and yangqi
~ ~. Qi is sometimes rendered "energy/matter," or "psycho-
physical stuff'-both translations emphasizing that, although it is
material, it resembles energy in being volatile. Qi is also connected
to breath and wind, but it is sometimes rendered as "vapor" to
distinguish it from "air," which is an element (and hence a
candidate for a pennanent substrate of reality). Unlike an element,
qi is context dependent. Yinqi andyangqi, the two main aspects of
qi, indicate dark, cold, and passive, on the one hand, and bright,
warm, and active on the other. But it is significant that something
can be yin with regard to one thing and yang with regard to
another. (In addition to its yin/yang aspects, in post-Warring
States fonnulations, qi also appears as part of the so-called five
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phases-wood, fire, soil, metal, and water-which relate to one
another as conqueror to conquered.) Thus, even in later
systematized cosmologies, qi is not an eternal substrate-its form
changes according to its context.
In the Warring States period, the cosmology based on qi
was not yet fully systematized in this way. In the philosophical
texts, many instances of the character qi refer to human qi (and,
to a lesser extent, animal qi). There are also some rarer references
to atmospheric qi. For instance, there are cases of cloud qi
(Zhuangzi 1/29), heaven and earth's qi (Zhuangzi 6/68), and night
qi (Mencius 6A8). In one case, qi does seem to refer to a
fundamental constituent of things. The Xunzi notes,
71< 1< # ~ mH!l€ ~
Water and fire have qi but do not have life.
(Xunzi 9/69)
However, as of the fourth century RC.E., the term qi did not
connote the single basic component of all things. This is apparent
in the Lunyu 16/7 reference to "blood and qi," which suggests that
blood did not consist of qi. We must be careful then, not to read
later cosmological systems back into the Warring States use of qi.
In Warring States texts, qi is an important feature of the cosmos,
but it does not have the singular position it later gains. In any case,
it is not, in the Warring States or later, a permanent substrate of
reality.
The cosmology of the Warring States period is holistic in
the sense that all parts are interrelated within the functioning of
the whole. Warring States astronomy and calendrics convey a
conception of heaven and earth as macrocosm, to which human
life should be microcosmically synchronized.24 With the help of
astrology, the Warring States period witnessed the creation of a
calendric system that formed a blueprint for the king's behavior by
mimicking the regularity of the stars. The Yi Jing (Book of
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Changes) presents similar clues as to the implicit holism in
Warring States cosmology. In the Yi, one also finds a strong
tendency to relate human affairs to natural affairs. Moreover, its
hexagrams and line statements indicate inter-dependent relations
between important pairs in the cosmos, such as heaven and earth
and male and female.25 Archaeological evidence also points to
holistic tendencies in early Chinese cosmology. Mortuary customs
from as early as the Shang Dynasty (approximately 1570-1050
B.C.E.) indicate a belief that material goods, such as servants and
chariots, would continue to confino one's status in the afterlife.26
In a sense, there is nothing "outside of the world," or "other
worldly" in this type of afterlife. Oracle bone inscriptions suggest a
belief that recently dead ancestors linger close enough to their
descendants to be propitiated by sacrificial offerings. With the
passage of time, the ancestors show less involvement with the
living and presumably become increasingly tenuous, before
dissipating entirely. In this holistic picture, heaven and earth, and
everything in between, are part of a self-contained continuous
creation in which there is no external creative agent and no drastic
rupture between creator and created.
Because there is nothing outside the world, Warring States
Chinese cosmology cannot help but reconcile itself to changes. As
the title of the Yi Jing indicates, change is fundamental to the
early Chinese cosmos. The Yi is a book about change, and within it,
even the associations attached to specific images alter according to
their context.27 The creation of astronomical and calendrical
systems also depended upon change, that is, they depended upon
the ordere~ celestial regularities associated with the seasons, which
set the standards for proper human conduct. Moreover, the
transition undergone by deceased ancestors-becoming increasingly
detached from social affairs-also represents an afterlife that is
not static or atemporaJ. Rather, the dead ancestor continues to be
part of an inevitable dynamic of change.
Like the conception of great cosmic powers, the
conception of ordinary people in the Warring States is also
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holistic. As is frequently noted, the same character (xin JL\
heartmind) denotes the source of both emoting and thinking. Thus
the human person is not broken down into separate reasoning and
emoting capacities. The person is also not divided into one
immutable soul and an impermanent body. Instead, there are many
souls, which separate and disperse after death.28
Holism is also apparent in the emphasis on the value of
society. From periods prior to and including the Warring States,
artistic representations of humans favor depictions of anonymous
people working collectively, rather than individual well-known
heroes.29 These collective social relations are also indicated by the
Neolithic and Shang practices of burying accompaniers-in-death.3o
Although the p~ctice may have died out by the Warring States, its
earlier existence represents a reminder that the bonds uniting
persons go beyond even the boundaries of death.
In addition to being holistic, the understanding of the
human person also reflects the centrality of change. One of the
medical conceptions in the Warring States period identifies health
with change.31 In this conception, the free movement of blood and
qi in the body's "vessels" guarantees the body's health. Hence,
stagnation is the cause of illness. Insofar as freedom of movement
was necessary for sustaining the body, a sick person was treated by
encouraging a holistic internal motion. Thus, like the cosmos, the
ancestors, and the ruler, the composition of the human person was
holistic and rooted in change.
In sum, early Chinese cosmology appears to be organismic
in its emphasis on holism and change. Perhaps as a result of these
organismic features, early Chinese cosmology did not create a
metaphysics of presence. This is not to say that early Chinese
cosmology is alone in managing this feat, or that early Chinese
thought did not create its own set of baneful philosophical
problems. However, at least in light of this contrast, early Chinese
cosmology seems to have some distinctive value.
Introduction
Organismic Cosmology and Sense Discrimination
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In order to briefly describe the connection between organismic
cosmology and the view of sense discrimination I find in these
texts, I will, once again, focus on holism and change.
Holism
The presentation of sense discrimination in these texts supports a
holistic conception of the human person:
(1) There is no sign of the view that sense discrimination must be
transcended in favor of a super-sensible form of knowing.
(2) Sense discrimination itself is characterized by holism, insofar as
sensing is integrated into the world. The senses' discriminations are
a system constituted by contrasts. The senses discriminate among
these contrasts, rather than making contact with brute
uninterpreted sense data. Hence, there is nothing in the process of
sense discrimination that is pure and untouched by human sig-
nification. In other words, there is nothing to mediate and alienate
the senses from the world. (For instance, in discriminating between
sounds, there are no bare, uninterpreted sound data. Before the ears
even hear-which is to say, while they are listening-they
establish a continuous interpretive contact. The effort of listening
itself channels what is being listened to, framing it within a range
of human significance.)
(3) The heartmind is integrated with the other senses. It behaves
like the senses and seems to be considered a sense function. It is
not distinguished from the other senses in its ability to know its
discriminations. Moreover, although it does have a special
knowledge capacity (for verifying the operations of seeing and
hearing), it does not do so from a position of detachment from the
body.
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(4) In contrast to the role of vision in Platonic and Cartesian
models of knowing, vision is not privileged in this scheme.
(Hearing is not privileged either. )32 The ears and eyes, while
performing a more important function than the other senses,
maintain a parallel relation with one another. This is not a pseudo-
equivalence, veiling a superior term's mastery over an inferior
term. Each of the two senses is valued for its strong points and
criticized for its weak points. Trust and verification of knowledge
requires the participation of both.
Change
No element of sense discrimination escapes change or has contact
with a realm ou~ide of change:
(1) The heartmind's pondering is likened to moving eyes in search
of a needle. This suggests that the heartmind moves. Ideally, it
may be "unmoved"-in the sense of not being led astray by the
attractions and repulsions that tug at it. But this sense of being
unmoved merely clears the way for the heartmind to respond like a
mirror to everything it encounters. (The Warring States metaphor
of the mirror indicates responsiveness, rather than re-presentation
and detachment.y 3
(2) Change also plays a significant role in the aural/visual parallels
in the text. Change, in the form of action, is the correlate of
seeing, just as speech is the correlate of hearing.34 A form of
change is therefore one-half of the equation that constitutes the
foundation for trusting people and for verifying knowledge.
(3) The analysis of sense discrimination reveals that there is an
element of change implicit in the use of an important character in
Warring States philosophical texts. Standard translations of shi •
(as "reality," "substance," or "stuff') do not do justice to the
notion of change inherent in the use of the character. Drawing
upon the implications of the parallelism between the ears and eyes,
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this work calls into question the translations of shi in Warring
States texts. Traditional understandings of the term shi seem to
present it as comparable to analytic philosophy's "medium-sized
dry goods"-the hard stuff that forms the basis of reference.35 On
the contrary, I argue that the way shi functions is best understood
as "fruit," due to its organic connotations of growth and
development. Although fruit does suggest solidity, my argument is
that uses of shi have more to do with something brought to
completion or fruition, rather than solidity or substance. (After all,
in a cosmos where heaven is simply tenuous, while the earth is
solid, there is no pressing reason why substance should connote
reality.) Translating shi as reality, as if that consisted of dry hard
goods, leads to a misconception of the notion of reality in Warring
States philosophical texts.
This view of sense discrimination fills a gap in our
understanding of Warring States thought. Moreover, these
elements of holism and change in the view of sense discrimination
support the claim that early Chinese cosmology is organismic.
They seem to represent one coherent way of understanding the
senses from the context of a cosmology in which there is no
eternal substrate of reality.
Chapter 1: An Overview of Sense Discrimination
This chapter describes the overarching view of sense
discrimination in the philosophical texts of the Warring States
period. I The individual texts vary in some of their opinions about
sense discrimination, but certain shared views about the senses
form the backdrop for these variations.2 In brief, the chapter aims
to accomplish two main things: (l) identify the senses and (2) de-
scribe their relation to knowledge. The chapter begins by
introducing the senses through two focal points of their
appearance in these texts: the metaphor of the senses as
administrative.officials and an image of sense processes carried
through the wind. These two focal points highlight some of the
complexities and ambiguity of sense discrimination in these texts.
They also lay the groundwork for a discussion of the role that the
senses play in the acquisition of knowledge, which forms the
second half of the chapter.
Identity of the Senses
The Warring States philosophical texts suggest that there are five
senses.3 This number happens to conform to a general tendency to
fit things into five-fold schemes.4 The "fives" include five colors,
five tastes, and so on.5 The Xunzi labels the senses as the "five
officials" (wu guan 1i '8), and the texts often list five senses.6
Moreover, many of the lists of senses look quite a bit like the
familiar five-senses model. For instance, Xunzi 4/44-45 and Xunzi
19/3-5 both list the senses as mouth, nose, eyes, ears, and body;
and Xunzi 17/11 and 18/116 list the senses as eyes, ears, nose,
mouth, and form. Mencius 7B24 is similar-it lists mouth, eyes,
ears, nose, and limbs. In addition to these lists of five senses, there
are also lists of four that sometimes look like the five-senses
model with one sense omitted. For example, three cases mention
mouth, body, eyes, and ears (not necessarily in that order)-
16
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Mencius lA7, Xunzi 22/80-81, and Mozi 32/3-6. With one
element replaced, we find eyes, ears, mouth, and form in Xunzi
21/14; body, nose, eyes, and ears in Xunzi 19/6-8; and ears, eyes,
nose, and mouth in Xunzi 12/6l.7 In sum, although these lists of
sense functions vary and omit items, they are said to number five,
and they often include eyes, ears, mouth, nose, and body.
Yet this notion of five senses may be deceptive. Many of
the things that appear to be lists of the senses vary remarkably in
their number and content.8 For example, Mozi 47/20 seems to list
physical organs associated with sensing-mouth, nose, and ears
-but fails to mention the eyes and instead includes hands and
feet.9 As in this Mozi 47/20 example, the fifth sense is not always
the only point of variation. In the Xunzi's lists of the senses,
sometimes one or another sense is missing, while the heartmind
and body (or form) are both included as the fourth and fifth senses
respectively.lo Even more surprisingly, in the Xunzi, a possible list
of the senses that begins "body, nose, eye, ear," continues with
"trust, awe, and peace."11 Another list mentions eye, ear, mouth,
body, form, happiness, and name.12 Yet another lists eye, ear,
mouth, form, and name.13 The challenge posed by these examples
might be evaded by saying that they do not count as lists of the
senses. But we might equally well permit these examples to raise
doubts about whether any of the lists refer to the senses as we
understand them. At the very least, these lists draw attention to
the question of what constitutes a sense. Moreover, these lists
should be reminders that while there is a compelling reason for the
texts to identify the senses as numbering five, there is no firm
consensus about the constituents of the senses.
Bureaucracy ofthe Senses
The metaphor of the senses as officials, and the image linking the
senses to the wind ([eng }j,), constitute two of the most striking
treatments of sense discrimination in these texts. On the one hand,
the metaphor of the senses as officials portrays them as orderly
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and controlled. Each sense occupies its own office, allowing its
desires to be restrained by a superior for the benefit of the
"government" of the whole. On the other hand, the role of the
wind in sense operations emphasizes a much less controlled
environment. The wind turns the senses into a nexus for
transformations, both good and bad. With the wind sweeping
through them, the senses expose the subject to a potential for
radical change. The conflict between these two treatments of the
senses does not appear to be resolved in these texts. Perhaps the
tensions between these two presentations of the senses are the
inevitable result of culling information about the senses from
indirect textual references. Or perhaps they are the result of the
texts' uncertainty about how the senses function. In either case, an
attempt to resolve these tensions might err by forcing coherence
on material that is not thoroughly coherent. Hence, I include both
descriptions for the sake of accuracy and as a reminder of the
confusion in the treatment of the subject of sense operations in
these texts.
The primary title for the senses in Warring States
philosophical texts identifies them as officials. In addition to the
five officials, the Xunzi also refers to the senses as the "heavenly
officials" (Iian guan *- '8').14 The bureaucratic title should not be
surprising, because the matter of proper governing is a pressing
concern in the Warring States period, evident in all of these
texts. 15
In their behavior as official, each sense is an office with its
own area of concern. Many lists articulate the specific role of each
function, insisting that they are not identical. For instance, the
Xunzi emphasizes the specialization of each sense structure:
:El= § .. 0 ~ /f' "ilJ PJ ;f§ ffl' g-
Ear, eye, nose, and mouth cannot trade offices.
(Xunzi 12/61)
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The Xunzi and the Mencius also emphasize that the officials are
ruled by the heartmind.16 The Xunzi says,
1+ § .. [] ff3 ff~ ~ ff ~
ffiPF :f§ ff~ 1h~ ~ z m7( '§'
iL' g cp ~ tJ m1i '§'
~~Zm7(;g
Ear, eye, nose, mouth, and form, each has its own contacts
[lit. "receptions" or "meetings") and does not do things for
the others. Now, these are called the heavenly officials.
The heartmind dwells in the central cavity and governs the
five officials. Now, this is called the heavenly ruler.
(Xunzi 1711 1-12)
Similarly, Mencius 6A5, which also attributes 'offices' to the
senses, indicates that the heartmind's job is superior. Hence, just as
officials function like senses, the senses behave like officials under
the control of a ruler.
The general opinion--expressed rather clearly in the
Xunzi, the Mencius, and the Mozi-is that, because of their
wayward desires, the senses make better officials than rulers. The
senses instigate their own desires. Rather than attributing the
desires to a person, or to the heartmind (the ruler of the senses),
the Xunzi speaks as if the ears themselves desire sound and the eyes
themselves desire appearances.! 7
:B~ § tiffg1+tif§ [] ~1~
iL' tif flJ ~ e rI J:!I! tif 'M'tr ~
~11'f~m- AZ'ti'ftE~1h
The eyes' love of color,18 the ears' love of sounds, the
mouth's love of flavors, the heartmind's love of profit, the
bones, flesh and skin-lines' love of pleasure and ease: these
are all born of a person's qing [condition? disposition?) and
nature.
Xunzi 23/25-26
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The senses also share the same respective desires, as the Mencius,
and the Mozi point OUt.19 The Xunzi notes that we are born with
these desires and speaks of them as the human qing 1W (condition?
disposition?), while the Mencius speaks of them as human xing JI1
(nature/what one is born with).20 Thus, sensory desires appear to be
something very fundamental in human beings that interfere with
ordering the person.
These shared sense desires pose dangers to the order of the
person by disturbing thinking and tending toward excess. Sense
desires contact things, and when their desires make contact,
thinking is lost. The Xunzi says,
If § ~.~ ~ ~lJ J& ~ ~ !I& !Irt ~ ~ ~ ~lJ ~ :Jt ~
[re: a man sitting in a cave, trying to concentrate] If the
desires of the ears and eyes contact [what they desire],
then his thoughts will be defeated, and if he hears the
buzzing of mosquitoes or flies, his concentration will be
damaged.
(Xunzi 21/62)
The Mencius says something similar, noting that the heartmind
gets what it seeks, but the senses are pulled by things:
If§~'§"/F~ffijlim-~
~~¥JJ WJ 51 ~ ffij B ~
IL\ ~ 'Er ~lJ ,W JW ~lJ m. ~ l' ,W ~lJ l' m. -tl!.
Thinking is not the office of the eyes and ears, and they
are clouded by things. Things interact with things and pull
them astray. That is all. The office of the heartmind is
thinking. It thinks and thus it obtains. If it does not think,
then it does not obtain.
(Mencius 6A15)
In addition to distracting one's thinking, sense desires are also
inherently inclined toward excess. As the Xunzi says,
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§ ~~fg~~~'t
tJ ~ ~ '* .. ~ ~ ~ IL' ~ ~ ~
The eyes desire the greatest extreme of colors, the ears
desire the greatest extreme of sounds, the mouth desires
the greatest extreme of tastes, the nose desires the greatest
extreme of smells, the heartmind desires the greatest
extreme of comfort.
(Xunzi 11/46-47)
This tendency toward excess is implicit in the Mozi's
condemnation of wicked kings for not checking the "flow" of their
ears and eyes.21 (This notion of flowing seems to derive from their
inability to remain within bounds.)
-=--.ftL~:E1'~Jt~ § L~
l' t~ Jt IL' 7tS; L $
The wicked kings of the Three Dynasties did not control
the flowing of their ears and eyes and did not restrain the
partialities of their heartmind's aims.22
(Mozi 36/18)
The distraction and excesses of the sense desires seem barely
controllable. In addition to sharing similar desires, the senses share
a similar inability to control them.
In sum, the senses are born instigating desires. These
desires distract the heartmind from its ability to think and
accomplish its aims. They are also dangerously excessive and lead
naturally toward inauspicious and immoral extremes. Because their
desires are distracting and excessive, the senses must be restrained.
This seems to account for why the senses may function only as
officials under the control of a ruler, without ever being rulers
themselves. With characteristic iconoclasm, the Zhuangzi
disagrees. It implies that the vassals and concubines of the body
might take turns being ruler.23 But even the Zhuangzts objection
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supports the point-if the purpose is order and control, the senses
should be officials (guan) rather than rulers (jun).
Sensing the Wind
The sensory aspects of the wind ([eng 100.) provide a contrasting
illustration of how the senses function.24 Instead of being clearly
organized officials with separate offices, sensing the wind hints at
subtle, blended forms of sensing. For example, while being carried
on the wind, music seems to spontaneously transform through the
senses, at the infinitesimal level of qi *" (vapor) and de ~
(charisma/virtue).25 In addition to this audible sensing, harmonious
winds/airs seem to have simultaneous effects on olfactory and
gustatory sensing. From this perspective, sense discrimination
appears to be a chaotic and unmanageable process.
Oracle inscriptions from the Shang Dynasty (eighteenth
through twelfth century Re.E.) suggest that winds were an object of
pressing concern for the ancient Chinese. The evidence indicates
that divination rituals were performed to determine all kinds of
questions about winds.26 The importance of wind continued to
figure in Warring States philosophical texts. The Zhuangzi depicts
the movements of the cosmos as a great blowing wind, impelling
force in cavities like ears, nostrils, and eye sockets (Zhuangzi 2/4-
9). The sensory aspects of wind apparent in the Warring States
texts may explain some of this concern about winds. Sensing the
wind produces automatic transformation. It seems to involve a
powerful mix of elements that immediately alter whomever hears
or "ingests" it.
Music is the most outstanding thing sensed through contact
with the wind. It changes people by affecting their winds/airs. (Like
the word "air" in English, the termfeng 00. also functions to mean
the style that is characteristic of a place or a group of people.)
The Xunzi extols the powers of music to improve such winds:
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~~~Azf1f~-tH
jffi riJ P..-t ~ ~ IL' ;!'t ~ A ~ ;!'t f$ fj. ~ %
Music is the joy of the sagesP It can improve people's
heartminds. It stimulates people deeply. It influences their
wind [{eng] and changes their customs.
(Xunzi 20/22-23)
The metaphor of people's wind being transformed by music
presumes that sound is sensed via its carrier: the wind. It seems that
because the style of a group is its wind, the style can be molded by
the sounds of music, which are carried on the wind.
At a more intricate level, the power of music can be
explained as the transmission of infinitesimal things like qi and de.
Both wind and music are spoken of in terms of qi. This is
noteworthy, because references to the qi of specific things are
quite rare in these texts.28 From the reference to the piping of qi
in the Zhuangzi and the two references to music's qi in the Xunzi,
we can infer that qi is more closely associated with wind and music
than it is with most things. According to the Zhuangzi, wind is the
qi that the earth exhales while piping its music.29 If wind is the
piped qi of. earth, then to an extent, qi, wind, and music are
interchangeable. Moreover, the Xunzi refers to music as qi, when






a ;g T m ;!'t rJT *gt -tH
'Yhen chaotic sounds stimulate a person, the response is an
oppositional qi. When an oppositional qi forms a shape,
thereupon disorder is born. When upright sounds stimulate
a person, the response is a compliant qi. When a
compliant qi forms a shape, thereupon order is born. The
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singer and the harmonizer have [mutual?] responses. Good
and bad take shape correspondingly. Therefore, noble
people are careful about their goings and comings.
(Xunzi 20/26-28)
The pattern of stimulation and response, along with the reference
to singer and harmonizer implies that music achieves its effect-
whether positive or negative-through the power of resonating
qi.30 In another reference to the qi of music, the Xunzi warns that
this stimulating resonance must be restrained. (As the passage
begins, the Xunzi notes that chaos will ensue if people are not free
to use the expression of music/joy as their guide.)
Jt x ~ ~ fJiL * i'& if1l1 ft 1l Z ~ ):) m: z
{@ ;1t ~ JE ):) ~ ffij :F w:
{@ ;1t )( JE ):) mffij :F ~
{@ ~ Ht! 1r~ ~ • ~ 111 *JE ):) ~ 1fIJJ A z ~ Ie.\
{@~$tfZ~1I\€ EI3 t-!jo~~
The kings of old hated such chaos. Therefore, they
regulated the sounds of the Odes and Hymns in order to
guide [dao] them [the people]. They caused the sounds to
be sufficient for joy, but not flowing. They caused the
forms to be sufficient to discriminate, but not restrictive.
They caused the intricacy or the directness, the abundance
or the scarcity, the modesty or the corporeity of the
rhythm and performance to be sufficient to stimulate and
move people's good heartminds. They thereby made sure
corrupt and impure qi could not make contact therein.
(Xunzi 20/3--4)
The passage's reference to not letting the qi of music gain
"contact" (jie ~) suggests that the resonating qi described here is
contacting the senses.31 Thus, this contact with musical qi
probably indicates contact through the senses.32 This clarifies what
occurs when a people's style (wind) is influenced by music (as in
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Xunzi 20/22). Music transfonns the wind via the intake of qi
through the senses. The resonance of the musical qi automatically
alters the person who senses it, causing an expulsion of similar qi.
In other words, qi is the music that enters the senses as well as the
wind that the music causes to emerge from them.
In addition to qi, the potency of music also works by
means of de-something that is accessible to the senses, but as
nebulous as qi.33 The Mencius notes that de can be heard through
music.
r~B~~m@~~~oo~~@~~~
Zigong said, "By viewing his ceremonies we know his
administration. By hearing his music, we know his de."
(Mencius 2A2)
De is as light as a hair (Xunzi 16/75), but it is often referred to as
"ample" or "thick." This is because de can accumulate.34 The
accumulation of de fills out into visual, and especially aural,
fonns.35 The Mozi and the Xunzi speak repeatedly of the effects of
IIde and tone"--emphasizing the transmission of de through sound.
In the course of explaining that the ancient kings increased their
efficiency by seeking help from others, the Mozi suggests that the
lips that emit speech are the medium by which de is spread:
~F fit! -ttt ::K at l'i~ ~ A ~:Et 13 WJ a m~
~A~umWJa§~
~ A ~ JL\ WJ a ,~ Jfi
~A~JH[na:WJaJ!JJfF
WJ ~mft ;fj XfJ. J!U ~ ffi 00 j[ ;fj m*
WJ ~ § ~ 11 XfJ. J!IJ ~ ~ if ~ ffi~ WI ;fj iW *
WJ ~ m, Jfi 11 XfJ. J!U ~ ~ ~ J!t ~ f~ *
WJ ~ j}ljJ fF 11 XfJ. RP Jt ~ $ W pX,*
[The ancient kings said] "It [their own effectiveness] was
not the spirits,36 but only the ability to use others' ears and
eyes to help their own hearing and sight to use others' lips
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to help their own speech and talk, to use others' heart-
minds to help their own thought, to use others' limbs to
help their movements and acts." When those who help
one's listening and looking are many, then one can hear
and see far. When those who help one's speech and talk are
many, then the soothing and compelling aspects of one's
de and tone are extensive.3 7 When those who help one's
thinking and pondering are many, then one's talk, plans
and operations can be attained quickly. When those who
help one's movements and acts are many, then one's
undertakings can be quickly accomplished.
(Mozi 12/65-67, emphasis added)
This claim that de is enhanced by the lips of others suggests that
de functions orlallyla:urally. Moreover, the association of de with
tone reinforces the claim in Mencius 2A2 that music provides
evidence of de. A less literal interpretation might take all this to
refer to spoken descriptions of virtue. But interpreting de at that
level of abstraction does not explain why de is so often spoken of,
rather than seen.38 Nor does it explain the connection of de to
music.
The power of music may also be linked to the harmony
that produces de. De and tone are "soothing and compelling" (Mozi
12/66 above); they "fill and soothe the hundred clans" (:Jt ~ 1f
JEPJ fJi ~ s M:, Xunzi 12/102).39 This power to soothe may
we]] derive from the harmony that seems to create de. The
Zhuangzi explains de through the concept of cultivating harmony
to the point of completion:
~ 1fAX: fO z {rtf if2
De is the cultivation of completed harmony.
(Zhuangzi 5/47)
It seems justifiable to take this harmony as referring to music,
because the Zhuangzi also speaks of the harmony of de via a
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metaphor suggestive of wind (which, as we have just seen, is the
carrier of music). The metaphor implies that the harmony that
creates de is like a wind upon which people can roam:
'Hi ii:.' f ~ Z ~
They let the heartmind roam upon the harmony of de.
(Zhuangzi 5/8)
This roaming is suggestive of the wind, because the Zhuangzi's
sages tend to roam on wind and/or qi. For instance, the Zhuangzi
chastises the character Liezi, whose riding on wind seems inferior
to riding on qi (or roaming in the boundless):40
JU T mJ mit ffii ff
~B~ftr~~m~~iliE~*~~ZKffiimJ
;\ *" Z mPJ J!fi ~ iJ ~ 1B{ J3. ~ f 1{f~
Liezi moved with the wind as his chariot.. ..Although this
avoids walking, it still depends on something. But ascending
straight through heaven and earth, taking the changes of
the six qi as one's chariot, and roaming that which has no
boundaries-how is that depending on anything?
(Zhuangzi 1/19-21)
This airborne "roaming" links roaming on the harmony of de to
roaming on wind or qi. As the passages discussed above indicate,
music is transported on wind or qi. Because it travels on wind or qi,
the harmony of de may well be musical, and it may derive its
capacity to soothe from its musical tones. If so, it is because wind
carries resonant (musical) qi and the soothing (musical) harmonies
that create de. By this means, the wind enters the ears and trans-
forms the person who hears it.
But the powers of wind are not limited to hearing music. At
times, wind transforms through being ingested in other ways, and at
times its effects overlap with more than one sense. The metaphor
in Zhuangzi 2/4 (see Chapter 1, footnote 29) of exhaling the qi of
28 On the Epistemology of the Senses
earth is one example wherein wind and qi are exhaled. They can
also be inhaled and, in a surprising number of circumstances, affect
one's desire for food. For instance, the Zhuangzi mentions an
inverse relation between depth of breathing and relish of taste.
Regarding the true people of old, it says,
.it4--;r,:-++.it§~~/ ..... ~ /1' 1=1 ""' ...... J~" "VI' 'PJ".
Their eating is not sweet. Their breathing is deeply deep.
(Zhuangzi 6/6)
Similarly, the Zhuangzi also describes a "spirit person" (shenren 1$
A), who inhales wind instead ofeating:
~MM L tl1 #1$A~~ ...
1'jtli~IQk}j\~1i
In the mountains of far-off Guyi resides ashen-person,
who...does not eat the five grains, but inhales the wind and
drinks the dew.
(Zhuangzi 1/28-29)
By inhaling (odorless?) wind and (tasteless?) dew, the person is
transformed into an airy creature of the mountain heights.
Although the quality of the taste/smell is not mentioned in this
passage, one can only imagine that, as in Zhuangzi 6/6, this
inhaling has replaced ordinary food with a rather bland diet.
A similar phenomenon may be operative in the Lunyu.
Confucius loses his appreciation for food upon being exposed to
impressive music:
T ft 1ft fig iffI-=. Ji l'm~ ~
When the Master was in Qi, he heard the Shao music-for
three months he did not know the taste of meat.
(Lunyu 7/14)
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Of course, the main point is that Confucius was completely
absorbed in the joy provided by the music. However, the
manifestation of his preoccupation is striking. Like the person in
Zhuangzi 1/29 who inhales wind instead of food, Confucius's
ingestion of music seems to counteract his desire for savory food.
This may explain why Confucius does not know (the desire for)
taste-he is already filled by the winds of music.
Like music in the case of the Lunyu, de causes a loss of
taste in the Mencius. Explicating a passage from the Book of
Poetry, it says a person who is full of de is like a person with a full
stomach:
~ -:A ret M P) @ ret M!! P) ~
§~3JZt~{g
mP) ~ Jjj A z Jf ~ z '* lli
~ ~ 1111 ¥ Dl!! 1P: ,!1t mP) ~ Jjj A z )( tit {g
The Book ofPoetry says, "He intoxicates us with his wine.
He satiates us with his de." That is, he satiates them with
humaneness and righteousness, hence they do not desire
the taste that people have for fat meat and fine millet. A
fine reputation and broad praise are bestowed upon their
persons, hence they do not desire people's elegant
embroidered garments.
(Mencius 6A7)
Here too de is as satisfying as food, and it overwhelms the ordinary
desires of taste.
Another passage from the Mencius may also suggest
transformation via inhaling wind, although "hearing reputation" is
the more acceptable translation. Mencius 5B1 speaks of people
being influenced by the wind of a person of good character. It says,
7b. ~ fs ~ z ma :1i
JiJi :1C it 11 :1C lLfL it
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Therefore, of those who hear/sme1l41 the wind of Bo Vi,
the obstinate become pure, the weak become erect in their
intent.
(Mencius 5Bl)
If wind is taken to refer to Bo Vi's reputation, the passage may
describe the sound of Bo Vi's good name being transmitted by the
wind. But the passage does not mention reputation. Thus, because
the wind can be smelled as well as heard, this passage may also be
invoking the transformative power of inhaling wind. Hence, in
addition to the transformative powers of hearing music, the wind
can transform in other ways. Its effects are felt in the senses of
smell and tast~, as well as hearing.
A loose connection seems to bind these elements carried
on the wind--one hears them, exhales or inhales them, and even
sometimes has them substitute for oral ingestion. Wind is the
carrier of music, whose influence seems to derive from the
resonance of qi and the harmonies of de. In whatever form,
however, sensing the wind has powerful transformative effects.
These effects account for some of the perceived power of the
wind. They also suggest a somewhat unruly potential inherent in
the senses, through which the wind operates.
Knowledge and Sense Discrimination
Whether sense discrimination resembles a bureaucracy or a wind-
storm, the senses indisputably play a role in the acquisition of
knowledge. The references to the senses' participation in knowing
are often brief or cryptic. However, I will argue that they yield an
intelligible portrait of the senses' role in knowing.
Briefly, there are two kinds of knowledge associated with
sense discrimination in Warring States philosophical texts: (1)
"Sensory knowledge" refers to knowledge of the senses themselves,
independent of the heartmind. (2) "Verifying knowledge" refers to
knowledge that is constructed by a combination of certain senses
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and the heartmind. In order to clarify the nature of these two
types of sense knowledge, I will compare them with three models
of sense knowledge in Western philosophy: sensation, perception,
and aspect perception. I will argue that sensation and perception
are significantly different from the kinds of knowledge associated
with the senses in these texts, but that aspect perception bears
some resemblance to them.
Comparative Models ofSense Knowledge
Sensation
Sensation is a model of sense knowledge that arises in the context
of a realist versus idealist debate about sense discrimination.
Broadly speaking, in that debate, realists argue that the senses have
some kind of direct contact with external objects in the world. By
contrast, idealists maintain that objects as we know them are
significantly constructed by their contact with the mind. Idealists
argue that realists underestimate the role of the operations of the
mind in the sensory process. Thus, according to idealists, we do not
have direct contact with external objects.
The model of sensation I describe here derives from a
position called representative realism that attempts to bridge the
two poles of realism and idealism. For the representative realist,
the term "sensation" means the direct, private awareness of sense
data. Sense data are content neutral and uninterpreted. For
instance, I might have the sensation of seeing a patch of red.42 If I
have that sensation, I may insist that I see the sense data, regard-
less of whether anyone else sees it or whether there is an actual
external object that corresponds to it. Sensation is supposed to
indicate what the experience is like "to me" (once again, regardless
of what is outside). The knowledge attributed to sensation is
infallible: I cannot be wrong about having a sensation that I see a
red patch.43
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Perception
Perception also plays a role in the representative realist model of
sense knowledge. Unlike sensation, perception is indirect. It
interprets the sense data.44 Thus, it is supposed to indicate
something about the object, as opposed to the red patch that I see.
Because the beliefs involved in perception are interpreted, they are
potentially fallible. Whereas sensation cannot be wrong about
amorphous things like patches of red, perception's interpretation
of such data contains the possibility of error-for instance, when it
identifies a patch of red as, say, a fire engine.
As this brief sketch of representative realism indicates,
sensation and perception refer to two different (often opposed)
modes of undt:rstanding how knowledge may be acquired by the
senses. The knowledge that is possible in sensation involves 'raw
data,' no interpretation, and no error. Knowledge in perception is
indirect, and beliefs based on perception can be wrong because of
the interpretation of raw data.
Aspect Perception
Ludwig Wittgenstein's model of "aspect perception" draws a
distinction between "seeing" and "seeing as."45 The latter refers to
seeing "aspects." For instance, seeing an aspect means seeing a face
as a face and not a flesh color with a certain shape. In looking at a
sketch that sometimes seems like a rabbit and sometimes a duck,
one sees aspects, when one regards it as a rabbit or as a duck. Even
if we quickly switch back and forth from seeing it as a rabbit to
seeing it as a duck, aspect-seeing is characteristically continuous in
a particular sense-it is not a disjointed inference drawn from a
hypothesis. As Wittgenstein explains, upon viewing a duck/rabbit
sketch, we do not say "Oh, if I see this part as an ear and this part
as the top, then it looks like a rabbit." Rather, we say, "Now it's a
duck! Now it's a rabbit!" In other words, seeing aspects is not a
kind of seeing that is followed by thinking and then drawing an
inference about what is seen.46 That is, although it involves
treating things as something, aspect-perception is not the same as
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perception (described above). Unlike perception, it is not mediated
by an act of interpreting raw data. It is embedded in a context (in
which, for instance, knowing rabbits and ducks is taken for
granted). This background gives it a spontaneity not characteristic
of making hypotheses and drawing inferences.
In spite of its immediateness, aspect perception does not
have the infallible certainty of sensation. Unlike sensation, it
regards things meaningfully, in the sense that things are perceived
as something.
Neither perception nor sensation fits the models of sense
discrimination in these Warring States texts. The knowledge
affiliated with the senses is not sensation, because it is not the
private knowledge of sense data. Furthermore, because there is no
notion of sense data, the sensory knowledge also does not fit the
perception model-wherein the mind interprets the data.
The fact that these models are not appropriate is not
surprising, because the idealist/realist debate is not operative in
Warring States philosophy. In these Warring States texts, the
distinction between things "as they seem to us" and things "as they
are in themselves" is not a philosophical problem. Of course, the
texts notice cases where one or more of the senses seems un-
reliable, but they do not proceed to express skepticism about the
senses as a whole.47 They manifest no concern about the senses
systematically distorting "things as they are." Thus, ideas about
private, immediately known sense data do not appear in these
texts. In other words, in keeping with the fact that the texts do
not doubt the reliability of the senses as a whole, they also do not
need a notion like sense data to allay their doubts.
Although the realist/idealist debate is not evident in
Warring States philosophical texts, their epistemological position
is not naive realism. It might be called naive, insofar as it is naive
not to entertain questions about being systematically deluded by
the senses. Yet, by not debating realism versus idealism, the
position does not, by default, become the naive realist confidence
that colors and sounds are somehow in the surfaces of objects. It
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treats things like colors and sounds as things in their own right, not
as things that belong to objects.48 Moreover, the default position
in these texts does not take the stand that colors and sounds
simply belong "out there" in the world. Although the texts do not
assert that consciousness shapes things like colors and sounds, their
default position is not that things exist without any connection to
human context. Rather, the epistemological position seems to take
for granted the influence of background in sense discrimination.
The texts suggest that things are sensed in terms of their
connections to a range of similar types of things. This is evident in
the Xunzi's selection of the character "discriminate" (bian ffl) to
indicate what the senses do.49 Discriminate is also the term the
Xunzi uses to describe what names do. Thus it is not that the senses
are natural and names are conventional-names and the senses are
similar. Just as names depend upon a system of differences (one
name can only function by means of not being another name), so
too any given sense discrimination (such as sweet) gains its identity
by not being something else (such as salty or sour). The identity of
what is sensed depends in part on relations to other sensed things.
Furthermore, the subjects who make sense discriminations are also
part of the constitutive relations among things. Rather than
bracketing the role of the human beings who sense, in their
discussions of sense discrimination the texts emphasize factors like
desire and aversion (that is, often the examples of sensing involve
desirable and undesirable things). The texts also imply that the
very attempt to sense something already entails regarding the
thing in some way. Thus, if there is such a thing as a range of
colors "out there," it would have to be unavailable to even the
most basic form of sensing. Moreover, the texts begin their
analysis of the senses with the human being in the midst of
sensing.50 Although it is not naive realism, this position is realistic
in its confidence that it is possible to have constant standards for
sensory and naming discriminations. In these texts, this position
contrasts with relativistic perspectivism-a position that
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maintains that we cannot have constant standards for sensory and
naming discriminations, because there is no constant perspective.51
In sum, the poles of idealism versus realism do not seem
important in Warring States philosophical texts. Whether things,
such as colors, are out there or in the sensing subject is not in
question. But that does not mean that, by default, the texts imply
that colors are merely out there. Instead, a color must be
discriminated in terms of a background of other colors and the
preferences associated with that form of discrimination.
Sensory Knowledge in Wa"ing States Philosophical Texts
My contention is that there is sensory knowledge in these texts
that is independent of the heartmind. This knowledge is mentioned
in the Zhengming (Rectification of Names) chapter of the Xunzi,
in a lengthy passage that describes the operations of the senses. It
also appears in a number of other passages.
Before presenting the evidence for sensory knowledge, it is
necessary to briefly sketch the Zhengming's discussion of sense
discrimination. The Zhengming introduces the function of the
senses in the course of its description of the "causes for sameness
and difference." The context of the discussion of the senses is an
explanation of how a qualified ruler would go about rectifying
names for the purpose of establishing order. A knowledgeable ruler
would clarify important distinctions-like those between nobility
and baseness and the very difference between sameness and
difference itself. The Zhengming inquires about what constitutes
the causes for sameness and difference and then answers its own
question. The answer seems to come in three stages: (I) a
description of sameness, (2) a description of difference, and (3) a
description of knowledge.
The reference to the senses having knowledge occurs in the
third section, along with a more detailed description of something
called "verifying knowledge" (in which the heartmind works with
certain senses). The Zhengming notes a series of conditions
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required for verifying knowledge. It seems to say that if there is
recording without knowing, or verifying without speaking, then the
person will not be credited with knowing:52
?&ffij~m&:'~tti7('B'M$~~
?&fit11Jii!.
Ii 'B $ z ffij l' ffl Ie., fJ& z ffij 1if€ m
~u A ~ l' ?& tiW Z l' ffl
However, verifying must await the heavenly officials'
meeting and recording their kinds in order to be possible. If
the five officials record them without knowing, or if the
heartmind verifies without speaking,53 then people will not
fail to pronounce it "not knowing."
(Xunzi' 22/19-21 )
I take it that the agent with the potential to know in the third line
refers to the sense officials themselves, rather than the heartmind.
This is not the only passage in the Xunzi that seems to
attribute knowledge to the senses themselves. In another passage,
the Xunzi also considers cases in which the senses do not know in a
way that implies that ordinarily they do know. The passage
describes cases wherein sensory knowledge is in jeopardy-when
principle is treated lightly, when external things are valued, when
behavior departs from principle, and when the body is threatened.
When the heartmind is distracted in these ways, the Xunzi says,
Dm~~ffij1'm~~
:Ej: IWHii rot ffij l' m:!'t !It
§ tJU.illll'@ ffij l' m:!'t M
~ 1~!PP: Ii ffij m l'm~ ~
The mouth may be holding fine meats, but it does not
know their flavor. The ears may listen to bens and drums,
but they do not know their sound. The eyes may see
embroidered, ornamented garments, but they do not know
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their fonn. Though it has cold and wannth, peace and a
fine bamboo mat, the body does not know their ease.
(Xunzi 22/80-81; Knoblock trans. modified 3:138)
A passage from the Mozi confinns that the senses can be spoken of
as knowing. The Mozi says (of music, ornament, delicious food,
and nice places to live),
... ~m~ Y: 0 m~ 1=t§ m~ ~ J.} m~ ~-Ift
...the body knows their comfort, the mouth knows their
sweetness, the eyes know their beauty, and the ears know
their music.
(Mozi 32/5-6)
Even if this type of knowing might translate more readily as
"awareness," the fact is, the texts developed no distinct tenn for
awareness.54 Hence, the same tenn for knowing is used both for the
senses and for the knowing attributed to the heartmind. To that
extent, it is fair to say that the senses do know.
If the senses know, then the Zhengmings long description
of sense operations should yield some clues about the nature of
their knowledge. The Zhengmings description begins with the
"cause for sameness":
J'L lI'tJ !Jffi lI'tJ '~ tf~ ::F:. 15 ;L ~ ~ -1ft lI'tJ
il& J:t 11 ;L ~ {P) ffiJ mi
~mP) ~ ~ t.0 ~ P) ffi Wl i!1
For anything of the same lei [kind] and the same qing
[condition? disposition?], the heavenly officials'
"intentional thing"55 is the same. Thus, by lining up their
[the senses'] areas of doubts and similarities, and making
them universal,56 they [the knowledgeable rulers alluded to
earlier?] make public [common?] the respective limits of
"fixed names."57
(Xunzi 22/16)
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This brief comment on the "cause of sameness" culminates with an
assertion that sameness builds from public agreement about habits
of naming.58
It is easy to see how this description of the cause for
sameness leads to misinterpretations of the Xunzts view of sense
discrimination. In the first line, the term qing 'If.!f has been
translated as "essential characteristics."59 However, in this context,
the term qing mis probably no more philosophically weighty than
the term lei ~ (kind). Hence, "things of the same kind and
condition/disposition" together suggest "generally similar things."
This section on the causes for sameness seems to claim that the
senses move in similar directions toward similar things, that is, the
passage asserts that, regarding things that are generally similar, the
heavenly officials will have similar yiwu ~ ~. The Chinese
character yi ~ is frequently translated as "idea," which in this
context, might give the unfortunate impression of something like
representative mental ideas.60 An immediate reason to reject such
an interpretation of the passage is that the yiwu belongs to the
sense officials, not the heartmind. Furthermore, translating yi ~
as "representation" or "idea" is misleading, because of the visual
connotations of these terms in much of the Western philosophical
tradition.61 Emphasis on the visual is belied by the aural element in
the constitution of this character-"tone" yin if, over the
"heartmind" xin iL\. Finally, such an interpretation is also unlikely
because yi is not internal.
Yi ~ is better translated as "intent"-in the sense of
something external and manifest in movement. This is apparent
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The intent [yi ~] of the dance joins with the way of
heaven....How can one know the intent of the dance?-
The eyes do not themselves see, the ears do not
themselves hear,62 and yet the order of the bowing, raising
the head, crouching and stretching out, advancing and
retreating, slowing down and speeding up is such that none
of it is not modest and controlled.
(Xunzi 20/37-39)
Thus, yi is not an internal mental picture at all. As in the orderly
movement of the dance, yi is a manifest and measurable tending or
movement. On these grounds, it seems that the senses' yiwu
(intentional thing) refers to the direction of the senses' movement
or inclination in relation to things. Thus, the description of the
cause for sameness describes a process whereby the senses share a
tendency with regard to similar things-a tendency to move in
similar directions toward similar things.63
This notion that the senses have an intention or a
direction helps explain sensory error and, by extension, sensory
knowledge. These texts mention two things that cause the senses
to fail to know. Xunzi 22/80-81 (see above) describes how the
heartmind's preoccupations can distract the senses from knowing
what is right in front of them. The implications of this are often
noticed, and the passage is taken as saying that the senses'
knowledge is like perception-the mind is necessary for the senses
to know. However, the presence of other obstructers of sensory
knowing-like darkness, distance, and pressure from the hands-
suggests a different conclusion.64 That is, sensory error can be
caused by any obstruction in the direction toward which it is
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The hungry sweeten [or "find sweetness in"] eating. The
thirsty sweeten drinking. This is not obtaining the
correctness of eating and drinking. [It is because] hunger
and thirst obstruct them.
(Mencius 7A27)
Hence, sensory knowledge depends, not on the heartmind's
attention per se, but on freedom from having its
directions/intentions obstructed (whether by the heartmind or the
hands, or anything else).
Xunzi 21/70 attributes sensory error to the influence of
various things on other things. It notes that darkness will make a
person confuse.a stone for a tiger and that drunkenness will change
a person's ability to judge spatial distance. It also addresses the
senses specifically:
JIR § rm m:ti m- tJ ~ ~
~£I:rm~:ti
~ ~ ~ rm t) ~ lIij Il(;gj
A person who presses the eye and looks, looks at one,65
deeming it as two. A person who covers the ear and listens,
listens to m o-m 0 but deems it as hong-hong. 66
(Xunzi 21/70)
In this explicit reference to sensory error, interference in the form
of pressure from the hands diverts the senses from knowing.
Nothing in the Xunzi 21/70 passage implies that the senses'
operations are inherently dubious. The passage does indicate a
disparity between how things ordinarily look and how they can
sometimes look; however, this disparity is not the difference
between "things as they are" and "things as they seem to our
senses." The cause of the error is a diversion in the direction of the
normal effort to look and listen. The context of the rest of the
passage-where darkness, distance, and alcohol affect things-also
shows a disparity between things as they seem to the ordinary
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attention of the senses and things as they seem when sensory
attention is misdirected. However, the passage presents the
misdirected state as a rare occurrence, rather than as the normal
state of affairs. It assumes that ordinarily, when we are not
pressing on our eyes, we need raise no doubts about how we look at
'one.' Moreover, the passage blames the cause for doubt on unstable
standards--or the undue influence of other things. The senses are
not unreliable. The fault lies in the influence of things like an
unstable heartmind, darkness, or blindness. The passage ends with
the assertion that we should be careful about what we take as our
standards. In terms of the senses, this frame implies that, like the
heartmind (when it is stable), the senses are acceptable standards,
provided other things do not interfere with them.
In Xunzi 21170, sensory errors occur within the very act of
listening and looking. These are not errors in hearing and seeing.6 7
Although it does not translate well into English, the passage
repeats the characters for "look" and "listen," rather than
switching to "see" and "hear" in the second half of each line. It
says that a person who puts pressure on hislher eye "looks at one,
deeming it as two," instead of saying slhe "looks at one, but sees
two." To understand the significance of this, we must investigate
how listening and looking are distinguished from hearing and seeing
in these texts.
In part, hearing and seeing refer to the completion of the
effort represented by listening and 100king.68 Looking implies
making an effort to pay attention, as in the following examples:
H if 1CjJ fJUiTI ::f J! EI
Blind persons raise their heads and look, but do not see
stars.
(Xunzi 21172-73)
The same is true of listening, which also indicates an exertion of
effort:
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Each is careful about what he hears, and does not strive to
listen to what he does not hear. Each is careful about what
he sees and does not strive to look at what he does not see.
(Xunzi 11/111-112, emphasis added)
The notion that seeing and hearing indicate completion of this
effort is evident in a variety of places. Just as "completion" is the
terminus of "doing," the Xunzi says, ordinarily, seeing is the
terminus of looking and hearing is the terminus of listening. The
Xunzi condemns those who strain at looking and listening beyond
their natural outcome:
~ ffi ~m~::f"iiJ 5!
~~::f"iiJ1*J
1.)~::f"iiJRX
This is what is called looking for what cannot be seen,
listening for what cannot be heard, and doing what cannot
be completed.
(Xunzi 12/116-117, emphasis added)
By the same token, the Xunzi's praise for exceptional people who
can see without bothering to look also implies that seeing follows
from the effort of looking:
::fmffij~
[Such a person] does not look yet sees.
(Xunzi 12/64, 24/2)
The Mozi also makes it clear that a certain amount of looking and
listening constitutes an effort that normally produces a
corresponding amount of seeing and hearing:
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How were they [the sage-kings] able to see across a
thousand Ii with one look? How were they able to hear
across a thousand Ii with one [attempt at] listening?
(Mozi 13/54)
Thus, part of the difference indicated by listening/looking versus
hearing/seeing is the difference between making an effort and
achieving a goal.
Aside from indicating effort, we might call the other
feature of listening and looking "organizational." To look and
listen is to organize things, in the sense of taking a certain attitude
toward them. This is particularly obvious in certain uses of the
terms. That is, shi m (look) can function as "to consider
something to be something," and ting ~ (listen) can function as
"to judge." This explains why the person in Xunzi 21170 can form
a mistaken impression merely on the basis of looking and listening.
Because shi functions as visually "consider" and ting functions as
aurally "judge," looking and listening involve deeming things in
certain ways.
Thus, sensory error can occur during the very effort to
sense, which is an act of organizing the sensing in some particular
direction. The fact that the error occurs during a process that is
simultaneously the attempt to sense and a kind of deeming (effort
and organization) rules out the perceptual model of error. That is,
the error is not a matter of misreading the raw data caused by
"things in themselves." It is not a miscalculated inference emerging
at the completion of hearing and seeing. Because organizing
already occurs during the effort to sense, there is no possibility of
things giving rise to raw data that could be subject to
interpretation. To use the examples from Xunzi 21170, this
depiction of sense discrimination does not present some "one"
thing, sending out data, which is then misinterpreted as "two."
Instead, it depicts the normal trajectory of looking-organizing in
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a visual effort-being misdirected by pressure on the eyes. So too,
it does not present mo-mo data being misinterpreted as hong-
hong. Instead, it depicts the normal trajectory of listening being
deflected by pressure on the ears. The interference in the look's
direction (which, in theory, could come from anything) changes
the direction of the effort of sensing. The mistake is not due to
misinterpretation-it is due to an obstruction of direction.
This treatment of sensory error in Xunzi 21/70 also makes
sense discrimination seem like aspect perception. The notion that
looking and listening are aimed at organizing things in a particular
way resembles the continuous "seeing as" and "hearing as" of
aspect perception. The organization is part of the senses' aim in
one direction rather than another. In the very act of trying to
look, the eyes look at something as something. As with aspect
perception, the emphasis is on things being regarded. Indeed, the
section of the passage begins with a person looking at "one" and
listening to mo-mo.
The resemblance to aspect perception is also evident in the
Zhengmings description of the senses differentiating. This
description occurs in the cause for difference section, which
follows the cause for sameness. The cause for difference presents a
much more detailed analysis of each sense operation:
~ets~p) § J!
~ '§f m1; ~ ~ ~ ~ P) 1+ J!
it E • ilk $ ~ ~ ,*P) D :W
W~ 3j: ~ Jm[ Mk Wi ~ ~ ~ P) .. J!
~ jf tit ~ iff JBi ~ 11! P) ~ fit J!
~ i'& :g ~ R ~ ~ ~ ~ P)JL\ ~
Forms, bodies, colors, and patterns are differentiated by the
eye. Sounds and tones, clear and muddy, modes and
harmony,69 and strange sounds are differentiated by the
ear. Sweet, bitter, salty, bland, pungent, sour, and strange
tastes are differentiated by the mouth. Fragrances and
stenches, perfumes and rotten odors, putrid and rancid
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smells, dank: and sour smells,70 as well as strange smells are
differentiated by the nose. Illness and weIIness,71 cold and
hot, smooth and sharp, light and heavy are differentiated
by the form and body. Speech and causes,72 happiness and
anger, sadness and joy, loves, hates, and desires are
differentiated by the heartmind.73
(Xunzi 22/17-19)
These lists of things that are differentiated seem to cover the
broadest possible range for each sense. The addition of "strange"
sounds, tastes, and smells virtually guarantees that nothing is left
out. Hence, the categories to be differentiated seem to designate
each sense's range of possible forms of distinction.
This notion of differentiation implies something like
aspect perception.74 The categories that the senses differentiate
are already too specific to suggest the sense data experienced by
sensation. For example, tastes that are qualified enough to be called
salty cannot be said to be raw sense data. At the same time, the
reference to colors and shapes does not imply a perception model,
wherein the senses take in data and the mind interprets it. The
heartmind's role here is no different from the other senses. Each
sense seems to perform its own differentiation within a system of
contrasts.75 In some cases, the contrasts are explicit. For example,
the nose distinguishes between appealing fragrances and repulsive
odors. Even when it is a question of differentiation among things
that do not appear to have an opposite, like shapes, they are still
determined by contrasts, because contrasts are inherent in the very
notion of differentiating. Nothing can be differentiated without
other things being rejected. Each selected differentiation inclines
toward one direction and away from another (or others). Thus, the
focus of attention in the passage is on a spectrum of humanly
significant differentiations.
In saying that the Xunzi describes aspects of sense, I am
not attributing a terribly complex view to the text. In spite of the
fact that my explanation derives from Wittgenstein, it is not an
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extraordinary perspective. As Martin Heidegger points out, the
complicated and abstract achievement is hearing sounds as distinct
from whatever creates them:
What we "first" hear is never noises or complexes of
sounds, but the creaking waggon, the motorcycle. We hear
the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker
tapping, the fire crackling. It requires a very artificial and
complicated frame of mind to "hear" a "pure noise."76
The discussion of sensory error in Xunzi 21170 gives no indication
that the Xunzi adopts such a complicated frame of mind that is
required to thiIfk of sound as this kind of abstraction. The use of
differentiate here reinforces that impression-the senses
themselves are embedded in a context, and they discriminate
among a spectrum of meaningful contrasts.
The fact that desirable conditions are often what the senses
know corroborates this idea that the senses' knowledge is
knowledge that is humanly significant. The senses know (or miss
the opportunity to know) pleasure. For instance, in Xunzi 22/80
(see page 37), the mouth encounters the delicious taste of fine
meat, but then fails to know it.77 Similarly, in Mozi 32/6 (see page
37), the mouth encounters sweetness, and in this case does manage
to know it. This knowing is directed in the sense of being attracted
to a desire (and, consequently, away from an aversion). This is
particularly evident in the examples of body knowledge from Mozi
32/5-6 and Xunzi 22/80-81. The body knows or fails to know
what pleases it. In these examples, the body's knowledge is not
something like the evidence of touch (determining whether
something is or is not the case). Instead, the body knows the ease
and comfort of desirable things, like temperate climates and
bamboo mats. The knowledge implied in the metaphor of touch in
the Lunyu 16/11 (where someone quickly removes his hand after
touching boiling water) also seems to be a mastery of the reactions
of attraction and repulsion. The touch of a hand rarely appears in
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lists of the senses, but when it does the context concerns desire. 78
In one of these rare cases referring to touch, the touch of the
hands functions to signal the immensity of desired objects:
13 l' ~ il!!i m~ l' fm ~ lfD1' fm ~ '*
The eyes cannot see all the dishes, the hands cannot handle
them all, and the mouth cannot taste them all.
(Mozi 6/24-25)
The knowledge of the body, like the knowledge of the mouth,
consists in knowing about the attraction of desirable things. Thus,
sensory knowledge concerns attractions (and by implication,
repulsions) appropriate to each sense. This is perhaps what the
Zhengming means when it says that the senses have similar
"intentional-things" (yiwu ~ W) in response to similar things. In
other words, it is not that they mechanically represent similar
mental pictures of similar defining characteristics. Rather, they
tend toward similarly attractive things and away from similarly
repulsive things. Their discriminations manifest the context of
human significance of which they are a part.
Verifying Knowledge
VerifYing knowledge (the Zhengmings term) is different from the
knowledge I am calling sensory knowledge. Sensory knowledge
applies to all of the senses (including the heartmind, because it too
differentiates). VerifYing knowledge is a feature of the heartmind
involving the ears and the eyes for the purpose of verification.
The description of the causes for sameness and difference
concludes with a brief comment on knowledge. Having just
described the heartmind's differentiations, the passage adds,
JL' # ~ ;;0 ~ ;;0 JW
f,&Ifffi);;oltfiJih
f,&13ffi);;o:®fiJih
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The heartmind has verifying knowledge.79 There is
verifying knowledge; thus, because of [lit. caused by] the
ear, it is possible to know sounds; because of [caused by]
the eye, it is possible to know forms.80 However, verifying
must await the heavenly officials' meeting and recording
their kinds in order to be possible. If the five officials
record them without knowing, or if the heartmind verifies
without speaking, then people will not fail to pronounce it
"not knowing." It is this that causes sameness and
difference.
(Xunzi 22/19-21)
Much about this section is unclear. The subject seems to shift from
the causes for sameness and difference to an explanation of the
heartmind's verifying knowledge. The term "verifying knowledge"
is unusual. It seems to involve only the heartmind, the eyes, and
the ears.81 The Xunzi adds a few more criteria necessary for
knowledge to be recognized. Then, in spite of the focus on
verifying knowledge, the last line reasserts that this is all part of
the description of the causes of sameness and difference.82
As with the causes for sameness and difference, the model
for this presentation of sensory knowledge is neither sensation nor
perception. The participation of the heartmind rules out any
resemblance to sensation. But the fact that the heartmind
performs a verifying procedure involving the senses may initially
sound like perception.83 However, if I am correct in arguing above
that form and sound are more like aspects than sense data, then
the heartmind need not translate form and sound into something
intelligible--as form aspects and sound aspects, they are already
imbued with human significance.84 The passage's attention to
eliciting external confirmation of knowledge also differentiates it
from a description of perception.85 This emphasis on the
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heartmind's speaking implies a context of convincing others of
one's knowledge, rather than a context of trying to arrive at
certainty about what appears to the senses. The concern with
getting others to concede that one knows brings a pragmatic
element into the passage. Thus, insofar as this seems to be about
verifying aspects rather than data, and insofar as it insists on
corroboration from others, this picture of sense knowledge does
not resemble sensation or perception.
Conclusions
Perhaps the ambiguities in this introductory overview reveal why
sense discrimination in Warring States philosophical texts has
never been the subject of lengthy sustained analysis: There are
quite a few areas of indeterminacy in this portrait of sense
discrimination. It is not certain whether there are only five senses,
or which things count as senses. It is also not certain whether the
senses are like well-structured government officials or a confused
blend of openings, exposed to the vicissitudes of the wind.
Nevertheless, this study advances the theory that there are
two different kinds of knowledge associated with the senses. In
general, the senses know their discriminations, which are always
embedded in a context of meaning. In addition, the heartmind, ears
and eyes also participate in verifying knowledge.
Without eliminating the confusion, this overview does at
least indicate where the confusion lies. Hopefully, it also points the
reader in the right direction, with hypotheses that are grounded in
the information, albeit fragmented, that is available.
Chapter 2: Hearing and Seeing
Of all the senses, hearing and sight appear most often in
these texts. Like the senses as a whole, these two senses tend to
appear in contexts related to knowledge or to desire. Because they
appear in these similar contexts, the auditory and visual senses
almost seem like substitutes for the senses as a whole. But the
situation is more complex than this. Hearing and seeing play a
unique role in the acquisition of knowledge. In my hypothesis, all
of the senses may be described as knowing (insofar as they know
what they desire), but hearing and seeing are significant for a
particular fOl:m of knowing, that is, knowledge that pairs and tallies
things. Moreover, as a result of this special role of hearing and
seeing, aural and visual categories serve to divide the things in the
world. A variety of things appear in aural and visual pairs within
these texts. The variety and the relentlessness of these pairings
imply that this bifurcation is fundamental to the way in which the
universe is conceived. This should not be surprising: if knowledge
(and sometimes desire) generally amounts to what is heard and
seen, then the knower would inevitably tend to divide things into
aural and visual categories. In other words, from the position that
hearing and seeing constitute this important type of knowledge,
the world itself should be something that is amenable to aural and
visual bifurcation. And indeed, that is how the things in the world
seem to appear in these texts.
Special Role of Hearing and Seeing
References to the desires of hearing and seeing do appear to serve
as a synecdoche for all sensory desires. The Xunzi seems to use the
ears and eyes to indicate the desires of the senses. For instance, it
notes that the desires of the ears and eyes are present from birth:1
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From birth, there are the desires of the ears and eyes-the
fondness for sound and visual appearance [se]2-the
compliance with which causes the birth of looseness and
chaos.
(Xunzi 23/2)
Here, the desires of the ears and eyes probably represent all
sensory desires, because it seems unlikely that other sensory desires
are not also seen as present from birth. Similarly, the Mozi
emphasizes the ears and eyes, when it describes the desires indulged
in by wicked kings and avoided by the great sage king Yu.3
Regarding the wicked kings, it says,
11f 1:. 1ft~ J: ~ "2 ;!t 1f § z ig {,' ~ z m
In ages past, the wicked kings did not restrain the flowing
of their ears and eyes and the deviance of their heartmind's
pursuits.4
(Mozi 35/38)
By contrast, according to the Mozi, satisfying the desires of the
ears and eyes played no part at all in motivating the sage king Yu:
;JP Pj 31< Pj m~.::pm t3fr ~ 1f § iQ
[King Yu did not go to war] on a quest to increase his
wealth and status, to seek favor and fortune, or to please
his ears and eyes.
(Mozi 16/54-55)
The Xunzi also focuses on the ears and eyes, when noting the
danger of rulers who aim to satisfy their desires:
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[If the ruler}-with regard to pleasant tones and good looks
[se] , pavilions and archery courts, parks, and gardens-
requires more to be satisfied and is fond of newness, this
harms the state.
(Xunzi 111132-133)
Like the Mozi and the Xunzi, the Mencius condemns indulging the
desires of the ears and eyes, although it does so in the context of
describing the social customs of ordinary people, rather than sage
kings. According to the Mencius, following the desires of the ears
and eyes is one among five things that society considers unfilial
(see Mencius 4B30 in Chapter 1, footnote 22). In each of these
cases, there seems to be no particular reason for the emphasis on
the desires of the ears and eyes, rather than, say, the mouth. Thus,
the passage suggests that, insofar as the senses of hearing and
seeing seek pleasures and must be restrained, they may represent all
sensory desires.
Like these contexts describing desire, the senses of the ears
and eyes are highlighted in contexts related to knowledge. In many
cases, they represent knowledge itself. The phrase "to hear and
see" actually can be interpreted as "to know" or "to understand."
For instance, noble people are those who hear and see (understand)
beyond the scope of their listening and looking:
;g r ... JG\ IJ\ ffif m *-
fiJI ~ fJ\! 1W ill ffif fiJI III J! 1W ~
As for noble people...their heartminds are small but their
way is great; what they listen for and look at is near, but
what they hear and see is far.5
(Xunzi 3/35)
The ability to hear and see is an achievement that forms the
completion of listening and looking and transforms them into
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knowing. In fact, at every level of the achievement of knowledge,
these texts invoke hearing and seeing. In brief, the picture of
knowledge looks like this: those who know nothing can neither
hear nor see (Mozi 46/3--4 and Zhuangzi 1/30-31); the knowledge
of a cultivated scholar is limited to hearing and seeing (Xunzi
8/96); the understanding of spiritual beings is marked by heightened
hearing and seeing (Mozi 46/3--4);6 and the greatest knowledge
need not rely on what is already heard and seen (Xunzi 8/98-99
and Lunyu 7/28).
Starting at the bottom of this hierarchy, according to the
Mozi, the deaf and the blind are the least knowledgeable of all:
*~z~~~~A~~~~§zWVVili
The clear understanding of ghosts and spirits, in relation to
that of the sages, is like the sharp eared and keen sighted
with regard to the deaf and blind.
(Mozi 46/3--4)
The Zhuangzi expresses a similar assumption that the inability to
understand is a kind of deafness or blindness. In a dialogue where
one character fails to appreciate something, the other character
casts his failure in terms of blindness and deafuess. He says,
~ tI ~ 11!€ Pj W:if )( ~ z I.!
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Yes, the blind lack what is needed to share in the spectacle
of emblems and ornaments, and the deaf lack what is
needed to share in the sound of drums and bells. Is it only
form and bone that has blindness and deafness? The
knowledge also has them.
(Zhuangzi 1130-31)
By itself, this comparison of knowledge's failure to blindness and
deafness implies that knowledge amounts to appreciating beauty
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and music. However, in combination, the two references to
deafness and blindness make a less specific point: that knowledge
depends on being able to see and hear.
Moreover, the Xunzi and the Lunyu also measure
knowledge through the senses of hearing and seeing, by drawing a
distinction between what they consider the highest two levels of
knowledge. To highlight the difference between the "elegant"
scholars and those who are even greater, the Xunzi contrasts two
types of knowledge in tenns of their capacities for hearing and
seeing. Although it ranks the elegant scholars over the common
people and the vulgar scholars, it notes that the knowledge of
elegant scholars is restricted to patterns that are based on what
they have already heard and seen:
MJi!.~1W*~
~Uml' ~~iH
What their hearing and seeing has not reached, their
knowledge cannot classify.
(Xunzi 8/96)
This amounts to no great insult, because the Xunzi does credit
these elegant scholars with knowledge. However, the knowledge of
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Regarding that which they have not heard and that which
they have not seen-if one comer is suddenly held up, they
can pick out the whole classification and respond to it.7
(Xunzi 8/98-99)
In other words, what these great scholars have heard or seen
constitutes the sum of what they already know, but they need not
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depend on such past knowledge. The Lunyu makes a similar point
about knowledge that is not bound to the past. The passage
presents Confucius as saying that the ultimate form of knowing is




There may be those who, unknowingly, create things. I am
not like this. Those who hear much, select the good, and
follow it; those who see much, and remember it-this is the
next kind of knowing.
(Lunyu 7/28)
This passage identifies hearing and sight with knowing, while
conceding the possibility of another kind of knowing. Not deeming
himself capable of the highest kind of knowing, Confucius seems to
place himself among those who hear and see much. These
distinctions between the two most advanced levels of knowledge
reiterate the importance of hearing and seeing for knowing: while
some may know what they have not yet heard or seen, ordinarily,
knowledge is what has already been heard and seen.
Furthermore, the use and rejection of these two senses-in
the Mozi and the Zhuangzi, respectively-represent the use and
rejection of knowledge itself. For instance, the Mozi invokes the
ears and eyes of the common people as one of the three factors
that contribute to establishing standards for knowledge. (Utility
and the concerns of the sages are the two other contributing




1R filJ mz Ffl t) ~ lfU 1& iJl ~ lf1 ~ *
Bt!ttA~zflj
56 On the Epistemology of the Senses
How are they to be based? They should be based on the
concerns of the ancient sage kings. How are they to be
originated? They are to be originated by products of the
ears and eyes of the common people.8 How are they to be
applied? They are to be applied by adopting them in
government and observing their benefits to the country
and the hundred surnames.
(Mozi 35/8-9)
Various forms of this appeal to the ears and eyes appear repeatedly
in the text of the Mozi.9 According to the Mozi, the method of
knowing whether or not something exists is to use the product of
the masses' ears and eyes as one's instrument of measure:
~ ~ 7( T Z PJT PJ ~mfI ~ 1Ire Z m:if
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Now as to the way to check to know whether or not a
thing exists, it is to take as one's instrument the product of
the ears and eyes of the multitude. If, indeed, some have
heard it or seen it, then we have to say it is there. If no
one has heard it and no one has seen it, then we have to
say it not there.
(Mozi 3 II10-1 I)
The Mozi considers objections to its emphasis on the ears and eyes
of the masses, but even the objections do not question the
importance of hearing and seeing for knowing. Instead, they pose
doubts about whether the masses themselves ought to be trusted.
Granting that the masses could be unreliable, the Mozi addresses
this objection by considering what the feudal lords have heard and
seen:
~~B~~~~~It§zm~~~w~~
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If the common people are considered stupid and worthless,
and the qing [conditions? dispositions?] of their ears and
eyes are not reliable as a standard, then why not inquire
into the recorded speech of the feudal lords that has flowed
down to us? From olden times until now, from the time
that people have been born, has any of them heard the
sound of ming [fate/ordainment/decree] or seen the body
[til of ming? Of course, none of them has.
(Mozi 36/7-9, emphasis added)
Thus, even if relying on the hearing and seeing of the masses
seems dubious, one can rely on the hearing and seeing of the feudal
lords. This attention to the feudal lords' hearing and seeing
confirms the importance of these two senses for the Mozi's view of
knowledge. Moreover, the fact that the feudal lords' hearing and
seeing trumps that of the masses sheds light on what the appeal to
the "ears and eyes of the masses" really means. The fact that the
Mozi is quite willing to abandon the ears and eyes of the masses in
favor of those of the nobles suggests that the source of knowledge
in the repeated phrase "ears and eyes of the masses" is not
certitude about listening and looking. The masses may be wrong
about what they hear and see. The argument ultimately only trusts
the hearing and seeing of those to whom tradition attributes
knowledge, and it seems to do so primarily in the interests of
utility-as if this is what it takes to convince its audience. Thus,
these two senses operate as standards for establishing knowledge
only in combination with the other two criteria-utility and the
wisdom of the ancient sages.
Perhaps deliberately echoing the Mozi's refrain of "the ears
and eyes of the masses," the Zhuangzi seems to dismiss knowledge,
specifically by rejecting the eyes and ears of the masses. In the
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Zhuangzi's unconventional perspective, the sages disregard the
masses' ears and eyes, as well as their own eyes and ears:
~ ~ Iff lInl~ 1+ § &: ~JUr~· ~ l'mj}fflj ~
c ~W11~P¥ f§l #5 ~ ji. jtlji ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
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[These sages... ] forget their liver and gall, abandon their
ears and eyes. They tum and repeat, end and begin, without
knowing their starting point or origin. They forgetfully
ramble outside the dust and dirt, wandering through the
instructions of non-action.
How could they even be capable of fussily performing the
rituals of the world for the ears and eyes of the multitude?
(Zhuangzi 6/69-71)
After abandoning these senses, these sages seem genuinely
confused. The passage above stresses that they do not know the
most basic of distinctions. In fact, each mention of abandoning
hearing and seeing in the Zhuangzi is followed by some form of
rejection of knowledge. For example, in the parodic dialogue
between a fictionalized Confucius and his pupil Yan Hui, the loss of
knowledge appears immediately after loss of perspicacity in seeing
and hearing. Van Hui summarizes his (meditative?) practice of
"sitting and forgetting" in these terms:
!!~ e !II JWP~f:J $lIE 7Ij ~m
~m-*iiJ1tmY~~
I drop off limbs and trunk, dismiss keenness of hearing and
clarity of eyesight, leave form and expel knowledge, and
unite with the great thoroughfare. This is what I mean by
"sitting and forgetting."
(Zhuangzi 6/92-93)
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Likewise, the Zhuangzi praises sages for not knowing what is
appropriate to ears and eyes, which then causes their heartminds
(the function in charge of a certain kind of knowing) to roam:
:j(;fi?&ff13.l'~Jf§~mE:
ffij mJL\ ~ ~ ~ f[]
As for such people, they do not know what is appropriate
to the ears and eyes, and they cause their heartminds to
roam in the peace of de [charisma/virtue].
(Zhuangzi 517-8)
Indeed, permitting the heartmind to roam does seem to mean
expelling its knowledge. In another fictionalized dialogue between
Confucius and Van Hui, Confucius hints that following the
channels of the ears and eyes leads straight to the loss of the
heartmind's knowledge:
:j(~Jf§pgjj
ffij Yi- 1P: JL\ m
*1$~**ffiji5lA~
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If you accord with the inward circulation through the eyes
and ears, and externalize the heartmind's knowing, the gui
[ghostly] and shen [spiritual] will come and reside, and all
the more so the human! I 0
(Zhuangzi 4/32-33)
When read in light of the other ear and eye references, the
"according" with the inward channels of the ears and eyes in this
passage suggests some kind of refusal to hear and see. II Once again,
this is succeeded by dismissing the heartmind-specifically its
knowledge. Thus, once again, a reference to ears and eyes indicates
knowledge. In sum, in sharp contrast to the Mozi, the Zhuangzi
rejects the eyes and ears and thereby rejects the knowledge they
represent. I 2
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Perhaps as a result of their role in acquiring knowledge,
hearing and seeing also represent the height of human powers
throughout these texts. An acute capacity for hearing and seeing
seems to coincide with a condition of physical strength. The
individuals who have the sharpest capacities of hearing and sight
are in their physical prime, according to the Mozi. In its criticism
of the misuse of music, the Mozi notes that rulers require people in
their prime to play it, because the very young and the very old
have inferior capacities of hearing and sight. 13 Apparently, the
weak limbs of youth and old age are accompanied by diminished
capacities of hearing and sight. In addition to youth and old age,
the Mozi also notes that powers of hearing and sight are damaged
by the proces~ of mourning (a phenomenon also described in the
Mencius). The fact that mourning damages the ability to hear and
see seems to be a tribute to the extremity of the sacrifice that
mourning calls forth. The Mencius discusses the case of a certain
person who fasts for three days, and thereupon loses his hearing
and sight:
....=. E3 /f' ~ II f!l€ f*1 13 ~ j[
...after three days of not eating, his ears lacked the ability
to hear, his eyes lacked the ability to see.
(Mencius 3BlO)
While the Mencius proffers qualified praise for such behavior (it
does note that the admirable severity of such mourning cannot
guarantee integrity), the Mozi explicitly criticizes it. In the Mozts
critique (which turns three days into three years), losing these
powers of hearing and sight renders the mourner worthless:
.=.1f~lli:
;f:JH3t ~ tt 1tt ff
ll~IYJ§~Jl
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Crying and weeping lasts for three years. They need a cane
to stand up and a cane to walk. Their ears lack [the ability
to] hear and their eyes lack [the ability to] see.
(Mozi 48/51)
Whether cited with approval or condemnation, the fact that
damage to the ears and eyes serves as the measure of the extremity
of one's sacrifice implies that the capacities of hearing and sight
are of supreme value. Moreover, like the reference to hearing and
eyesight being weakened during old age and youth, these
descriptions of the effects of mourning make the point that these
senses function best when the body as a whole is strong. Thus,
conditions that undermine the vitality of the entire body likewise
undermine the capacities of hearing and seeing. In sum, well-
functioning senses of hearing and sight coincide with maximally
healthy and vital human powers.
This connection of hearing and sight with power may
explain why the capacities of these two senses are necessary for
unifying the empire. In the Mods mythic reconstruction of the
past, a wise emperor makes a statement implying that only his ears
and eyes prevent him from being able to unify the world by
himself:
7( T ret PJ if. ~
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Upon becoming established, the emperor-taking the qing
[conditions? dispositions?] of his own ears and eyes as
incapable of unifying the world-selected the world's
experienced, virtuous, intelligent, and wise people [and
installed them].
(Mozi 12/7)
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Similarly, the Mencius also contains a myth describing ancient
sages who require supplementary powers of hearing and sight in
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When the sages had exhausted the strength of their eyes,
they followed that with the compass, the square, the level,
and t~e line, which could be inexhaustibly used to make
things square, round, level, and straight.
When they had exhausted the strength of their ears, they
followed that with the pitch tubes, which could be
inexhaustibly used to set in order the five notes.
When they had exhausted their heartmind's thinking, they
followed that with a government that could not endure
human suffering-and benevolence overspread the
kingdom.
(Mencius 4Al)
In both these passages, the inadequacy of hearing and seeing seems
to indicate that an individual's powers are insufficient to the task.
The scope of anyone individual's hearing and sight is too limited,
as the Mozi points out:
~i'iXitz~3:Z~7(rif1.
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Therefore, in the ancient sage kings' ordering of the world,
if there were good people more than a thousand Ii away,14
they would be able to reward them before all those who
were within their own villages heard and saw [their
goodness].... Only do not take the sage kings as having
done so with their own keen ears and clear eyes. How could
they be able to see across a thousand Ii with one look? How
could they be able to hear across a thousand Ii with one
[attempt at] listening? The sages look at things without
going, listen to things without approaching them.
(Mozi 13/51-55)
As both the Mencius and Mozi passages suggest, a single individual's
hearing and sight is limited in range. Moreover, from the Xunzi we
find that hearing and sight are also limited in their ability to focus
(that is, Xunzi 1/22 says it is impossible to focus the ears and eyes
on more than one thing at once).15 Thus, the advantage of things
like compasses, pitch tubes, and the assistance of multiple ears and
eyes is that they expand the scope of an individual's knowledge.
The ability to hear and see an area means having knowledge of it
and the power to control it. Hence, hearing and seeing are essential
to unifying the empire, because they represent the ability to
know-and thereby the power to control- that which falls within
their range.
The Heard and the Seen
In addition to their unique connection to knowledge, hearing and
seeing are distinct from the other senses in their effect on how the
world is construed. Along with the prominence of seeing and
hearing comes a prominence of things heard and seen. Even if one
holds the view that hearing and seeing merely serve as a
synecdoche for the senses as a whole, the effects are striking. The
sensed world is generally met by hearing and seeing, instead of
being contacted by a variety of senses. In effect, the world seems
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to present itself in tenns of this bifurcation-as things to be either
heard or seen.
For instance, the objects of desire tend to be either aural or
visual. These items are not fixed-the ears and eyes are described
as desiring different things in different contexts. The variety of
items that match the ears' and eyes' desires suggests that the
pattern of aurality and visuality is more significant than the items
involved. Xunzi 111132 (see page 52) remarks that the ears and
eyes desire pleasant tones and good looks. The Lunyu phrases this
slightly differently: it quotes Confucius as criticizing his generation
for its emphasis on eloquence and beauty:
TB~1'fm~z-@(ffij1'f*JW1z~
IP¥ fR. m- 9 z i!t ~
Without the eloquence of Priest Tuo or the beauty of Song
Chao, it is difficult to avoid danger in this present age.
(Lunyu 6/16)
The objects of desire cited in the Mencius IB 1 present another
variation on the aural and visual, reflecting the context of a royal
hunt. The ruler's desire for hunting is observed by the people, who
overhear the pounding of the ruler's horses' hooves and catch sight
of the beauty of the hunt's ornamentation. Mencius says to a king,
9£ff11lim-l!tB~pij£*~zif
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Now when your Majesty hunts like this, the common
people hear the noise of your carriages and horses and see
the beauty of your plumes and streamers...and speak to
each other of "our king's love of hunting.... "
(Mencius IBI)
Here in the context of enjoying a hunt, the ears wish to hear
pounding hooves and the eyes wish to see the ornaments of the
hunt. As this last example shows clearly, in different cases, the
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specified objects of the ears and eyes' desires can vary.16 But these
variations highlight the importance of the pattern-in each case,
the world of desire consists of some form of aural and visual pairs.
The combination of the heard and the seen indicates
something else when used to describe human beings. The aural and
the visual constitute the impression of a person as a whole. For
example, the Mencius sums up the dangers of arrogance in terms of
a person's tone and look:
iW! jWL~~ !it if~ ts 1m A 1R' -=f m~ jf.
The tone and look of arrogance will keep people away as
far as a thousand Ii.
(Mencius 6B13)
1ffi~ ~ liT tJ 't if~~ ~ ~
Respectfulness and restraint: how can these be obtained
from tone of voice and a smiling demeanor?
(Mencius 4A17)
This distrust of tone and appearance seems to derive from the
Mencius's theory that the heartmind's concerns will manifest
themselves in a similar aural/visual pair:
A It![ ~ ~ ~ ij~ i& ffi 1R' It:., 1if 1R' !Jl ffij ~ it~ 1R' ts
~1R'!itffij~1I)frJ
Generally, people are able to learn after they make
mistakes. Only after their heartminds feel surrounded and
their thoughts feel crossed, are [people able] to create.
Only after being evident in their looks and issued in their
voices, are things clear.
(Mencius 6B15)
Thus, it is fitting that in the Mencius, when spectators come to
view the sincerity of someone's mourning, they attend to the
sound of their cries and the look on their face:
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They came from all quarters to observe it. The mourners
were greatly pleased by the miserable look on his face and
the pathos of his crying and weeping.
(Mencius 3A2)
The Mozi uses similar categories to indicate familiarity with a
person. Mozi is quoted as saying,
§~.z~m~~.~~.~~~~
I am no contemporary of theirs, neither have I heard their
sounds nor seen their countenances.
(Mozi 16/49)
While the Lunyu makes a similar kind of claim about human
appearances, it specifically emphasizes a person's speech, rather
than the more general terms for "sound." (The pairing of speech
with something else-action-will be discussed in detail below.)
Two quotations attributed to Confucius both use people's speech
and looks to refer to their general appearance:
013~~f!f~t:




[A person of achievement] examines people's speech and
observes their countenances.
(Lunyu 12/20)
The pattern is so pervasive that the same pair of terms even
applies to meeting an animal in the Mencius. The Mencius
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explains that if noble people hear or see an animal, they will feel
too familiar with it to permit it to die:
~rZ~~~~~~~~~~~~OO~~~~
tt~~
Such is the noble person's attitude towards animals: having
seen them alive, they cannot bear to see them die; having
heard their cries, they cannot bear to eat their flesh.
(Mencius 1A7)
The heard and the seen represent everything significant in
appearance. Just as the desired objects of the eyes and ears take a
variety of forms, so too the aural and visual aspects of animals and
humans differ. But this difference merely reinforces the point-the
aural and visual pairs themselves matter more than the content of
those pairs.
Speech and Action
In addition to providing a w~y to sum up human appearances,
hearing and seeing also provide knowledge of human character.
The emphasis on these two senses is not arbitrary, because hearing
and seeing sense the two things whose correspondence is the
foundation for knowledge about humans, that is, the ears hear
speech, and the eyes see action. And when speech matches action,
like two parts of a tally, it becomes possible to trust and know.
As the examples from the Lunyu show (1/3, 12/20),
references to hearing are not confined to sensing sounds per se--
references to hearing also indicate hearing speech and its content.
In other words, the "object" of hearing includes speech, as well as
the actual sound of the voice. In fact, the character "sound" itself
sometimes refers to speech. For example, in different contexts in
the Mencius, the same term (sheng) refers to both the physical
sound of the voice and the speech it articulates. After Confucius
dies, his disciples are said to "lose sound."
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They turned towards one another and cried until they all
lost their voices [sheng].
(Mencius 3A4)
The same tenn for sound also functions as speech in the case
where someone has a retort for any bad sounds directed at him:
?@~~~, Ei. Z
Any bad word [sheng] that reached him, he always
returned.
(Mencius 2A2)
Sometimes, the sound of the voice seems to overlap with the
speech it conveys. For instance, the Mencius does not really
distinguish sheng from yan when it says of Bo Vi, in two different
places, that he would not listen to a bad sound and that he would
not speak to a bad person. Both instances remark that Bo Yi would
not serve a bad ruler, and both mention that there is something
sensed by hearing that Bo Yi would not do. Thus, the Mencius
seems to be rephrasing, when it says the following two things:
m.§~m1@~~~~1@~#~~~.
Bo Vi's eyes would not look at bad [visual] appearances,
and his ears would not listen to bad sounds. If it was not his




[of Bo Yi] He would not stand in a bad prince's court, and
he would not speak with a bad person.
(Mencius 2A9)
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These examples from the Mencius confinn that hearing sounds
sometimes functions as the equivalent of hearing speech in these
textsP Thus, it seems reasonable that the object of hearing may
be sound or speech.
When the object of hearing is speech, the corresponding
object of vision is usually action.18 The idea that action is visible
to the eyes is asserted in this passage from the Xunzi: 19
§~11J1!J
fT~11J ~
Speech is what it is possible to hear.
Action is what it is possible to see.
(Xunzi 27/87-88)
It is also indicated by one case in the Lunyu, which likewise implies
that observation of action is the visual counterpart to hearing
speech. In describing how Confucius hopes to escape errors, it says,
~-fr~A-tl!.
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Nowadays, in my dealings with others, upon listening to
their speech, I observe their actions.
(Lunyu 5/10)
This suggestion that action is visible becomes more explicit when
read in conjunction with another section of the Lunyu. In a
passage similarly concerned with avoiding errors, in the same way
that listening nonnally precedes hearing, the Lunyu asserts that
looking should precede acting:
~ I!J rm ~ tl § ~ ~ ~U # :f;
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If you listen broadly, set aside what you are unsure of, and
speak cautiously on the rest, you will make few errors; if
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you look broadly, set aside what is perilous, and act
cautiously on the rest, you will have few regrets.
(Lunyu 2118)
These lines suggest not only that speech and action are sensed by
the ears and eyes, respectively, but that speech and action are
primary objects associated with these two senses. In the context of
observing human beings, while speech is the frequent corollary of
hearing, its matching visual corollary is usually action.
The reason action is construed as being sensed by vision is
that action literally refers to walking, which is more accessible to
vision than to any other sense. The character xing fi functions to
mean both "~alk" and, by extension, "act." Moreover, walking
creates paths and leaves footsteps that are visible to the eyes. A
reference to looking at someone treading a path appears in a
passage from the Shi Jing, which is cited in both the Mozi and the
Mencius. The petty person looks (at the walking or at the path
being walked), whereas the noble person walks a path:
;tt][;fi*;tt~;fi~
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It [the ruler's way] is straight like an arrow and smooth like
a whetstone. The noble person treads it; the petty person
looks upon it.20
(Mozi 16/61)
The Mencius's use of the same passage expands the visual
metaphor, by suggesting that the ruler, like the petty people, also
watches a noble person who treads the way. This case from the
Mencius discusses how a virtuous person should be summoned to go
to court. It compares seeing virtuous people with wanting them to
walk through a gate-if one wants to see them, one must provide
the proper road and gate:
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When a ruler desires to see people of virtue, but does not
use this [proper] way, it is like wanting them to enter [the
palace] and shutting the gate against them. Now,
righteousness is the road, and ritual is the gate, but only
noble persons can follow this way, entering and exiting this
gate. The Book ofPoetry says, "The way to Zhou is like a
whetstone, and straight as an arrow. The noble person
treads it; the petty person looks upon it."
(Mencius 5B7)
This Mencian extrapolation of the Shi Jing passage implies that
action is visible, by alluding to the motion of walking through a
gate as well as the traces created by treading a path. A passage
from the Mozi even uses the metaphor of "following in footsteps"
of someone's actions as the counterpart for hearing their speech.
JJl1 A ~ :Et ~ ~ :Et H 'R :Et ~ e~
:=E. ~ /, r::::::t Jt'JJI""" I J ~.,., .... rJI F3~•••
The sages listened to their speech, retraced their actions,
and examined their capabilities...
(Mozi 9/6)
Hence, action amounts to walking, which creates motion and other
traces that can be seen by the eyes. Thus, just as speech may be
heard by the ears, the act of walking may be seen by the eyes.
Given these parallels between audible speech and visible
action, it is not surprising that hearing and seeing play a special
role in gaining knowledge of human character. Human beings can
be known through their speech and action, especially if the two
tally with one another. But, according to these texts, knowledge
based on either speech or action alone is precarious, as I will
explain below.21 Only speech and action that tally suffice for
knowing people.
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The parallels between speech and action in these texts
suggest that these two things constitute the most significant
features of a human being. In its ranking of levels of scholar
officials, the Lunyu implies that ordinary people value trustworthy
speech and productive action. Confucius himself is not terribly
impressed by these values; he calls them "stubborn" and ranks them
third, following those who act without disgracing their rulers and
those who act with filial piety. Yet he offers this telling
description of "the little people":
§ £' ffi ff £' =* ~ ~ 1'& IJ\ A. ~
They are determined to be trustworthy in what they say
and make sure their actions have results-stubborn little
people.
(Lunyu 13/20)
The Mencius extrapolates on the point, suggesting that "great"




Great people's speech need not be trustworthy. and their
actions need not be productive. They simply need to reside
in righteousness.
(Mencius 4Bll)
But this comment from the Mencius does not deny that the little
people do indeed need to be trustworthy in speech and productive
in action. Nor does it deny that the great people actually are
trustworthy in speech and productive in action. It only denies that
among great people this requires any effort beyond being righteous.
Thus, these passages from the Lunyu and the Mencius ultimately
affirm the prevalence of the value of trustworthy speech and
productive action in these texts.22
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Aside from these passages from the Lunyu and the
Mencius, repeated attention to speech and action elsewhere
confirms the value placed on these two things. The Zhuangzi notes
that speech and action put a person's character to the test. The
Zhuangzi says,
§~maiJt[ilirr~'Jf~ili
;j( mit 7Bt ~ PJ iJJ
.~~PJfe;
Speech is wind and waves,
Action is fulfillment and loss.
It is easy for wind and waves to move [things], and as easy
for fulfillment and loss to endanger [things].
(Zhuangzi 4/49-50)
Thus, speech and action present a challenge: they are the means by
which people are swayed and tempted to danger. Hence they are
the focus of character building and the focus of assessing the
character of others. The Mozi recommends assimilating the speech
and action of virtuous people in order to become virtuous
oneself.23 Sagacity and virtue manifest themselves in speech and
action. In its explanation for why Confucius was not a virtuous
person, a character in the Mozi offers this conception of being
virtuous:24
~ PJ § E!ij ffii ~ m ili
rrE!ijffii~~ili
It is this: their speech is clear and easy to understand.
Their actions are clear and easy to follow.
(Mozi 39/39)
The Lunyu and the Mencius do not disagree with this emphasis on
the speech and action of the virtuous (although they would surely
disagree that Confucius does not fit them). In fact, the Lunyu
reports that Confucius explains proper action in these terms:
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~ J*ffifJ1.P!&mlf~B z~fJ~
Your speech should be reliable and trustworthy, and your
actions should be straightforward and respectful-[so you
should] act, even in the foreign nations of the Man or Mo.
(Lunyu 15/6)
The Lunyu focuses on the same qualifications to justifY deeming
two officials to be virtuous in spite of their having risked disgrace:
§ J:fl ftflf fJ J:fl~
[of Hui of Liu Xia and Shao Lian] Their speech was on
target with analysis and their actions were on target with
ponde~ing.
(Lunyu 18/8)
The Lunyu also criticizes people by focusing on flaws in their
speech and action:
iff ,Ii! ~ 8 § l' :& ~ !if 1T IJ\ ~ it~ mG
If you get together a number of people and all day their
speech never reaches [the subject of] righteousness, while
they adore acting on petty shrewdness: that's a difficult
case.
(Lunyu 15/7)
The Mencius uses the same categories to establish the presence or
absence of virtue in a variety of circumstances. The Mencius cites
a conversation wherein one of Mencius's dialogue partners uses
these categories to assess Confucius and his followers. The
comment evaluates all of them in terms of their speech and/or
action:25
*~-=fJi~~ti}l~
-14 ~ 00 -=f liUJllf ~ ~ ~ fJ
fL -=f 31ft z B :og m: ~ $ J!U l' till -tl!
Hearing and Seeing 75
Zaiwo and Zigong were good at speaking/explaining
rhetoric, Ran Niu, Minzi, and Van Hui, were good at
speaking and virtuous in acting.26 Confucius united these
traits, yet he said, "With regard to rhetoric, I am not
capable."
(Mencius 2A2)
The same categories for evaluation also emerge from the mouth of
Mencius himself, when he is cited as providing this description of
the ancient sage, Shun:
oo-;gg ~-;gfTE?'JUIfiiJmJf&
~ Z fig ~ {g
When he heard a single good word, or saw a single good
action, he was like the bursting of a stream or a river, so
overwhelming that none could withstand it.
(Mencius 7A16)
Mencius himself is also cited as noting the role of speech and
action in determining whether noble persons should serve a ruler.
Of old, noble persons would serve on the condition that the ruler
promised to enact their speech:
g ~fT;!'t g {g JW ~ Z
mMl*~g5tfT{gJ!lJ*Z
[If the ruler] said he was going to put their speech into
practice, then they would go to him. If, without ritual or
manners diminishing, their speech was not put into
practice, then they would leave him.
(Mencius 6B14)
Occasionally, a third element enters the equation, but the point is
essentially the same. For instance, the Mencius tacks on clothes to
a claim that otherwise says that speech and action make the
person:
76 On the Epistemology ofthe Senses
~~z~fi~z§ff~zff~~we~
Wear the clothes of Yao, recite the words of Yao, and do
the actions of Yao, and you will just be a Yao.
(Mencius 6B2)
Similarly, the Mozi supplies the factor of government, in addition




l=> ,e- I J WI: -'... i=i ~ ~IR A IC- ,UJ- ii~ IC- l=> i=i ~ LX.. A IC-
~rmZ~~§~~~~~.7(Z~rmZ~~
jI)( IX 7( z ~ rm z ~ ~ 7flJ jI)(
Observe people's actions, and if they accord with the intent
of heaven, call them well-intended actions. If they are
contrary to the intent of heaven, call them not well-
intended actions. Observe their speech and talk, if they
accord with the intent of heaven, call them good speech
and talk. If they are contrary to the intent of heaven, call
them bad speech and talk. Observe their laws and
government, if they accord with the intent of heaven, call
them well-intended laws and government. If they are
contrary to the intent of heaven, call them bad laws and
government.
(Mozi 27/69-71)
Even with the addition of things like clothes and government, the
pattern of emphasis on speech and action is clear. For the purposes
of character evaluation, the two significant features of a human
being are speech and action. They provide the basis for
detennining whether or not a person is virtuous. Thus, they
provide all that needs to be known about the character of others.
Yet speech and action are not automatically reliable
sources of knowledge. The most common obstruction to correct
evaluation of speech and action is a lack of equivalence between
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them-a condition particularly likely to result from an excess on
the part of speech. The texts commonly indict speech for
surpassing actionP Apparently, it is easier for speech to exceed
action than vice versa. Speech can seem reckless and careless. The
Zhuangzi contrasts it with the more dignified act of walking the
way. For example, when commenting on a description of a sage,
one follower of Confucius says,
7cTPJ~~~z §
ffij ~ P) ~ ~y m z 1T t!1
The Master took this [description] to be speech of careless
extravagance. I take it to be walking of the most excellent
way.
(Zhuangzi 2/75)
This recklessness may express itself in a tendency to bypass
action. The Lunyu calls this a source of shame:
If' it ~ -,,;; },@, it /.-JfU p, 5 II U ;IE! r, IT
The gentleman is ashamed lest he speak and thereby
overpass his action.
(Lunyu 14/27)
As the Mozi puts it, a person consists of a mouth that speaks and a
body that acts. By speaking, it is possible for the mouth to create
chaos in the body:28




In governing, what the mouth speaks, the body must enact.
Now your mouth says something, but your body does not
act [on it]. This is your body being in chaos. If you cannot
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govern your body, how can you govern the administration
of a state?
(Mozi 48/85-86)
Taken rather literally, speech seems to flow out from the mouth
and travel to places where action cannot catch up to it:
r!l1f g Z ~ l:fi ~G M Z ~ ~ ili.
The ancients did not emit speech, because they would be
ashamed lest they would not personally be able to pursue
what they said.
(Lunyu 4/22)
It is as if speech has a certain speed that, in some cases, needs to be




The exemplary person wants to be slow to speak, yet quick
to act.
(Lunyu 4/24)
In sum, speech has a certain fluidity that action lacks. Perhaps this
is because, in addition to covering a broader ranger of space, the
texts suggest that sound also carries faster than its visual
counterpart.30 Action often seems obliged to pursue speech, in an
attempt to create or restore order.
To counteract the speed of sound, there is a recurring
tendency to measure speech and action against one another in
these texts. If one allows a disparity between speech and action,
the consequences are dire. People will cease paying attention:
f8gffijt.&ff
!M£ m&;\ ~ ft
Hearing and Seeing 79
As for those who make every effort to speak: but are slow
to act, even if they are discerning, no one will listen.
(Mozi 2/12)
Thus, the Mozi seeks only speech that can affect action. The rest,
it says, is a waste of the mouth.3 1 The Xunzi also objects to wasting
the mouth, which is exemplified by an incongruity between saying
and doing.32 Furthermore, it criticizes those whose mouths and
bodies are at odds and instructs the state to reject such people.33
The Lunyu also insists that what is said must be enacted:
;g T 1; Z ~\ J:iT § 1tt
§ Z ~\ J:iT 1T 1tt
What the exemplary person names must be speakable,
what he/she says must be enactable.
(Lunyu 13/1)
The Xunzi presents the matter as a contrast between the ease of
talking while seated and the effort of rising to put speech into
effect:
Me ~ ffij § Z ~ ffij J:iT ~ ~ ffij J:iT ~ 1T
Those who sit and talk should be able to stand and show
that what they say can be established-that it can be
enacted over a broad area.
(Xunzi 23/45)
The Mozi uses a metaphor of two parts of a matching tally to
specify how speech and action should be mutually aligned. Its tally
metaphor makes speech and action the measure for one another:
;Ei Z -= ± 1i § ffi ~F ffij 1T ffi fi. W
~~;Ei-=±1i§~m1T~*~§1TZk~k
~1rJ1tt1!!€§ffij/f'1T1tt
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It is as if there are two scholars, each of whose speech
denies that of the other and whose action opposes that of
the other. Now, if you make it so that their speech has to
be trustworthy and their action has to produce results, that
is, make their speech and actions unified, like unifying
parts of a tally, then there would be no speech that is not
enacted.
(Mozi 16/29)
This metaphor indicates that speech and action will only serve as a
basis for knowledge if they match like two parts of a tally. The
character of .human beings consists in their speech and action;
hence understanding them depends upon observance of their
speech and action. Both of these elements are decisive in creating
character, but in isolation they are not necessarily reliable. In
particular, because speech can exceed action, one must ensure that
the two coincide.
The need to make speech and action tally amounts to
matching the senses of hearing and seeing. This notion of tallying
hearing and seeing evokes the verifying knowledge, referred to in
the Zhengming chapter of the Xunzi. While the Zhengming does
not articulate what "verification" involves, it seems likely that it
entails comparing and tallying. My hypothesis is that verifying
knowledge amounts to tallying what is heard by the ears with what
is seen by the eyes. (The reasons for this are given in Chapter 3.)
Once the heartmind tallies the ears and eyes, it produces speech,
which, according to the Zhengming merits being called knowing.
(However, the Zhengming chapter does not mention that the
heartmind also produces action.) In any case, even without the
corroboration from the Zhengming, it seems undeniable that
hearing and seeing playa far more important role in knowing than
the other senses, and that part of their role depends upon the two
senses matching one another.
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The persistence of aural and visual pairs even in contexts where
one or the other element does not seem to fit provides further
evidence of their significance. The aural and visual pairing is
apparent in the way the Zhuangzi character, Ziqi of Nanguo,
queries his attendant about his knowledge of the pipes of earth:
~*~ ~ *" ;!=I; i; ~ ma...
ffif ~ l' I*l L ~ ~ if-...
ffiffij1'~L~~L;::];::]if-
The great clump of earth blows out qi whose name IS
"wind"...have you alone not heard the hubbubL.have you
alone not seen how the stirring quivers!
(Zhuangzi 2/4-8, emphasis added)
Hence, even when asking about something predominantly aural-
the "pipes" of earth-the pattern demands a balance with the
visual. So too, when describing an eye, the Mencius (consciously or
not) takes the rather unnecessary step of tacking on an assertion
that speech also reveals what goes on within the breast. The
Mencius says the pupil of the eye is bright or dull in accordance
with the center of the chest being correct or not:
1¥if-A~~~1R'I!$-T
I!$ -T l' ij~ ~ ;!=I; ~
Jjij $ 1£ ~U I!$ -T ~ ~
1JoJ $ l' 1£ ~U I!$ -T 1ft~
~;!=I;§Il;!=l;I!$-TA~m~
Within the person, there's nothing more wonderful than
the pupil of the eye. The pupil cannot cover a person's
badness. If within the breast things are aligned, then the
pupil is clear. If within the breast things are not aligned,
then the pupil is dull. Listen to a person's speech and look
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at his/her PUpilS:34 how can the person be concealed?
(Mencius 4A16, emphasis added.)
Like this case in the Mencius that includes the aural where it is not
necessary, a case in the Mozi also includes the aural without reason.
In a description of the sage's clothing, it notes pointlessly that
their clothes do not dazzle the ears:
:~L~ Z ~ ~ H~ jjj ~mfa J1JL Ilf rm )E ~
~F ~:Ej: § rm ~ ~ ~ *
The sages made their clothes just to suit their bodies, not
for ~ling ears and eyes or showing stupid people.
(Mozi 6/12)
Thus, there are repeated occurrences of the ears and eyes in
contexts where one sense alone would suffice. These occurrences
point to not only the importance of the two senses but the
importance of their pairing. The desired and known things of the
world are aural or visual in nature, and they also form a
complement to one another.
Conclusions
In their prominent role in these texts, the senses of hearing and
sight sometimes substitute for the senses as a whole. But it seems
that hearing and seeing do quite a bit more than stand in for the
other senses. In and of themselves, they seem to indicate
knowledge of the world and the power to control it.
Even more significantly, a surprising variety of things that
are desired and known conform to either being heard or being seen.
In these texts, aurality and visuality seem to represent a very basic
way in which the universe is divided. Both human beings and things
tend to manifest themselves as partly aural and partly visual, and
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the two fonn a pair of complementary parts. While many of the
references to hearing and seeing do not mention that they should
match, the pairing itself implicitly suggests they should. What the
ear hears should tally with what the eye sees, and if it does not,












Chapter 3: The Heartmind's Relation to the Senses
While the heartmind is superior to the senses in certain
ways, much of its role is not too different from that of the senses.
The Mencius and the Xunzi are careful to point out that the
heartmind is the ruler of the other senses. But in the passages that
deal with the functions of the heartmind and the senses, the
heartmind's similarity to the other senses is often striking. The
very notion of the "heartmind"-as one function that both emotes
and thinks-makes an important point in this regard: its thinking
and feeling cannot be disengaged from one another. This chapter
aims to sit.uate this thinking/feeling function in terms of its
relation to sensing. If the heartmind feels as well as thinks, does it
also sense? My contention is that the heartmind is, if not a sense
itself, then very closely related to them. To make this argument,
this chapter will examine various traits ascribed to the heartmind,
ranging from the simple act of discrimination to what the
Zhengming chapter of the Xunzi calls verifying knowledge.
Afterwards, it will counterbalance claims about the heartmind's
superiority with a presentation of its similarities to the other
senses. The fragmented evidence in these texts cannot provide a
definitive conclusion that the heartmind is a sense, but it does
undermine the view that the heartmind is radically distinct from
the senses.
Activities of the Heartmind
Warring States philosophical texts ascribe only a handful of
activities to the heartmind, one of the most basic of which seems
to be "discriminating" or "distinguishing." The description of the
heartmind in the Zhengming says that, like the senses, the
heartmind makes discriminations. Although discriminating is not
unique to the heartmind, it is still a significant part of the heart-
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mind's function. The Mozi cites the heartmind's distinguishing as
the detming feature of an intelligent person:
• ~ JlJ' ¥li$ ffii l' ~ ~
:g, 11 ffii l' {~ J1J
Intelligent people's heartminds distinguish, but they do not
speak in complex ways.
They have much strength, but they do not boast of their
deeds.
(Mozi 2/12-13)
While the Mozi highlights the importance of the heartmind's
distinguishing, the Zhengming specifies which categories it
distinguishes:
~ Me :'g ~ $: ~ ~ ~ ~ P) JG\ ~
Speech and causes, happiness and anger, sadness and joy,
loves, hates, and desires are differentiated by the
heartmind.
(Xunzi 22/19)
If we ignore the first two items, this looks like a series of
emotions. But because "speech" and "causes" are included, we
might say this is a group of "categories," strongly influenced by
emotions. Drawing distinctions between these categories is one of
the heartmind's basic operations.
The heartmind's pondering seems to build upon its
distinguishing. I The items distinguished by the heartmind in the
Zhengming bear a significant resemblance to what the Xunzi
elsewhere calls the qing (conditions? dispositions?).2 These qing
are what the Xunzi uses to explain the heartmind's pondering.
After introducing the notion of a person's nature or "what he/she is
born with," the Xunzi says,
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ttz~~~~:jli~ttWzm
m1'& ffii JL\ ~ Z WttW z J1!
The nature's love, hatred, pleasure, anger, sadness, and
happiness: [we] call this qing [condition? disposition?].
Given that the qing is like this, the heartmind's acting
upon this and selecting: [we] call this pondering.
(Xunzi 22/3)
The passage implies that pondering amounts to selecting. The
notion that pondering consists in selection is reinforced by the use
of similar characters (ze Wand qu 1&) to describe the heartmind's
actions. A passage from the Zhuangzi seems to refer to the
heartmind's "self-selection":
::X. /iJIi :.It ~ JL\ ffii fIiIj z
ffiE~J3.flreflilj:¥
~ &\ m{~ ffii IL\ § 1& ~ 1'f z
m-~JfiJ:1'f~
But if you accord with your completed heartmind and make
it your authority, who is without such an authority?
Why should it be someone who knows alternations and
whose heartmind selects by itself who has such an
authority? A stupid person has one also.
(Zhuangzi 2/21-22)
The emphasis on selfselections seems to recur in the expression of
the heartmind's independence, as described in the Xunzi. 3 Once
again, that text speaks in the same breath of qing and the
heartmind's selections:
IL\ ~ :.It W* fire ~ &, § ~
~!Jo/.]*mp;J
~'~Z~*::fJt
Of the heartmind's manner, its selections cannot be
prohibited. It must see by itself. Though things may be
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varied and extensive, the arrival at its qing [conditions?
dispositions?] will not be divided.
(Xunzi 21146-47)
Given the Xunzi 22/3 reference (above) to selecting qing, I take
this portrait of the heartmind's independence to concern selection
of qing. No matter how varied the things confronting it, the
heartmind will "see by itself" (more on this image below). It does
so by directly selecting qing (that is, either selecting a "condition"
from among the things or selecting a "disposition" in response to
the things). In light of these repeated references to selections, we
may infer that the description of pondering as selecting among
qing is no idle quirk on the part of one author. In these texts, it
seems that the heartmind ponders by selecting among the
categories that it discriminates.
Through a process that the texts describe as "seeking" (qui
*) and "obtaining" (de ~), this pondering leads to knowing. Both
the Xunzi and the corrupted chapters of the Mozi, known as the
"Neo-Mohist Canons," compare the heartmind's pondering to an
eye's seeking for a needle. The Xunzi passage reads,
4-~L~1i~B*~ffij1'~
~ ~ ~:lF § ~ I!fj -w.
!W ffij ~ z -w. JL.' ~ ~ ~ 7jj\ 1&
Now when it is a case of a needle being lost, one can seek
all day and not find it. Finding it is not a matter of the eye
gaining additional clarity. [One uses one's] pupil and sees it.
The heartmind's pondering is also like this.4
(Xunzi 27/64-65)
If A. C. Graham's reconstruction of the Neo-Mohist Canons is
successful enough to be used as evidence, Canon A 4 repeats the
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A41131<i!!.
( II) (II) i!!. if tJ Jt m:fi 31< i!!. ffii /f &;\ ~ Z
(;fi!G)
A 4 To ponder is to seek.
(Ponder) "Ponder": by means of one's knowing one seeks
something, but does not necessarily obtain it. (Like
peering).
(Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 266,
translation modified)
Thus, pondering is like seeking, but it may not fmd what it seeks.
This notion that the heartmind seeks to obtain something may be
illuminated by another aspect of the Xunzi. The Xunzi compares
the difference between pondering and knowing to the difference
between looking and seeing. That is, it presents a sequence that
parallels seeing without looking to knowing without pondering:
/fmffifJ!/f~ffif~/f§ffifffi/fllffifm
[The gentleman] does not look yet sees; does not listen yet
hears; does not speak yet is trusted; does not ponder yet
knows.
(Xunzi 24/2)
Working from this analogy, we might say that the difference
between looking and seeing is that looking does not necessarily
obtain what it seeks. (For example, the Xunzi mentions that a blind
person can "look" at the stars, but slhe cannot see them.)6
Applying this to the heartmind, it seems that two of the
heartmind's activities-pondering and knowing-relate to one
another as seeking relates to obtaining. Mencius 6A15 (quoted
below) says as much. The heartmind differs from the senses
because ofthe fact that it thinks; and because it thinks, it obtains
something.7 Thus, the heartmind's pondering is a kind of seeking,
and knowing means getting what it seeks.
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The idea that the heartmind's knowing amounts to getting
what it seeks evokes the ambiguity of its being both heart and
mind. Seeking introduces an element of desire to these descriptions
of the heartmind's knowing. It indicates desire insofar as it
presupposes a desire to meet a goal. The relation of seeking to
desire is especially close in these texts, where desires are very often
described in terms of the character qui 3.1( (seek). For instance, the
Xunzi explains the nature of desire in terms of seeking.8 It says
things like,
A ~ ffij fl ~ ~ ffij l'~ ~tl1' ~ 11!€ 3.1(
Once people are born, they have desires. And once there




Desires are such that they seek without waiting for what
can be obtained.
(Xunzi 22/57)
Portraying the heartrnind as seeking means the heartmind's
pondering is motivated by desire, and its knowing is getting what it
desires. Thus, not only do the qing that the heartmind selects in its
pondering resemble a catalogue of emotions, but the motivation to
select among such emotions may be as compulsive as these
impatient desires. This, too, characterizes the function as both
heart and mind.
"Verifying Knowledge" in the Zhengming
In addition to knowing, the heartmind has the capacity for
verifying knowing, according to the Zhengming chapter of the
Xunzi. (The term does not appear elsewhere in these texts.) Before
attempting to identify what the heartmind's verifying knowledge
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is, it is worth articulating what it is not. The Zhengming suggests
that it is not a transcendent function that steps in to interpret
sensations by means of names or judgments. In other words, just as
notions of "perception" and "sensation" do not apply to sense
discrimination in these texts, they also do not apply to the
heartmind.
The depiction of sense discrimination must be read in light
of the Zhengming chapter as a whole. The Zhengming professes
to have a central aim: to show what the sages would need to
investigate in order to make new names. The Zhengming does not
try to describe an imaginary state (of a group or an individual)
prior to the existence of speech and names. For its project of
showing what is needed for new names, the Xunzi points out three
agendas and addresses each in turn. The sages should consider (1)
the "purpose of names" PJT ~ ~ ~, (2) "what we rely on for
distinguishing the same and the different" 1iJT ~ ~ IrlJ ~, and (3)
the "pivot for regulating names" *,J ~ Z m'i~. In this three-part
sequence, the sages' naming takes place in the first section and
culminates in the third section, neither of which describes knowing.
Verifying knowledge and what I call sensory knowledge only
appear in the second section. This means that the Zhengmings
interest in the application of names to things has much to do with
the purpose and regulation of names and only indirectly relates to
knowledge based on sense discrimination. Moreover, it means that
naming occurs in the Zhengmings project from the very
beginning. The sequence in the structure of the Zhengming does
not present naming as something that can only occur after sense
discrimination. Although it is true that the heartmind does have a
special function in the Zhengmings description of sense
discrimination, its job is not to name or interpret data. Speech and
interpretation already appear in the process of sense
discrimination before the heartmind begins its special function.
The role of speech in the Zhengming is complex. The
Zhengming mentions the ears' discrimination of sounds (sheng
if}--a term that in some cases can indicate voices or speech.9 The
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Zhengming then places the heartmind's discrimination of speech,
or spoken explanations (shuo Jm), at the very same level:10
!It if m?Ii ~ ~ ~ !It tJ If: •....
~~ +IT IN.. "5tX. ~ s ~ ill! r,W 1'1 " at
i1J[. AA = II'" -R * ~ ID' m .vAiL ~
Sounds and tones, clear and muddy, modes and hannony,
and strange sounds are differentiated by the ear....
Speech and causes, happiness and anger, sadness and joy,
loves, hates, and desires are differentiated by the
heartmind.11
(Xunzi 22/17-19)
Thus, speech is an aspect differentiated by the heartmind, as sound
is differentiated by the ears. If I am correct that there is such a
thing as sensory knowing, these differentiations of sound and
speech seem to belong in that category.
Speech also plays an additional role in verifying
knowledge-the special fonn of knowing attributed to the
heartmind, working in tandem with the ears and eyes. But speech
does not name things in this role. On the contrary, the passage
simply notes that speech is necessary for confirming knowledge:
~ffijll?i1&:'~f,f~'B~~~~
~~IiJtP.
1i 'B aJ z ffij l' ?;[] ii:' 11 z ffij ~ Jm
flU A ~ /f ~ m'l z /f m
However, verifying must await the heavenly officers'
meeting and recording their kinds in order to be possible. If
the five officers record them without knowing, or if the
heartmind verifies without speaking, then people will not
fail to pronounce it "not knowing."12
(Xunzi 22/19-21)
The passage does not elaborate on what it is about speech that
permits the attribution of knowledge. At this point, the discussion





ofknowledge of sense discrimination ends. After the discussion of
knowing, the second section very clearly comes to a close with the
announcement that, "It is this that causes sameness and
difference."
Not until the beginning of the last section does the Xunzi
finally state that these (already known) distinctions between same
and different should be followed and named----rendering similar the
similar and different the different. In other words, the naming
referred to in the first section's description of the "purpose of
names" is not reintroduced in the second section's description of
how discriminations are known by the senses and the heartmind,
and verified by the heartmind. The final section concerning
regulating names is where the same and different are named. Two
things show that this naming of sameness and difference is not like
interpreting uninterpreted sense data. First, as argued earlier, the
differences are already imbued with meaning. Second, verifying is
not a process of naming. The Xunzi does not explain how the
heartmind progresses from the verifying knowing of the second
section, which already requires speech (shuo ~), to the third
section's naming the same and the different. However, the fact
that naming only appears in the third section shows that verifying
knowing is not the heartmind using its speech to name unnamed
sense products.
Thus, the ears' discriminating sound and the heartmind's
discriminating speech, as well as the heartmind's verifying
knowledge, all occur prior to decreeing names (ming $),13 which
does not reappear until the third section, the "pivot for regulating
names." Hence, whatever verifying knowledge is, it is not a process
whereby the heartmind names.
"Verifying Knowledge" outside the Zhengming
Although the term verifying knowledge only appears III the
Zhengming chapter of the Xunzi, the idea may extend outside of
that chapter. Xunzi 21/34-39 consists of a long description of the
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heartmind's knowledge, but aside from the claim that knowledge
requires sameness and difference, nothing in the passage reflects
the Zhengmings discussion of verifying knowledge.14 However,
hints of something like verification seem present in other places.
Some other activities ascribed to the heartmind would seem to be
helpful for verification. For example, in Mencius 6A9, the
heartmind "supposes," and in the Xunzi 21/33, the heartmind
"endorses" something. Furthermore, the Mozi refers to the
heartmind's failure to examine knowledge in a way that suggests it
possesses the capacity to examine.1S All of these actions-
supposing, endorsing, and examining-may be likely to contribute
to verification, but do not approximate the act of verifying itself.
My hypothesis is that the reference to the heartmind's
tallying in the Zhuangzi is the closest thing to verification. The
Zhuangzi implies that tallying is characteristic of the ordinary use
of the heartmind. In the context of identifying the limitations of
ordinary functions, the Zhuangzi comments that listening stops at
the ears. Then it adds,
...iL' Jl: 1* ~
... the heartmind stops at tallying.
(Zhuangzi 4/27)
In early Chinese history, tallies consisted of two sticks with
matched notches. These were widely used as tokens of
agreement-the carving on the tally being split in two when the
tally was broken, and each half serving as proof of a promise.16
While "supposing," "endorsing," and "examining" may all be useful
for the purpose of verifying something, only "tallying" seems able
to accomplish that purpose.
Other references to tallying in these texts provide support
for the case that tallying might be what the Zhengming calls
verifying knowledge. As this passage from the Xunzi implies, tallies
derive their value from their ability to justify trust:
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Uniting the halves of tallies and tokens and separating






The trust invested in a tally helps explain why the Xunzi
characterizes creating strange names as a crime comparable to
disrupting tallies (and other standards of measure). Speaking of
those who interfere with correct names, the Xunzi says,
:Jt~~1..'t1~1I1lt.z~-tl!
iii. :Jt .a; ~ j& itt; 1..'t1 ~ ~ PJ ~ 1£ ;g
Their crime is [treated] like those who violate tallies or
weights and measures.
Hence, [the true ruler's] people do not dare to make up
strange phrases and disorder correct names.
(Xunzi 22/8-9)
The connection of tallies with naming here is not arbitrary. Not
only the allusion to trust, but also the mention of names is a
reminder that what tallies accomplish in one sphere, correlating
speech with action accomplishes in another. In other words, what
makes trust possible in human relations (according to these texts)
is speech that coincides with behavior, like two parts of a tally.




In terms of those who analyze things, there is value in
discrimination and matching, as well as tallying and
confirming. Those who sit and talk should be able to stand
and show that what they say can be established-that it can
be enacted over a broad area.
(Xunzi 23/44-45)
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An even more explicit metaphor for matching speech with action
like two parts of a tally appears in Mozi 16/29 (quoted in full in
Chapter 2). This repeated use of a trustworthy tally as a metaphor
for enacting speech sheds light on the Zhuangzts comment about
the heartmind's tallying. The reader may recall that the
Zhengming specifies that the heartmind uses the ears and eyes for
verifYing knowledge. I 7 Thus, the evidence indicates four things: (I)
that one of the heartmind's functions is tallying, (2) that speech
and action need to be tallied, (3) that speech is heard and action is
seen, and (4) that the heartmind verifies through the ears and eyes.
In combination, this evidence points to the conclusion that the
heartmind verifies by tallying the senses of hearing and vision.
The Heartmind's Status in Relation to the Senses
As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, by virtue of some of
its activities, the heartmind is presented as superior to the other
senses in these texts. The consensus seems to be that, ordinarily,
the heartmind controls the other parts of the person. The Xunzi
says the heartmind is the ruler of the form. 18 It also notes that the
heartmind governs the other senses, ordering the five officers from
the center, where it is positioned:
Ii:" !i5 tp l!![ P) 7f11i 'Er
The heartmind dwells in the central emptiness, in order to
govern the five officers.
(Xunzi 17/12)
The Mencius contrasts the heartmind to the ears and eyes, calling
the former the great part of a person and the latter the petty part.
According to the Mencius, one should follow the heartmind, both
because it is greater and because it is sent from heaven.19 One
should not let the ears and eyes undermine the heartmind's office:
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IL' ~ 'B' ~UmJ~ ~U flf ~ ~m~u ~ flf -t!!.
l!t7'2~J=WW~ii
:$'[; JL :if ~ *- ii ~U ~ 11\ ii l' ij~ • -t!!.
Thinking is not the office of the eyes and ears, and they
are clouded by things. Things interact with things, and pull
them astray. That is all. The office of the heartmind is
thinking. It thinks, and thus it obtains. If it does not think,
then it does not obtain. This is what heaven has given me.
If you first take your stand upon the great part, then the
small part cannot take it away.
(Mencius 6AI5)
As the passage points out, the heartmind's ability to think gives it
more self-control than the ears and eyes in the face of the things
that tug at it. The Zhuangzi also recognizes that the heartmind is
characteristically the master (although the Zhuangzi disagrees
about the wisdom of putting the heartmind in control). One of the
Zhuangzi's characters criticizes someone for using his heartmind as
his teacher (~ Bili IL' ii -t!!.) in a way that indicates that generally
the heartmind occupies the position of authority (Zhuangzi 4/24).
Leadership is a capacity that the other senses do not seem to have,
hence, the heartmind is superior in this respect.
The heartmind has the additional superior feature of
helping the other senses to function. The Xunzi claims that, unless
the heartmind is employed, hearing or seeing will not occur:
Ie., l' ue ~ ~U B JlIit tE WI ffij l' ~
~ !fZ tE mu ffij :EJ: l' ~ t5i'. m- ue ;g :if
If the heartmind is not being applied to it, then black and
white may be right before one's eyes and not be seen;
thunder or drums may be at one's side and one's ears will
not hear them. How much more so with one whose
heartmind is occupied by somethingPO
(Xunzi 21/4-5)
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In the Zhengming, the Xunzi repeats this claim, saying that,
because of the heartmind's verifying knowing, it is possible to use
the ears to know sounds and the eyes to know forms.21 In addition
to this assistance in knowing, the heartmind also seems to have a
capacity to substitute for the senses, which the Xunzi claims the
senses do not have22 (more on this below). In its assistance to the
other senses, as welI as substitution for them, the heartmind
manifests superiority and control.
Similarities Between the Heartmind and the
(Other) Senses
Nevertheless, there are many reasons to think that the heartmind
is like a sense, not the least of which is the fact that sensory lists
often include the heartmind. The Xunzi, which is the most
adamant about the heartmind's leadership, repeatedly lists the
heartmind as one of the five senses. In some cases, there seems to
be no discernible distinction between the heartmind and the rest of
the senses.B For example, in the Xunzi 11146-47 listing of what
the senses desire, no changes in the rhetorical pattern serve to
isolate the heartmind from the other senses (see Chapter 1). A
similar kind of list of human qing includes the heartmind but omits
the nose and adds the form and body. In a discussion of the role of
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more beautiful [than what the emperor has]; the ear is fond
of sounds, yet no sounds of music are more grand; the eye
is fond of color, yet no ornaments or patterns extend more
completely, nor are women more numerous; the form and
limbs are fond of ease, yet no peace or weightiness, nor
period of quietude is more pleasant; the heartmind is fond





One might object that in both these examples the heartmind
appears at the end of the list-a location that might alone serve to
distinguish it from the other senses. But the heartmind does not
always appear as the culmination of the list (see Xunzi 23/25-26
on page 19): Similarly, an example from the Laozi includes the
heartmind in the midst of what appear to be sensory lists. The case
from the Laozi manages to find one desired "object" that
motivates the heartmind in the same way that, for example, tastes
motivate the mouth. (Interestingly, it decides upon speedy horses.
which also inspire desire in Mozi 36/18, Mencius IB1, and
Zhuangzi 2/81.)
1iiSfJl!A§"'@"




The five colors cause people's eyes to go blind. Riding and
hunting cause people's heartminds to go crazy. Goods that
are hard to obtain cause people's actions to be obstructed;
the five colors cause people's mouths to miss the mark.
The five tones cause people's ears to go deaf.24
(Laozi 12)
Once again. the subject seems to be the sensory desires, and in this
regard, the heartmind seems very much like a sense.25 Hence,
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insofar as it desires, the heartmind does not appear to be too
different from the other senses.
Moreover, the heartmind's ability to substitute for the
other senses renders it similar to the senses, even as it serves to
mark its superiority. According to Xunzi 21/46-47 (above) the
heartmind can see for itself. While this may sound like an
insignificant metaphor, the Xunzi also mentions the heartmind's
speaking and listening:
PJ tiL' ID? PJ ftJ! IL' ~ PJ 0 IL' m
Use a humane heartmind to speak; use a learned heartmind
to listen; use a fair heartmind to discriminate.
(Y"n7; ??/.:1"~/>\
,- -_••_. -_. • - • - J
The heartmind's ability to listen appears in the Zhuangzi as well, as
if it were an advance over ordinary listening with the ears:
1!!€ ~ L PJ J=t ffii mL PJ iL'
Do not listen with the ear, but listen with the heartmind.
(Zhuangzi 4/27)
The heartmind's capacity to speak is also noted more than once.
In addition to Xunzi 22/45, it appears in the Zhengming and the
Mencius. The Zhengming implies that the heartmind has the
capacity to speak, by saying that if it does not speak, then no one
wi!! credit it with knowing.26 The MencilLS actually cites the
heartmind's speech:
~ iL' 8 ~ fiiJ JE W13 t ~ itt i5:. m
Their heartminds say, "This person is not fit to speak with
about hu.1Jlaneness a..Jld righteousness."
(Mencius 2B2)
Thus, the heartmind sees, listens, and speaks in a variety of
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I:"
the heartmind has the capacity to substitute for the other senses-
these passages paint the heartmind as a physically interactive
function. A heartmind that is said to see, listen, and speak cannot
seem radically divorced from the senses.
Other senses serve as analogies for the heartmind, which
contributes to the sense that there are similarities between them.
For example, the Xunzi mentions an unnamed thinker, who
believes the heartmind's goodness inheres in it like good eyesight
inheres in the eye:
m.tt@w~.~#w~~~.~.W~~ili
~ 'f( 1{ ;f+ ~ ~ ~ iL' ~ ~ ~ @
;fi 'f(."ilJ PJ J! ~ ~ ~ mE §
"ilJ PJ ft\ ~ JLW ~MIt
~l3§~WItJtl!!ili
The so-called view that "[human] nature is good" takes its
[the nature's] failure to leave its plain s~ate as beauty and
its failure to separate from its original character as
beneficial. Such a view compares the plain state's relation
to beauty, as well as the intent of the heartmind's relation
to goodness, to the way brightness of ocular capacity does
not leave the eyes and keenness of aural capacity does not
leave the ears, (whence comes the saying "bright eye and
keen ear").
(Xunzi 23/15-17)
The view described here finds fault with the deleterious effects of
distance in time and space. This view objects to leaving the
heartmind's original state on the same principle that brightness and
keenness do not venture far from the eyes and earsP The point
seems to be that the pinnacle of goodness lies in remaining in the
heartmind's original state, for the same reason that the eyes and
ears function best when things are close to them (either in space or
time). The analogy in the Mencius is a bit more straightforward.
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The Mencius notes that, just as the sages set the standards of the
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In the relation of mouths to taste, there is similarity in
what they relish. In the relation of ears to sounds, there is
similarity in what they listen to. In the relation of eyes to
color, there is similarity in what they find beauty in. As for
the heartmind, does it alone lack similarities in what it
approves of'? '" Therefore, the way pattern and
righteousness please my heartmind is like the way the flesh
of animals pleases my mouth.
(Mencius 6A7)
According to these two analogies, the heartrnind and the senses
have certain things in common-they function on the same
principles regarding space and time, and they share the tendency to
prefer similar things. The fact that the senses serve as analogies
for the heartmind makes it unlikely that they are radically
different in nature.
The metaphor of the heartmind as a mirror does not
explicitly compare the heartmind to the senses, but it still manages
to highlight their similarities. These texts treat a pan of water as a
potential standard of measure. They say the heartmind is like a
pan of water, insofar as it reflects what passes before it. They use
the water-mirror metaphor to emphasize, not representation, but
the ability to respond to changing stimulation. As the Zhuangzi
puts it,
.3:I A z mJL' B ~ l'~ l' jill
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People of achievement use the heartmind like a mirror.
They do not escort or welcome. They respond, but do not








The Zhuangzi passage notes that for a mirror to be effective, it
cannot escort what has come or welcome what will come. Such
storing inhibits its ability to respond. The reference to response
suggests stimulation, and indeed, the heartmind can be stimulated.
A character in the Zhuangzi objects to having his heartmind
stimulated by an offer of power:
& X fnJ mPJ 7i1 X r ~ .:y Z JL\ ~
What are you doing stimulating my heartmind with the
prospect of ruling the world?
(Zhuangzi 7/10)
Thus, the mirroring heartmind operates on the same principle of
stimulus and response that characterizes the operation of the
senses.28
The mirror metaphor also shows that, in addition to being
stimulated, the heartmind resembles the senses in being enticed by
things. Whereas the Zhuangzi juxtaposes the heartmind's storage
to its response, the Xunzi makes a similar point via an opposition
between storage and emptiness. The Xunzi says that the heartmind
can store its aims as long as it remains empty-that is, as long as
they do not interfere with its receptiveness:
A~fffiflmmfffifl;!;;!;-tl?~~-tl?
?&fffiflfJTif~
~ PJ fJT B~ ~ PJf ~ §'t if z ~
Once people are born, there is knowledge, once there is
knowledge, there is the heartmind's aims. The heartmind's_
aims are its storing. And yet the heartmind has what is
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called emptiness. Not letting what has been stored damage
what is to be received is called emptiness.
(Xunzi 21/36-37)
The passage says the storage in the heartmind pertains to its aims
or the directions in which it heads.29 The implication seems to be
that repeated aims are stored in the heartmind, perhaps in the
form of habits. While this passage suggests that the heartmind
should not let its aims interfere with its receptiveness, the Xunzi's
own mirror metaphor indicates that its success in this regard is
rare. It implies that the mirror of the heartmind is easily disrupted
by the passing of the wind, rendering it unable to reflect.30 Using
the same character from Mencius 6A15 to describe how things tug
(yin 5I) at the senses, the Xunzi goes on to assert that the
heartmind's mirror is vulnerable to the enticement of things:
Ij\ W51 Z ~U ~ IE 7f- ~
~ Ii:.\ pg flj ~U l' JI! PJ #!: m~ ~
If small things pull it, then its correct exterior alters and
the heartmind's interior overturns. Then it is not sufficient
to settle various patterns.
(Xunzi 21/57-58)
Thus, contrary to the claim in Xunzi 21/44-46, the heartmind is
not unlike the senses in being pulled by things. The mirror
metaphor betrays the resemblance: like the senses, the heartmind
only functions properly when the undue influence of external
things does not disrupt it.
In the course of its interaction with things, parts of the
heartmind seem to move from the inside to the outside. The
Mencius describes the heartmind in terms of exiting, as well as
entering. At one time, Mencius considers a saying of Confucius and
determines that it applies to the heartmind:
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fN! ~u fj * ~u L tB A ~ IF.f ~m:jt m
fllL' ~ ID!J W
"Hold it and it is preserved, cast it off and it is lost.
Its entrances and exits lack regular timing, and no one
knows its place." Isn't this said of the heartmind?
(Mencius 6A8)
"i I
Although the passage does not specify what enters and exits, it
certainly affirms that entering and exiting are features of the
heartmind. Thus things exit from the heartmind, as well as
entering it.
A variety of things can emerge from the heartmind. The
Xunzi mentions that shapes (or "forms") leave the heartmind:
~ 1B II IL' 3<: ~ ~ ~
15 .. -S fdf j't ~ l' f!ij ~ ~ l' 5JU
If heterodox [different] forms leave the heartmind,
encountering and illuminating heterodox [different] things,
then name and filling will be mysterious and knotted, noble
and base will not be clear, same and different will not be
distinguished.3 1
(Xunzi 22/13)
To understand the concern that strange forms might leave the
heartmind, it may help to consider a passage from the Zhuangzi
that speaks of things being bound to the heartmind:
*r~*m=
:jt-1fPih:jt-~ih
T ~ ~m1fP ih l' fiJ fIR ~ IL'
The world has two great commandments. One is ordained
and the other is duty. A child's love for its parents IS
ordained. It cannot be unbound from the heartmind.
(Zhuangzi 4/39-40)
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In light of the possibility that things can be let loose from the
heartmind, the Xunzi passage seems to say that odd items should
not be allowed to escape the heartmind and cause chaos in their
encounters with things.
Peace is also something that can escape or be "emitted"
(chu I±l) from the heartmind, according to the Zhuangzi.32 In
preparation for contact with a dangerous person, one of Zhuangzi's
characters suggests rectifying the body. He elaborates on this as
wanting the form to approach without entering and wanting the
heartmind to have peace without emitting:
IEft!li!!~




JL\ f[] ffii I±lll ~ 5l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Align your body! In form, there is nothing like the
approach. In the heartmind, there is nothing like peace.
However, these two have difficulties. With approaching,
you don't want to enter. With peace, you don't want to
emit. If the form approaches and enters, then there will be
overturning, disaster, collapse, and stumbling. If the heart-
mind has peace but emits it, then there will be sound, fame,
uncanny events, and retribution.33
(Zhuangzi 4/56-58)
In this balancing act of entering and exiting, the Zhuangzi says it is
dangerous to allow peace to exit from the heartmind.
The Mencius seems to posit other things emerging from
the heartmind. The Mencius states explicitly that something
rooted in the heartmind will appear in the visual expression:
m~ JL\ ;tt ~ is i!!
1rP~J!~OO
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[These are] rooted in the heartmind and born in the









The Mencius also refers to speech being "instigated in" (zuo yu i'F
1n) the heartmind. When it justifies why Mencius engages in
debates with nonorthodox thinkers, the text refers to something as
being instigated in the heartmind. The subject is slightly ambiguous,
but Mencius is quoted as saying that he drives away their excessive
phrases (speech) so that perverse speakers cannot instigate things.
He then adds that what is instigated in the heartmind will
subsequently obstruct affairs and governing:
]FE ~.~ 1tx ~ ~$ ~ ~ ~ 1~ 11'
11' 1n ;It iL' ~ 1n;It .11' 1n;It • ~ 1n;It i&
I resist Yang and Mo, drive away their excessive
expressions, so that perverse speakers do not instigate
things. [Such] things that are instigated in the heartmind,
obstruct in affairs. [Such] things that are instigated in
affairs, obstruct in government.
(Mencius 3B9)
The likelihood that speech is what is instigated in the heartmind is
supported by another passage that says more or less the same thing
about excessive phrases and obstructing governing. Here Mencius
defends what he means by saying he "knows speech," and in this
case seems to describe speech as "born in" (sheng yu ~ 1n) the
heartmind. Mencius appears to say that by knowing speech, he
means inferring something about the source of the heterodox
phrases (speech). The subject of the next clause is unclear, but it
states that something is "born in" the heartmind that obstructs
governing. Because Mencius was just speaking of the source of
various illicit phrases, and is now speaking of something being
born, it is likely that the subject is these phrases whose source he
knows:




~ ~ ~ JL\ ~ ~ ~ i& f1 ~ ~ i& ~ ~ ~ $
"What does it mean to know speech?" Mencius replied,
"From one-sided phrases, I know that from which they
cloud. From excessive phrases, I know that from which
they sink. From bad phrases, I know that from which they
estrange; from evasive phrases, I know that from which
they exhaust.
What is born in their heartminds obstructs in their
governing; what issues from their governing obstructs in
their affairs."
(Mencius 2A2)
Thus, in addition to causing facial expressions, the Mencius seems
to say the heartmind causes speech to be instigated or born. While
this is not as explicit as a term like "exit," it does hint at
interaction (albeit indirect) between the heartmind and the exterior
of the person. This may be what the Zhuangzi means by implying
that inward channels of the eyes and ears can lead to expelling the
heartmind's knowledge (see Zhuangzi 4/32-33, page 59). From this
perspective, the heartmind's external vent depends upon its
connection to the ears and eyes. In any case, the Mencius suggests
that speech and visual expression "exit" from the heartmind. Thus,
the heartmind is like the other senses insofar as it interacts with
things.
Conclusions
While the heartmind may rule the senses, it is not unlike them.
The heartmind's capacity to distinguish seems to be something it
shares with the senses. If we take these analogies seriously, its
pondering is comparable to the eye's looking. To some extent,
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even its knowing may be a feature that all of the senses share (as
argued in Chapter 1). The Xunzi and the Mencius insist that the
heartmind has more balance and self-control than the senses. But
perhaps their claims implicitly admit that the difference is a
matter of degrees. Only the heartmind's verifying knowledge seems
qualitatively different from anything performed by the senses. If I
am right that this verifying corresponds to the heartmind's tallying
things heard and seen, then there is a significant reason why the
senses of hearing and seeing are featured so prominently in these
texts.
The heartmind does have some capacity that permits it to
rule over the senses. But this does not eliminate the possibility that
the heartmin~ is a sense, or very much like a sense. In fact, it
seems to be the proper consequence of the ruler analogy that the
heartmind would be one of the senses. Rulers may be superior to
their subjects in important ways, but even if they are descendants
of ancestors in heaven, they are not a different species of being.
Chapter 4: Names and Their "Filling"
As noted in the Introduction, many sinologists describe the
early Chinese cosmology in terms of an organismic process. Such a
cosmos, they argue, has no room for eternally unchanging
substances or realities. Instead of immutability, at best the cosmos
offers constant patterns amidst change (epitomized by things like
the seasons and the alternation of night and day). The regularity of
patterns provides the basis for order, which seems to be the main
concern of Warring States philosophical texts. Change is
inevitable, but not disastrous-as long as there is regularity in the
constant patterns of the cosmos. This chapter contributes
evidence for that view of the early Chinese cosmos, by focusing on
the implicit role of change in one central feature of the worldview
expressed in these texts. That is, I will suggest that intimations of
change are present in the use of the character shi ., which is
frequently translated as "substance" or "reality." Shi appears
together with ming i; (names) in a dyad that seems to refer to a
very basic division of the world. I This chapter argues that there are
two aspects of change associated with the use of the character shi:
(1) The character is used to signify the product of a process (a
"fruit"). (2) It is also used within an aural/visual pair. I contend
that "names and shirt is an aural/visual pairing, like "speech and
action" described in Chapter 2. As the partner term for names, shi
is visual in nature, and insofar as vision correlates with action (as
Chapter 2 argues), shi also indicates activity, and therefore change.
"Fruit" versus "Substance" and "Reality"
Translating the character shi as "substance" obscures its frequent
association with notions of change. This sense of change can be
highlighted by focusing on the connotations of the term's use as
"fruit." Fruition is a matter of becoming full, in the sense of a seed,
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Xu Shen's (c. 55-149) Han dictionary, the Shuo wenjie zi,
clearly post-dates the Warring States period, but must be addressed
because of its widespread influence.2 The Shuo wen glosses shi as fu
j; "wealth." Indeed, shi'" is composed of three parts-a "roof," as
well as a "string" and "shells" (suggesting coins strung together).
The Shuo wen gloss seems to encourage the idea that the
constitution of the character shi consists of strings of coins filling
up a house, hence seemingly indicating wealth as a storehouse of
substances. However, in the composition of a character containing
the element "roof," what is underneath the roof need not be
something inside of that roof. Fu M itself is a graph composed of a
"roof' and a "field," and, in addition to "wealth," its use has an
extended conQotation of "fullness." But it seems unlikely that this
connotation refers to a field that is underneath a roof filling up a
house like a container. The same point applies to shi. On this
model, the Shuo wen's suggestion that shi means "filling" is
unlikely to refer to substances filling up a house. Instead, it may be
related to shi's function as "fruit." In the organic sense of the term,
shi fills space by growing and expanding its contours.3 (Similarly,
shi and its opposite xu l!![--empty-may refer to a stomach, which
changes shape as it moves from empty to full.)4 In other words,
the filling does not involve adding substance to a container that
has a permanently fixed shape. The focus of filling in the use of
the character shi is on the filling out of space, like a seed growing
to fruition.
The Zhengming chapter of the Xunzi confirms this
emphasis on the importance of spatial filling for understanding shi.
When the Xunzi explains how shi can be counted, it says that if
something has the same manner, but is different in spatial location,
then, although it can be united, we should call it "two" shi. Thus,
the relevant feature in counting shi-even if it has the same
manner--seems to be how it fills space:
:fi ~ :IX ill fPl PH ~ PI l1U ift
:lXfPlill~~PJT~NdEI1J-§-tiW~=Jf
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~ it ffif 1!l€ 7JU ilW ~ - ,.
!It JJ ~ ffi P--t fi ,. )E I5r -tl!
Things that have different shapes but occupy the same
place can be separated. If the shape is the same, but the
place is different, although they can be united, call them
two shi. If the shape changes, but the shi has not been
separated, although it is different, call it transformed.
Things that transform without being separated, call them
one shi. This process is how shi are investigated and
numbers are determined.
(Xunzi 22/27-29)
Thus, whether or not a shi is divided determines whether to call it
one shi. If there is transformation without division, the Xunzi calls
it one shi. If by "division" the Xunzi means split into two, then
again the emphasis seems to be on occupation of space. The
criteria for being one shi, then, are that (l) it is not in two places
and (2) it is not divided (perhaps again, by place). A shi can alter
its manner and still be one shi, but if it fills different spaces, it
becomes two shi. Hence the sense in which shi connotes fullness
lies in how it fills space. Its solidity (or substantiality) is
secondary-a byproduct of this filling.
Like the translation of shi as "substance," the translation
of shi as "reality" also obscures the notion of change implicit in
the use of the character. The term "reality" has a variety of uses in
English that do not suit shi-particularly its use in opposition to
illusion and nonexistence.s Moreover, while "reality" invariably
connotes authenticity, such connotations are not bound to appear
in the use of shi. This means, as I will argue below, that certain
translations of shi as "reality" do not produce the most coherent
interpretations of the texts.
Although things that are not shi are generally described as
empty, emptiness is not unreality.6 Even in the contexts where
empty is associated with falsity (jia ~), emptiness is not a matter




of illusion masking nonexistence. Rather, when something empty
is false, it is because some potential is not being fulfilled. For
example, the Mozi refers to emptiness and falseness as not being
embodied, i.e., filled by the body:
;g -r z m~ ~IJ ~ Efft
M ~U ~ ~ 1:. ~U ~ ~ 1E ~U J! :R
[g fJ ::g- l' EJ ~ ~ & z :!it ::g-ifJ.
• "* IL' ::g- 1P.€ tJ, m~
!!VJ "* :!it ::g- 1P.€ tJ, m$
1:B "* IJ ::g- 1P.€ tJ, m~Jr1
The way of noble people is such that, as to poverty, they
are p~e; as to wealth, they are righteous; as to life, they
are loving; and as to death, they are sad. These four actions
cannot be emptied and falsified in contrast to their bodies.
There is nothing hidden in their heartminds that is not the
utmost effort to love. There is nothing that moves from
their bodies that is not the utmost effort to be respectful.
There is nothing emitted from their mouths that is not the
utmost effort to be mild.
(Mozi 2/6-8)
In other words, these actions are empty when the heartmind, the
body, and the mouth do not "ful-fill" them-indeed, fulfill them by
manifesting them to the utmost point of exhaustion. Thus,
emptiness is not unreal in the sense of being non-existent or
illusory. The implication is that an empty action is like a dormant
seed of potential that is not carried out.
An empty name provides an even clearer illustration of
what emptiness connotes. Such a name is not illusory in the sense
that it does not exist. The Mozi says that actions are the source of
names (fame). An empty name is one that flows obscurely from a
murky, untrustworthy original act:
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:&/F~~ffii¥1'§:R
J}]p'x-ij~-ijV1'PJ~1I-Jl
When the origin is muddy, the flow is not clear. When
actions are not trustworthy, one's name/fame will certainly
be exhausted. Names are not just born, praise does not grow
on its own. When effort is achieved, one's name follows,
and the name and praise cannot be empty and false.
(Mozi 2/11)
There is a contrast here between, on the one hand, the act of
effortless birth and growth, and, on the other, the achievement of
an effort. The contrast indicates that the emptiness or falseness of
a name reflects that it did not originate in an act of striving. Such a
name can be called "misleading," but it is not illusory in the sense
that it is not really there.
Likewise, the Mencius's explanation of shi in terms of
beauty in no way hints at the subject of illusion. In the Mencius's
aesthetic evaluation, fulfillment and emptiness designate degrees of
beauty, not degrees of existence. Someone asks Mencius what he
means by the terms "good" and "trustworthy." Mencius answers,
PJ~zm!J~1'fMf2zm!Jlli
3iS • Z m!J ~ 3iS • ffii 1'f :J\: ~ Z taLk
What can be desired is called good, and having it within
oneself is called trustworthy. What is full and shi [brought
to fruition] is called beauty. What is full, shi, and brightly
displayed is called greatness.
(Mencius 1825)
In this passage, shi is something beautiful, insofar as it is
completely manifest-it extends through its fullness and brightness
of display. By contrast, emptiness would be something not fully
manifest. Because the Mencius presents this contrast in terms of




degrees of beauty, this too supports the interpretation that when
emptiness connotes falsity, it is because of nonfulfillment, rather
than illusion or nonexistence.
Like reality versus illusion, the opposition of authenticity
versus inauthenticity can be misleading when applied to shi. In
some circumstances, shi is interchangeable with the character qing
m, and seems to connote authenticity.7 However, when contrasted
to emptiness, shi is not always the more favored of the two, which
makes it incongruous to view shi as authentic. For example,
heaven's emptiness (or tenuousness) seems to contrast positively
against the qualities of earth-that is, whereas the earth is heavy
and damp, heaven is empty, warm, and bright.s Rather than
rendering heayen less authentic, the greater tenuousness of heaven
seems to be part of the overall superiority of the powers on high.
The value of emptiness is also apparent in the Xunzi's praise for
the heartmind's emptiness, which provides the space that allows it
to govern (Xunzi 17/12) and be receptive to new aims in spite of
already stored aims (Xunzi 21/36-37). Thus, while in some
contexts, the use of shi implies authenticity, in other contexts,
emptiness possesses advantages that preclude viewing shi as the
more authentic of the two.
The Mengsun Cai passage of the Zhuangzi illustrates the
danger of insisting that shi is authentic. In this passage,
"Confucius" (the mouthpiece of the Zhuangzi) praises the very
people whom Van Hui describes as lacking shi. Van Hui asks,
J%:!*';t:Jt£1:JE
~ ill: 1!l€ ~ lf1 ie., /F Jl% m~ /F ;a
1!l€ ~ .=. ~ tJ ~ Jlf, ~ ~ ~ ~
l!m1[1!l€:Jt.ffif~:Jtil~J¥
When Mengsun Cai's mother died, his cries and wails lacked
tears. His inner/central heartmind was not sad. While
residing in mourning, he did not grieve. Though lacking
these three things, his excellence at being in mourning
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covers the whole state of Lu. Are there indeed people who
obtain a name for something without its shi [filling]?
(Zhuangzi 6/75-76)
When answering this last question, Confucius does not deny that
Mengsun has the name but lacks the shi. Yet, nonetheless, he
praises him, saying that Mengsun has gone beyond knowledge and
simply wails when another person wails. If we translate shi as
"authenticity," then Confucius's answer seems to praise Mengsun
for lacking in authenticity/reality. While Yan Hui does present
Confucius with a puzzle, it is doubtful that the puzzle is quite so
bizarre as this. Translating shi as "real" makes the passage say that
emotions are genuine, while behavior is mere appearance. From
this view, Mengsun Cai got the name and did the deed (mourned)
but lacked the real, authentic emotion.
My contention is that such an interpretation is too quick
to categorize certain things as actions and certain other things as
emotions. The passage states that, in addition to sadness and grief,
Mengsun lacked tears. Tears are not emotions. They might be
counted as expressions of emotion, but according to that
conception of emotion, so too would crying and wailing, with
which Mengsun is credited.9 Thus, on that view, Mengsun could not
be said to lack emotions. Moreover, sadness is described as an
action in Mozi 2/6-7, which opens the possibility that Mengsun
(who is said to lack sadness) did not perform at least one relevant
action. Indeed, perhaps there is no antithesis here between actions
and emotions.
There is little reason to assume that, in these texts,
emotions are something other than a type of action. If emotions
are manifestations and expressions, then these too are actions.
The alternative is to think that emotions are private
entities/events that are located within hearts and minds and never
manifest on the "outside." Certain translations of Zhuangzi 5/45-















located in the heartmind. When asked about "completed abilities,"
"Confucius" says:
~~~L~~~Mft~~~~¥~$~~
~ $ Z ~ 1f/i Z 17 -tl2.
B~ffi~:p.HrJffijm~fjgm:p.~tzit1!i-tl2.
iN. ~ JE P). mfa ~ PI A :p. I! Jf.f ne z fO ~
jiffij~~~~
'fie B {{( ~ -m ffij :W ~ ~ :ff
~ ~ ffij ~ ~ ~ IL' 1!i -tl2. ~ z m!J ::t ~
Death and life, persistence and loss, exhaustion and
achievement, poverty and wealth, competence and
incompetence, slander and praise, hunger and thirst, cold
and neat. These are the changes of events, the actions of
ming [fate/ordainment/decree]. Day and night, they
mutually alternate in front of us, and knowledge cannot
measure their origins.
Therefore they are not sufficient to disturb one's hannony.
They cannot enter one's spiritual residence.
To make it so that harmony and ease circulate, but are not
lost in openings,10 to make it so that, while night and day
lack a break, together with things, one is like springtime,
this is to greet [things] and to generate timeliness in the
heartmind. This is caHed "completed abilities."
(Zhuangzi 5/43-46)
Rather than a sealed storehouse, the lingfu (spiritual residence)
image described here points to a place that permits open
circulation. The references to generating timeliness and an ever-
readiness to begin (like springtime) make the heartmind seem
responsive and open as it "greets" things. Loss of peace and ease is
avoided, not by sealing up a container, but by maintaining an
equilibrium in the midst of inside/outside interaction. I I Emotions
of harmony and ease circulate (or interact, tong ji), while the
heartmind greets things in a timely fashion. It is possible to
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envision a circulation of private entities/events inside a closed
container, but it seems more likely that these emotions circulate
inside and outside as manifestations and expressions.
In applying this notion of emotions as actions to the
Mengsun passage, we might say that by lacking tears, sadness, and
grief, Mengsun "lacked the shi " insofar as he did not fully perform
the act of mourning. Perhaps Mengsun's mourning was not brought
to fruition. Fruition requires development and completion. In that
case-rather than singling out emotion as genuine, in contrast to
actions as inauthentic-the point of the use of shi may be that
Mengsun did not complete the acts offeeling necessary to fulfill
the name "mourning." Thus, when Confucius praises Mengsun for
wailing because another person wails, he is not praising him for
lacking authentic and real emotions. On the contrary, he praises
him for an act of feeling that he views as authentic, in spite of-or
even perhaps because-it did not bring a name to fruition. Perhaps
Mengsun and Confucius are liberated from the requirement of
tallying name and shi. This may be what Confucius means by
saying that Mengsun has gone beyond knowledge, (that is, as I
argue below, like matching speech and action, matching names and
shi may be constitutive of knowledge). Assuming that the
Zhuangzi maintains a consistent position on the subject of
emotions, then it is significant that Zhuangzi 5155-60 does not
advocate ceasing to emote.12 Like this interpretation of the
Mengsun passage, Zhuangzi 5155-60 merely promotes not letting
one's emotions cause oneself harm, which seems to amount to
limiting, rather than eradicating, them. In sum, consistently
reading shi as "authentic" can produce peculiar interpretations of
passages, whereas consistently reading shi as fulfillment/fruit seems
to avoid this problem.
As this discussion shows, the use of the character shi
implies more of a sense of change and activity than translations
like "reality" and "substance" tend to convey. Understood in terms
of the notion of fruition, we see that the way shi functions implies
























container model stuffed with substances does not bring this activity
to the fore. Terms that invoke illusion and nonexistence also fail
to note the process involved in bringing something to fruition. In
light of that process, the falseness that is sometimes associated
with emptiness is the result of incomplete fruition. Something that
is called shi, the Mencius reminds us, is brought to completion. On
these grounds, it seems highly improbable that, in the Mengsun Cai
passage, the term shi would refer to authenticity by virtue of an
opposition to action (as if he "did the deed" but lacked the shi).
With consistent interpretation of shi as fruition, activity seems
central to the meaning of the term.
Ming/Ski as an AuralNisual Pair
The distinctive role of shi .. in sense discrimination is another
factor that connects shi to change. Unlike reality, which may be
accessible to all of the senses, shi is generally something seen by
the eyes, in the same way that names are heard by the ears. In
other words, in this section I argue that minglshi is an aural/visual
polarity. This point will be made by noting the various inter-
connections between the two pairs of terms-"speech and action"
and "ming and shi. "
Whereas an empirical approach to 'reality' might define it
in terms of access to the senses as a whole, shi is primarily
accessible to sight. There is no indication that the senses
collectively access shi. In fact, the five senses do not even seem to
collectively verify knowledge. 13 The most common examples of
testing knowledge in these texts involve tallying the ears' hearing
with the eyes' seeing. Thus, most of the senses do not participate
in verifying knowledge and most of the senses do not contact shi.
The behavior of sense discrimination in these texts does not meet
the expectation that reality is indicated by the character shi.
The emphasis on ears and eyes and their effects on the
reception of the world (discussed in Chapter 2) should lend some
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initial credibility to the claim that ming/shi is an aural/visual pair.
But before arguing that shi is visual in nature, the case must be
made that ming is fundamentally aural/oral. What is controversial
here is the texts' view of Chinese writing. My contention is that,
within these early philosophical texts, ming ~ refers, first and
foremost, to speech, and only incidentally to written characters as
records of speech.
The use of sensory metaphors shows that ming ~ is
consistently presented aurally/orally in Warring States
philosophical texts. The texts contain no instances of ming being
seen, while there are multiple instances of ming being heard and
ming coming out of the mouth. In the most overt instance, the
Xunzi 22/38 says that the function of a ming ~ is to be heard in
such a way that makes shi understood.14 Moreover, the substitution
of ming €P for ming ~ in Mozi 19/4-6 (see below) associates
ming~ with something inherently spoken (a decree).15 Given the
connection between these two mings, the Mozi's argument against
ming €p implies that both terms refer to something that is not
visible in nature. That is, ming $ is so obviously not visible that
the passage that argues against ming $ cannot even use the phrase
"seeing mingo II Except when asserting that it is not possible to see
ming, the Mozi resorts to strange phrases like "seeing the 'thing'
(wu ¥;]) of ming," and "seeing the 'body' (ti iii) of ming," in an
attempt to find some aspect of ming that could possibly be visible:
f& ~ l' 1i~ L B M: Lm
§ f!t PJ ». B;-~ ~ PJ * :ff
I)J\1iJ{l,$L¥JJOO$L~~Jf-
~U * 1i 1'f -tl!.
~~S~~~1'~~§Lm1'~~ffi~~
f& ~U J'VJ l' 1i~ L~ fI* L f!!l § mt: aa Jf-
§ f!t PJ ». B;- ~ ~ PJ *~
1)J\1i~OO$L~J{I,$Le~Jf-~*1i~-tl!.
Then, why not try to test the qing [conditions?
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until now, from the time that people have been born, has
anyone ever seen the wu [thing] of ming
[fate/ordainment/decree] or heard the sound of ming? Of
course, no one has.
If the common people are considered stupid and worthless,
and the qing [conditions? dispositions?] of their ears and
eyes are not reliable as a standard, then why not inquire
into the recorded speech of the feudal lords that has flowed
down to us? From olden times until now, from the time
that people have been born, has any of them ever heard
the sound of ming or seen the body [til of ming? Of
course, none of them has.
(Mozi 36/6-9)
Translating this passage's Imt visual reference to ming as "such a
thing as ming" (or some other equally smooth locution) would
obscure the pattern here. The parallelism in the passage requires
some visual aspect of ming to correspond to the aurality of its
sound. Not satisfied with its first attempt (wu of ming), the
passage tries "Ii of ming" the second time. The text's fumbling with
"wu of ming" followed by "Ii of ming" indicates that wu and Ii are
visual items (a point of relevance later in this argument). At the
same time, it indicates that ming is not normally viewed as having
a visual aspect. If it were, the text would have settled on it.
Evidence of various other sorts speaks in favor of the
theory that names are oral/aural. One could read Canon A 78 of
the reconstructed Neo-Mohist Canons as saying that an sounds
emitted by the mouth "have a ming":
A 781'1 j'!~~
(;g) (¥JJ) }iit!;gW&,m*Z (~) *1'1 it!
$Z(~J~it!(~.)it!~~~~1'1~
$Z (~) fJ,.~~1'1~J1:~~.~
IH±lOm;g1'1 (~~ (~) *f)
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c. Ming (name). Unrestricted: classifying: private.
E. 'Thing' is 'unrestricted'; any object necessarily requires
this name. Naming something 'horse' is 'classifying'; for
'like the object' we necessarily use this name. Naming
someone 'Jack' is 'private'; this name stays confined in this
object. The sounds which issue from the mouth all have the
name. (For example, surname and style-name.)16
(Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 325)
Whatever this might mean, it does seem to assert that "name" can
be applied to any sound coming from the mouth. The Shuo wen jie
zi says something similar regarding the constitution of the
character-explaining ming;;g by saying fff. 0 fff. 11 (derived from
"mouth" and from "dark").l7 The term ming;;g also seems related
to the less semantic, but certainly oral, ming q~ (calling) in the
Zhuangzi, that appears when "Confucius" offers the following
obscure advice:
:g~EEij~Am3t~ffii~~3t;;g
A ~U q!Wi ::f A ~U 11:
I will tell you. You can enter and roam in his enclosure, but
don't stimulate his naming. If you enter, then call [ming
U.!Wi], if not then stop.18
(Zhuangzi 4/29-30)
The passage implies some kind of echo-response connection
between a birdlike "calling" and the use of names (ming ;;g). Both
this passage and those above support the claim that names (ming
15) refer broadly to sounds that come out of the mouth.19 Thus,
ming seems to be aural in nature.
Having argued thus far that ming is aural, it remains to be
argued that shi is visual. The visuality of shi appears in certain
passages that substitute ming and xing (name and action) and yan
and shi (speech and shi), instead of the usual yan and xing and
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and shi become more comprehensible when viewing shi as (a visible
act of) fulfillment, rather than as reality.21 More importantly,
simply by implying a parallel relation between the two pairs-
yan/xing and minglshi-these passages lend credence to the idea
that minglshi is an aural/visual pair.
Just as one's speech may be enacted (xing), so too one's
speech may be fulfilled (shi) through action. For example, the




Spee~h without shi [fulfillment] IS inauspIcIOUS, and
beclouding the virtuous is equivalent to an inauspicious
shi.22
(Mencius 4B17)
The passage is less puzzling if we think of "speech" here as a
promise (or perhaps a reputation, as in ming/name) and shi as
actions (as in xing/act) that fulfill the reputation. We might
interpret the first line as saying that speech not fulfilled by action
is unlucky. The second line then supplies an act of fulfilling that is
itself unlucky-the act of obscuring the virtuous. Such a reading
has advantages over reading shi as "reality." "Beclouding the
virtuous" seems more likely to be described as an act than as a
reality. Moreover, if shi were "reality" or even "the facts," then
the failure to match speech and shi should be called "inaccurate"
rather than "inauspicious." The normative tenor of the example
(the reference to obscuring the virtuous) also points to something
other than a factual failure.
In another example of yan and shi (Zhuangzi 4/49-50),
speech is paired with action, which is explicitly associated with shi.
The Zhuangzi 4/49-50 says that speech is like wind and waves and
implies that action (xing fi) either loses (sang ~) it or "shi-es" •
it.23 In addition to implying that shi fulfills speech through action,
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the passage characterizes shi as the swelling of a wave-thus
presenting shi as extending in space. The opposite of shi here is
not unreality, but loss (perhaps the deflation of a retreating wave).
Thus, like the case discussed above, this passage argues for
interpreting shi on the model of xing-as action that fills out
speech.24
Along with these connections of yan and shi, the uses of
shi in the Mozi provide particularly good evidence for interpreting
shi as visually accessible action.25 The Mozi speaks generally of the
shi of both the eyes and ears, but when it breaks down the
compound, ming is what is heard and shi is what is seen.
Some of the Mozi evidence for the visuality of shi occurs in
its analogies involving blind people. One such analogy makes use
of this subtle aural/visual contrast:
q. 7\2 ~ iL ~ fl~U~ ~ :g, ~ !R. :r& «; ~*
5lU ~ f'f !If ~ iL ~ ffij ::f~ ;1t • if!
I!t.~li~iLWA[ilJiPB~iL;g;
ffij ::f fi~ 7t ;1t f7JJ if!
5lU ~ mi :ff 53U ~
Now the world's feudal lords still attack and assault each
other. This is to have praise for the name of righteousness,
without investigating its shi [its fulfillment?]. This
resembles the way a blind person, along with others,
similarly ordains [ming iP] the names [ming ~] of black
and white, but cannot discriminate their wu [the things that
correspond to them?]. Can this be said to be having
discrimination?
(Mozi 19/4-6)
The passage shows that wu (thing) can substitute for shi. (It first
mentions "investigating its shi," and then puts "discriminat[e] their
wu" in its place.) As Mozi 36/7 indicates (see page 57), the wu here
that cannot be discriminated is visual in nature.26 Moreover, while
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reference to ordaining suggests that ming is aural. In other words,
the passage claims that a blind person can sense ming (the
correlate of the aural sense); however, he/she cannot sense shi
and/or wu (its visual counterpart). Finally, the passage implies
some kind of visual analogy between righteous shi and black and
white things. In both cases, the blind person, while able to utter
their names, cannot see the differences.
Another blind-person analogy in Mozi 47/23 illustrates
that "seeing the difference" depends on action. The passage
compares the act of picking black and white (things) to the
articulation of a name:
~WS$£~B~~1LIHft
E4E Iyf§ ~ 11!€ PJ ~ Z
3KtB~UEWJ&~1'(fgm~
afiSW1'mB~~~~~~~~~.~
Now, the blind say that what is bright is white, and what is
dark is black. Even the clear-sighted would not change that.
But if you mix together white and black and cause blind
people to pick [among them], they are not able to know
[how to do it]P Therefore, when I say that the blind do
not know white and black, it is not with regard to their use
of names, it is with regard to their picking.
(Mozi 47/23-24)
Although the passage does not mention either shi or wu, it clearly
echoes Mozi 19/4-6. Here, instead of "investigation of shi" and
"discrimination of wu," we have picking out black from white. On
the grounds of the similarity between this passage and 19/4-6, we
might expect that here too there is an implicit shi that matches
the names black and white. We might initially suppose that the
unstated shi in this passage are black and white things. But a closer
reading argues for a different conclusion. First, black and white
stand on their own. In contrast to what might be expected in a
substance-based metaphysics, no word for "thing/object" even
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appears. Second, in the last line, the comparison is not between
names and things, but between names and picking.28 Like 1914-6,
which identifies an act of righteousness as a visual counterpart for
the name of righteousness, this too identifies a visual act: the act
of picking. Whereas speech is the aural evidence that a person can
use names, the act of picking is the visual evidence. Once again, in
a substance-based metaphysics, the significant visual element would
be the objects, which possess properties of being black and white.
But here the act of picking (which is the proof of eyesight) counts
more. The use of a blind person in both of these passages manages
to highlight both the visuality of shi and its connection to action.
In addition to highlighting the visuality of shi, the Mozi
also contains passages suggesting an aural/visual aspect to the
minglshi pair. In the Mozi, examples of aural/visual patterns that
use wu rather than shi are more common. One example that
parallels ming and wu concerns the sound and the wu (visual
aspect?) of ghosts and spirits. The Mozi asks,
...~ ~ P) *ii 1'J\ 1'f 1!f J! W. 141 ~ ¥h l*J W. 1* ~ ~
~U W. 1$ fiiJ ~ 1!IP¥
[If] ... since the beginning of humanity, there are also those
who have seen the wu of ghosts and spirits, and heard the
voices of ghosts and spirits, how can they be called
"absent"?
(Mozi 31/12-13)
Here, instead of "the sound and wu of ming" (Mozi 36/6 above), we
have "the sound and wu of ghosts and spirits." (Again, translating
this as "such things as ghosts and spirits" would obscure the
aural/visual pattern in these examples.) The use of these different
pairs-sound and wu (Mozi 31/12, 36/6), sound and ti (Mozi 36/9),
ming and wu (19/5), and ming and shi (l9/5}-in each case, more
or less obviously in the context of things heard and seen, implies
that shi, like other pairs for ming and sound, is something visible.
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aural and visual paraJJel pairings, like yon and xing. Ming is
something sensed by the ears, and so too shi seems to be something
sensed by the eyes.
Indeed, ming and shi resemble yon and xing in one other
significant way-their union seems to contribute to knowledge. As
noted in Chapters 2 and 3, the philosophical texts of the period
tend to presume that speech and action should match like two
parts of a taJJy. The Mozi's version of this refers to their matching
by using the term he it (uniting) (Mozi 16/29). Similarly, the Mozi
describes the ideal relation of ming and shi using the term
"uniting." According to the Mozi, ming and shi unite by "mating":
13fT ]:) ~ 15 -tl! 13fT ~ 'It -tl! 15 Jr ~ it-tl!
That by which something is caJJed is the name. What is
called is the shi. The mating of name and sM is uniting.29
(Mozi 42/37)
Thus, the same term that depicts the relation of speech to action
also depicts the relation of names to shi. As noted in Chapter 3,
like speech and action, names and shi are invoked in the context
of standards of measure. Because standards of measure facilitate
reliable knowing, it may be significant that this line from the Mozi
appears to belong to a passage concerning knowledge.30 On these
grounds, it could be argued that standardized matching of ming and
shi produces knowledge, following the same pattern that produces
knowledge by reliably matching speech and action.
Hence, a variety of evidence contributes to the proposition
that ming/shi is an aural/visual pair: Consistent references to
hearing and speaking ming imply that ming is (at least
fundamentaJly, if not exclusively) something spoken and heard. At
the same time, paraJlels between ming and shi imply that shi is
primarily visual in nature. In addition, some troublesome passages
containing the character shi seem more coherent when shi is in-
terpreted in terms of (visible) acts of fulfiJlment. The import of
these factors, which argue for interpreting ming/shi as an
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aural/visual pair, is enhanced by the possibility that uniting ming
and shi produces knowledge. In sum, rather than view shi as reality,
a better understanding of the texts might result from viewing it as
the active, visual counterpart to hearing sounds.
Ming/Shi and tbe Rectification of Names
The discussion of the "rectification of names" (zhengming 1£ i;)
in the Lunyu 13/3 and in Xunzi 22 can be used in favor of the
argument that ming/shi is an aural/visual pair. The view that
ming/shi should be understood as names/reality is in tension with
the notion of rectification of names. If reality is truly real, and
names are not part of it, then correcting names is not likely to
have much of an effect on it. This problem might be resolved by
arguing that names do not describe a preexistent reality, but rather
prescribe what reality is to be like.31 But to the extent that this
means reality is determined by something external to it, the term
"reality" itself seems dubious. In the discussion of rectifying names,
it seems even more important than usual to get our own
terminology right. If names create reality, then names might be
more real than what they create. At the very least, it seems that
names are equally as real as what they create. With this question
about ontological status-equivalence in mind, this section explores
how the texts present interactions between names and shi. It argues
that the relation between names and shi is two-sided, with no
inherently superior side. And yet, when it comes to restoring order,
it is names that are subject to correction. Working from
aural/visual parallels and metaphors related to names and shi, the
section proposes a justification for the importance placed on
correcting names.
The Lunyu and the Xunzi seem far more interested in
correcting names than they are in correcting the counterpart of
names (however conceived).32 The Xunzi contains an entire
chapter devoted to the topic of correcting names, asserting that
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governing. For its part, the Lunylls attention to the topic makes
up in enthusiasm what it lacks in quantity. The rectification of
names passage in the Lunyu invests enormous confidence in the
efficacy of correcting names. When asked about his first priority
for administering a state, Confucius is reported to have replied,
£' t!!. 1£ i; :¥....
i; /f 1£ ~U§ /f III §/f fl!f[ ~U$ /f ~
$ /f ~ ~U tI ~ /f $
11~ /f J! ~U fflJ iJ /ftfl
jfIJ iJ /ftfl JfU ~ 1lre rtf ~ '¥ JE.
~ ;g .:y. i; Z £' PI § t!!. § Z £' PI fJ t!!.
;g-=fm-;!'t§1lrem~ffijB*
Certainly, correct the names....
If names are not correct, then speech is not smooth. If
speech is not smooth, then events are not completed. If
events are not completed, then ritual and music do not
flourish. If ritual and music do not flourish, then laws and
punishments are not on target. If laws and punishments are
not on target, then the people have nowhere to place hand
and foot. Therefore, noble people's naming must be
speakable, their speech must be enactable. With regard to
speech, the noble person is in no way careless.
(Lunyu 13/3)
Of course, there are multiple cases in all the texts wherein ming
and shi are weighed against one another, but this notion of
"rectifYing names" stands out. It seems a bit inexplicable that the
Lunyu and the Xunzi adopt this program expressly aimed at
naming.
In order to understand the conception of names, we might
look at the metaphors relating names and shi. Rather than saying
that names "picture" or "mirror" things (which implies a re-
productive, secondary status), the texts tend to use terms that
cluster around the metaphor of "binding" to describe the relation
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between names and shi. The Xunzi describes a disruptive relation of
names and shi as being "knotted" (22/13).33 Ideally, this knotty
relation is a straightforward bond. But it is significant that both
sides are subject to being bound. In some cases, the relation of
names and shi seems as if the shi were there first. The Zhengming
provides an example of this:
Me ~ ~ ~ Z 7t 51U $11 1:l PJ m..
J: PJ 13J3. ~
r PJ mIPJ oW
• G IYl IPJ oW 51U
Therefore those who are knowledgeable for this reason
divide and separate and establish names in order to point to
shi.
Above, to clarifY noble and base, below, to distinguish same
and different.
(Xunzi 22/14-15)
Here, names have an ostensive relation to shi-"pointing" to shi
that are noble, base, similar, or different-as if names were bound
to shi. But the Zhengming also mentions a type of binding wherein
shi are bound by names:
1:l ili ~ ffi PJ:wI ~ 'If ili
As for names, they are that which meet and bind shi.34
(Xunzi 22/38-39)
Perhaps examples of names binding shi might include cases where
deeds are turned to the benefit of reputation. For instance, a
fictitious Confucius in the Zhuangzi notes that desire for fame
fosters remarkable acts of bravery:
~~~Z~~~Z"~±-A$A~n~
~ *~ ffii fig § ~ ~ ffii lI!L;fi ~
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The test of protecting the beginning [or "what one starts
with"] is shi [acting/fulfilling a name] without being afraid:
a single brave knight boldly entering a battle of the nine
armies. If someone seeking a name can demand this of
himself, and be like this, how much more sO...one whose
heartmind never dies?!
(Zhuangzi 5/11-13)
With something akin to begrudging admiration, the passage shows
how deeds can be performed in the service of a name (which, thus,
antedates the deed).35 The Zhengming describes yet another
option-an interrelated process in which shi are bound by names,
and, in virtue of this, names are bound by shi:
15 1!l€ tfU .. t!J z Pj $" ..
t!JktfrRX:tiWZjfl5
l51'ftfU~~~ffij1':l?ttiWz~l5
Names have no original shi [filling?]. Bind them by
ordaining shi.36 If the binding settles and a habit forms, call
it a shi name [a full name? a productive name?].
Names do have original goodness. If it is direct, easy, and
not contrary, call it a good name.37
Xunzi 22/26-27
Looking carefully at the second and third lines, as the shi are
named, the names themselves become bound to the shi (which is
why they become "shi names"). It is as if the binding of the shi
(naming them) is concomitant with binding the names. Thus, both
names and shi are in some sense "bound" in these attachments. We
may see this as evidence that it is not the case that names merely
reflect or re-present shi. Thus far, it seems that names and shi
occupy equal footing.
Arguments to the contrary often point to the supposed
parasitic aspect of names in one particular passage from the
Zhuangzi. The Zhuangzi reports the comments of a person who
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You're ordering the world, and the world is already ordered;
if I were to take your place, would it be for the sake of the
name? The name is the guest of the shi. Would it be for
the sake of the guest?
(Zhuangzi 1/24-25)
The speaker compares the relation of shi and name to that of host
and guest. However, it would be wrong to read this as affirming the
superiority of shi. The first line points to a shi that is already
filled-the position of ordering the world. Because that position is
filled, the only position available is that of the guest. Although a
host may seem more important than a guest, the passage identifies
names as honored visitors (using the polite term bin JU. Thus, the
name visits the shi, like a guest of honor, in a relation of mutual
respect.38 The recluse refuses the position of guest, not because it
is inferior, but because it is the only position available to refuse.
In fact, respectful relations of host to guest are typical of
the formalized, even ritualized, relations between shi and names.
As in the context of ritual, repeated patterns of use produce order
in the mutual bonds between names and shi-that is, the original
situation (wherein shi are named) is stabilized by a gradual process
of habitual attachment. This ceremonial attachment connotes
decorum and ethical correctness. The Xunzts preceding reference
to "appropriateness" (yi 11:) in naming (Xunzi 22/25) hints at
questions of ethical and ceremonial decorum. In fact, "binding" is
the term that the ethically ideal Van Hui purportedly uses to
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Perhaps just as ritual gradually binds Yan Hui to upright behaviors,
so too the habitual use of names gradually binds an ethically
correct order to their relation to certain shi. Like guests and hosts,
names and shi are bound by a ritual context that would counteract
any tendencies to stray off into unpredictability. In other words,
the attachment of names and shi may belong to the context of an
organized and ritualized process of ethical enhancement. (Hence
the term for "correcting" names is also used to connote ethical
correctness.) The ritualized setting highlights that the connection
between names and shi is orderly and reliable (and by no means
parasitic).
The metaphor of guest and host not only sets names and
shi in a ritualized context, it also indicates the particular feature of
names that accounts for why they elicit correcting. Like a guest,
names seem to be less "grounded" than shi,and more inclined to
move. On the same lines, the fact that names are said to be "added
to" or "located in" shi, conveys an impression that a name takes
up less space, so to speak.39 As the Mozi mentions, individual
names seem to stop or stay within the confines of certain shi:
;,ij! i;* 11: m: ;,ij! If *
This name stays in this shi.
(Mozi 42/35)
The implication of this stopping is that names have more
potential than shi to move on. The implication is similar when the
Xunzi mentions names, rather than shi, as being "settled."40 As
Xunzi 22/26 (see above) makes clear-names have the capacity to
be shi-Iike (to be shi names), whereas the same is not said of shi,
that is, shi are not described as name-like (named shi?). Thus,
names are more flexible in relation to shi than vice versa. Names
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have the potential to be either full or empty, and it is easy for
something flexible (or tenuous) to travel.
In contrast to the flexible emptiness of names, the
metaphor inherent in the notion of shi as fruit evokes a certain
gradual slowness. The Lunyu stipulates that fruits occur only
gradually-not arriving until after flowers, if they arrive at all:41
1Efffi1'*1ffl~~*fffi1'.1ffl~~
There are indeed seedlings that do not flower, and there are
flowers that do not fruit.
(Lunyu 9/22)
In addition to coming slowly, fruit has a characteristic heaviness
that can only impede its speed. The Laozi implies that shi is also
relatively "thick" in character. The passage aligns shi with the
thickness of fruit, in contrast to the thinness of flowers:42
~ PJ "* 1:~ f5 ;!=t J!i fffi l' f5 ;!=t 78
f5 ;!=t .. l'f5 ;!=t •
Therefore, the great man dwells in the thick and does not
dwell in the thin; dwells in the fruit and does not dwell in
the flower.
(Laozi 38)
A passage from the Yuan Dao chapter of the Huainanzi (dating
from the early Han and therefore questionable as evidence here)
hints at the relative "heaviness" of earthbound shi by contrasting it
with birds flying in the air:
~ fJl: l!: fffi m~ Ji'lff .. fffi fE
Birds fly by stroking emptiness.
Animals run by treading shi.43
Although names are not always empty, their flexible potential to
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While heaviness of shi is associated with the earth, names
have more affinity with the air. They benefit from being carried
on the wind, which, the Xunzi notes, amplifies sound:
l'i J!\ iTIi af ft ~~ DO ~ t!?
iTIi~~~
When you accord with the wind and shout, the sound is no
stronger, and yet the audibility is amplified.
(Xunzi 117)
As argued in Chapter 2, the wind is a force of disruption, with a
potency that notably affects those who contact it. But names also
hang in the. air in a positive sense-as scalelike standards of
measure. The Xunzi says,
~ ft * ,@ P) ~ J( r
[Their] name and sound is not sufficient to hang over the
world [as a balancing foree].44
(Xunzi 9/99)
While names may not exactly fly, they do move "at the speed of
sound" so to speak. The Lunyu bemoans this capacity in reference
to speech:
Tffil8m~~TZ~;gTt!?.lY1'&15
Zigong commented, "It is a pity that the gentleman should
have spoken so about the gentleman. 'A team of horses
cannot catch up with one's tongue.'"
(Lunyu 12/8)
In addition to speed, names also partake in the peculiar
responsiveness of sound.45 In sum, names contrast to shi like the
heavens above to the earth below, or the tenuous to the filled out.
Names have the greater speed and flexibility. To that extent, it is
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both more important to counter their influence, and more feasible
to alter their state.
Conclusions
I have argued that ming and shi are an aural and visual pair. As
such, their relations are parallel to one another, and their
importance seems equivalent. Yet names are the focus of
rectification, for reasons that might relate to the aurality of
names. In contrast to action, which moves with the heaviness of
earth, names occupy little space and travel lightly. The reason why
rulers must take unauthorized names particularly seriously is that
names travel with the speed of sound, like speech, which is inclined
to bypass action, because of its greater speed and fluidity. As a
result, speech must slow down if it is to match action like two parts
of a tally. So too names must slow down, perhaps so that names








As a measure of the usefulness of this project, this
Conclusion aims to employ this study of the senses to illuminate
some underlying differences in the arguments of certain Warring
States texts. In particular, this Conclusion will illustrate points
where the Xunzi contrasts with the Mencius and the Laozi
contrasts with the Zhuangzi. In the first section, I will show, by
means of an analysis of their treatment of hearing and seeing, that
the Xunzi and the Mencius ground knowledge differently. In the
second section, by exploring their unusual approaches to the
senses, I will sort out how the Laozi and the Zhuangzi reach
different positions about their use.
Hopefully, the overall project will gain some justification
insofar as its analysis of the senses can elucidate the contrasts
considered in this Conclusion. In other words, this Conclusion may
serve as a test of the accuracy of my analysis of sense
discrimination in these texts.
Comparison of the Xunzj and the Mencius
While aural/visual parallels occur in all of the Warring States
philosophical texts, in the Xunzi they play an especially
prominent role. For the Xunzi the responses of the eyes and ears
produce reliable knowledge, both because they correspond to one
another, and because they respond spontaneously to stimulation.
While spontaneity of this sort precludes the labor of selecting an
appropriate response, it does not preclude evaluating responses in
relation to their consequences. This indeed reflects the Xunzi's
pragmatic approach to knowledge. In the Xunzi, knowledge is
oriented toward embodiment and action. By contrast, in the
Mencius, origin plays a greater role than consequences. When the
Mencius treats aural and visual parallels, it shows greater interest in
136
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how these senses are rooted in the heartmind. Likewise,
spontaneity of the senses is quite a different matter in the
Mencius. For the Mencius, spontaneity has to do with reflecting
the heartmind. It is less a response than an extension. Thus, the
Xunzi and the Mencius attribute the reliability of aural/visual pairs
to different causes-for the Xunzi, spontaneous response; for the
Mencius, spontaneous extension of the heartmind.
The Xunzi
The Xunzi treats the eyes and ears as things that respond and
correspond. The Xunzts aural and visual pairs often consist of
echoes and shadows. In the Xunzi's usage, these metaphors tend to
emphasize spontaneity of response. That is, the Xunzi does not
employ them to indicate dubious ontological status. Instead, the
Xunzi emphasizes the automatic nature of the responses of echoes
and shadows. For example, the Xunzi compares the ruler's moral
responses to echoes and shadows. Although it notes that people in
superior roles teach those who are below, it does not imply that
the response of those below is somehow illusory or false. In fact,




Those above are the teachers of those below. The way
those below harmonize with those above is like, for
example, the way an echo responds to a sound and the
shadow has the shape of a form...
(Xunzi 16/77-78)
The Xunzi dwells on speed and spontaneity when it describes a
good government as one in which the people imitate and respond
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JB( ~ fk it Wr tm ~ JJ! -¥ ~ ~ 'ff tii tm •
Their government orders and instructions for
transformation are modeled below like a shadow. They
respond promptly to sudden change with quick speed, like
an echo.1
(Xunzi 13/5)
The Xunzi also compares the common people's responses to the
ruler with the responses involved in singing (auditory) and in using
a gnomon (visual). The people respond spontaneously, as long as
the form is displayed.2
.±~~zn~iftJ:~rZ.ift
1JJl. ~·ft n~ ffii JJ! mit ffii IJJ
~ ~ ~U ~ 1Il€ If! ift
fi ~ ~U r 1Il€ IJJ ift
l' JJ! l' IJJ ~U J: r 1Il€ tJ t§ 1'f ift
The ruler is the people's singing master. Those above are
the model instrument for those below. They listen to the
singing master, then respond. They look at the instrument,
then move. If the singing master is silent, then the people
have nothing to respond to. If the model is dark, then
those below have nothing to move with. If there's no
response and no movement, then it's like above and below
having no relations at all.
(Xunzi l8/1-2)
In sum, aurality and visuality in the Xunzi indicate spontaneous
responsiveness.
In fact, correspondence and response are fundamental to





The knowledge [of worthies] communes with the great
way, responds and changes and does not reach a limit, and
divides the qingxing [dispositional nature?] of the ten
thousand things.
(Xunzi 31/17)
The metaphor for the 'correspondence' (dang 'M) of knowing
seems to be a road to which knowledge responds.3
~J :R ~ If! m1% HH H Me itt
[The gentleman] changes and responds through
righteousness, because his knowledge corresponds to the
crooked and straight.
(Xunzi 3/15)
Hence, for the Xunzi, knowledge itself amounts to corresponding
responses.
As in the examples of echoes and shadows, a knowledgeable
response in the Xunzi seems to be one that occurs spontaneously.
The Xunzi stresses that responses should be timely. It notes that
one should respond as things "arrive" (happen):
1% ffi'f ~U f1IJJ W~ ffij If!
$ 1m ffii mTEl ~L rlJ B
8B?t.IY'J*
When the time corresponds, then act; when things arrive,
respond; when events occur, then discriminate. Order and
disorder, proper and improper, will become patently clear.
(Xunzi 21/93)
The Xunzi states explicitly that the proper response does not
involve forethought. Appropriate responses simply happen, in a










responses that meet the changes of time happen easily, like
counting one and two:
flff B x Z ~ :E r;L~ B
If! ~ !F.1 Z ~ :E~ - =...
when one cultivates the model of the Hundred Kings like
distinguishing black from white, and when one responds
appropriately to every change of circumstances like
counting one, two...
(Xunzi 8/59-60)
Perhaps because it is easy, the response does not wear itself out.5
In other words, knowledge may be derived from spontaneous
responses because they are simple and unforced.
In keeping with this sense of spontaneity, the reliability of
the eyes and ears does not even depend upon looking and listening.
In one case, the Xunzi says the eyes and ears of the gentleman can
dispense entirely with the effort of looking and listening:
1'mffif Jl1'![tlffifJtW 1'§" ffifUf1'Li ffifm
l' !IfJ ffif J/J 1!L~ fi *
7( T *~ 1A ~m~ ~ fk JL\ ~ 1fJl
He does not look yet sees; does not listen yet hears; does
not speak yet is trusted; does not ponder yet knows; does
not move yet achieves. His announcements are completely
perfect. One who is a Son of Heaven: his strength is
completely respected; his form is completely comfortable;
his heartmind is completely at ease.
(Xunzi 24/2-3)
It seems that looking and listening are not necessary, because the
mutual resonance occurs spontaneously.6 This may explain the
Xunzts attitude toward the unseen and unheard. Instead of
advocating investigation of the unseen and unheard in order to
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respond properly to them, the Xunzi warns the rulers and ministers
against overtaxing the senses (see Xunzi 11/111-112, page 42).
Specifically, the Xunzi is opposed to the effort of extending




Knowledge should not strive for more, but strive to
examine what it knows. Speech should not strive for more,
but strive to examine what is spoken of. Action should not
strive for more, but strive to examine from whence it
comes.
(Xunzi 31/10-11)
According to the Xunzi, some things (such as "the mutual
operations and alternations of fullness and emptiness, the
separations and distinctions of hard and white and same and
different," ;.fi 1'( 1E mz ffi flffi £if!. ~ S fP] :W z 7t ~ if!., Xunzi
8/34) simply exceed the boundaries of the sage's knowledge. These
alternations and distinctions that are beyond the limits of
knowledge are beyond the limits of the ear and eye:




[These are what] the keen ear cannot hear, the bright eye
cannot see, and the well-spoken scholar cannot speak.
Even if he possesses the knowledge of a sage, still he will be
unable to "bend a fmger" at them.7
(Xunzi 8/34)
The Xunzi criticizes a ruler who tries to do small things by himself










12/116-117, page 42.) This kind of criticism might simply mean
that better discriminations result from mastery of a limited
quantity.9 But viewed in terms of the Xunzi's emphasis on
responsiveness, it is probable that, in the Xunzi, even subtle
mastery of the discriminations at hand should be spontaneous and
unforced. What seems noteworthy is that the Xunzi expects seeing,
hearing, and knowing to be spontaneous and forbids transgressing
the proper limits of these functions. In other words, the Xunzi's
strictures against extending sensory investigation also fit its model
of spontaneous sensory response.
The Xunzi's focus on spontaneous sensory responses is
compatible with its pragmatic concerns. In the Xunzi, the
alternative to reliable sight and hearing is not inaccurate sight and
hearing, but danger and confusion. The Xunzi contrasts blindness to
clarity of sight, deafness to keenness of hearing, ending the
sequence with the contrast of danger and safety.
P) if~ gfj P) D ~ 1U!! P) fB ~ !Ji:
He considers blindness as clarity, deafness as keenness, and
danger as safety.
(Xunzi 26/35)
Distinguishing colors with blind eyes or sounds with deaf ears
produces confusion and chaos:
1'~I'liIi7ftffii~§m
'If L ~ 1! P) if mtg
p)J!m~{g
*tlL~~~{g
Not to take this as one's teacher and model, but instead
favor one's own usage, is like using the blind to distinguish
color, using the deaf to distinguish sounds. Apart from
[causing] chaos and recklessness, it does nothing.
(Xunzi 2/39-40)
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Thus, the alternative to keenness and clarity is confusion, which
amounts to danger. In other words, failure of the two senses that
produce knowledge is assessed in terms of pragmatic
considerations, rather than considerations of accuracy.
Judging hearing and seeing in terms of their consequences is
an extension of the idea that knowing itself is not the final aim.
The Xunzi states that knowing is superior to hearing and seeing,
but not as good as acting, whereas acting is better than knowing,






Not hearing is not as good as hearing something, hearing it
is not as good as seeing it, seeing it is not as good as
knowing it, knowing it is not as good as enacting it. Study
goes as far as enacting it, and then it stops. II
(Xunzi 8/102-103)
This ranking suggests something in the distance gradually becoming
more internalized. That is, the only difference between seeing and
hearing that the Xunzi explicitly notes is that the eye's range is
closer than that of the ear.12 Thus, viewing the ranking in this
light, hearing, seeing, knowing, and enacting might indicate things
becoming increasing near and finally being enacted in oneself.
This movement from the distant to the near may be
elucidated by another passage that is also related to study. In this
passage, the progression is directed toward beautifying or
embellishing the body/person:13
;g T Z ~ -tl!. A J]Z 1f~ J]Z JL'
:flJ J]Z 1m I'l Jfj J]Z !l!JnW
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IJ\ A z. !J1i! if! A .:p. 1+ tfj .:p. 0
o 1+ z. Fa' J:lU 1m '.t 1+
-Fij ..IE PJ ~ -t; R z. Ii
The gentleman's study enters through the ear, is apparent
in the heartmind, is located in the four limbs, and is shaped
in his movement and rest. In the slightest speech and
smallest movement, it can be taken as model and rule. The
small person's study enters in the ear and exits from the
mouth. The space between the ear and the mouth is a mere
four inches. How can this be sufficient to embellish seven
feet of body?
(Xunzi 1/30-32)
Here, what the gentleman hears becomes manifest in aural and
visual responses that mark a transformation of the entire
body/person. This embellishment of the person seems to have
something to do with knowing. In another passage, right after
"collectively knowing the ten thousand things" and before the
"singular identification of a kind" (which seem to be two poles of
the knowing process), the Xunzi mentions that the body/person
will be adorned or beautified:
PJ It mz 1( ¥J I1J~ ;;0 if!
,@- ~L!t ~ J:lU ~
~'pr~ I1J mitt
~m~m-ffif1t~
By considering comparatively, the ten thousand things can
be collectively known. When the body/person exhausts its
gu, it is embellished. "Of a kind" cannot be two. Therefore
the knower selects one and has oneness.14
(Xunzi 21149-50)
These bodily embellishment passages help explain how the Xunzi
ranks knowing. It values knowing not in itself, but for the changes
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it can affect. The progression in the passage that ranks hearing.
seeing. knowing, and acting does not simply reaffirm that hearing
and seeing function in the service of knowing. It suggests that
hearing, seeing, and knowing all work in the service of
embodying.15 Thus, embodying the way and allowing it to
transform oneself is the goal of knowing. The Xunzi says,
mm:~mm:1TIlm:~if1
One who knows the way of examining, and knows the way
of acting, embodies the way.
(Xunzi 21/40)
Thus, in the Xunzi, knowledge itself works in the service of
transformative embodiment.
The Xunzi depicts knowledge as a kind of response and
emphasizes corresponding aural and visual responses. Its stress on
the spontaneity of these responses leaves little room for strenuous
calculated analysis. In fact, the Xunzi endorses timely responses
and explicitly rejects strained effort in the areas of looking and
listening. The Xunzi implies that hearing, seeing, and knowing
should be evaluated on the basis of their results-a consequentially
focused perspective that coincides with the Xunzi's view of
knowing as embodied transformation. Thus, we can see in the
Xunzi the Warring States texts' shared view of the senses working
to support the Xunzi's specific evaluative criteria for knowledge.
The Mencius
The Mencius's criteria for evaluating reliable speech and action is
quite different from the Xunzi's. In certain passages, the Mencius
states that action need not produce consequences and speech need
not rectify action or even be trustworthy. These striking
differences between the Mencius and the Xunzi can be explained by








aural and visual senses, the Mencius does not describe them in
tenns of responses. Instead, the Mencius emphasizes that what we
hear and see in people originates in their heartminds. Hence, it
describes aural and visual aspects of a person in tenns of how they
reflect their origins. Both texts emphasize spontaneity, but in the
two texts spontaneous movement flows in different directions.
The Xunzi's spontaneity does not originate in any particular place.
By contrast, the Mencius emphasizes the heartmind, which
spontaneously extends to the body's periphery and beyond. This is
evident in another area of contrast between the Mencius and the
Xunzi. Whereas the Xunzi devotes an entire chapter to discrediting
the practice of reading physiognomy, the Mencius seems
sympathetic "to physiognomic principles. That is, the Mencius
trusts that the visible and auditory aspects of a person will reflect
their common origin.
The Mencius asserts that a great person's speech does not
have to be trustworthy and a great person's actions do not have to
produce results: I 6
*- A :ti 13 l' &:\ ffi 11" l' &:' * ffE i% Pff tE
In the great person, speech need not be trustworthy,
actions need not be productiveP They must only be
located in what is right.
(Mencius 4Bll)
In a description of the proper attitude for mourning, the Mencius
also states that speech should not aim to rectify action:
••1'@~~~.~13m~ffi~~~11"~
;g T 11" tft PJ ~ IfP ffij B~
Go straight in virtue without turning, not in order to seek
emolument. Speech and words must be trustworthy, not in
order to rectify action. The action and model of the
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superior person awaits ming [fate/ordainment/decree] and
that is all.
(Mencius 7B33)
The notion that actions need not be productive seems congruent
with the claim that speech need not be aimed at rectifying action.
There is some confusion regarding trustworthiness, however,
because, unlike Mencius 4B11, this description of a great person
insists that speech must be trustworthy. But despite the confusion
about trustworthiness, the general force of these passages seems to
be that attention to consequences is not necessary.
What seems to be more important in the Mencius is that,
at least in some cases, speech and action should not be measured by
their consequences. The Mencius seems to argue that there should
be some other basis for evaluating speech and action. It offers two
criteria for evaluating speech. The frrst is that it be concerned with
the concise:
ft ~ ffii ~ IDl Z ~ PJ IX IDl t!'J ttt
Learn broadly and discuss/explain it in detail, in order to
return to discussing/explaining the concise [the
restricted].18
(Mencius 4B15)
The second criterion for evaluating speech is that it proceeds from
near to far. With its basis in one's own body/self, it only





Speech about the near that points to the far is skillful
speech. Holding the basics and giving broadly is a skillful
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the belt, but the way is preserved within it. What the
superior person holds on to is the cultivation of the
body/self and thereby the whole world is tranquiJ.19
(Mencius 7B32)
These cases show that the Mencius favors returning to conciseness
and proceeding from the near. What these two directions might
have in common is that they indicate the origin-rather than the
outcome. This suggests that the Mencius's supplementary criterion
for evaluating speech is preserving its originlbase.
The Mencius emphasizes that the origin of both visual and
audible expression is the heartmind. In contrast to Xunzi 1/30-
where study ~omes into the ears, and makes it way through the
heartmind and limbs, with no particular stress on the heartmind-
the Mencius states explicitly that visual expression comes from
the heartmind. For instance, things that are rooted in the
gentleman's heartmind are manifest in his whole body:
;grPJTtte~m~
;fR 1R IL\ Jt ~ ts * IJ¥ 1'& ~ 1R 00
~1R~1ifg1Rggm
That which the gentleman takes as his nature is
humaneness, righteousness, ritual, and wisdom. These are
rooted in the heartmind and born in the complexion. They
are manifest agreeably in the face, as forcefulness of the
back, and they show themselves in the four limbs.
(Mencius 7A21)
Moreover, as described in Chapter 3, the Mencius specificaJJy
refers to micit speech as emerging from the heartmind. In addition,
it seems that good speech is born in the heartmind, according to
the Mencius. Mencius does not include any orthodox phrases in his
defense of his claim to "know speech," but we can infer that he has
some mastery of these as well. In the dialogue with King Xuan of
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Qi, the king complains that upon considering his own action, he
himself failed to "obtain" his own heartmind. He praises Mencius,
however, whom he describes as personifYing the expression about
being able to gauge another person's heartmind. Elaborating on this
point, the king explicitly ascribes Mencius's success (in attaining
his heartmind) to using speech that draws upon the connections to
his heartmind:
tf!j A fl!! A 1'f Ie" .:y 'tt N. L X r L ~ -1ft
X~ lJ 1T L IX [ffi 31< L l' ~ ~ ie"
X r g L ~ ~ Ie" 1'f JEG JEG ~
The Book ofPoetry says, nIt is the heartmind of the other
person, but I gauge and measure it." This describes you,
Master. I indeed did the thing, but when I returned my
thoughts to seek it, I could not obtain my heartmind.
When you, Master, spoke it, in my mind there was much
consonance.
(Mencius lA7)
Thus, good and bad speech is connected to the heartmind, where it
seems to be "born" or "instigated." Perhaps this explains the
Mencius's criteria for judging speech and action. Visual and auditory
manifestations may be measured against something other than
each other or their consequences-they may be measured against
their correspondence to their origins in the heartmind.
Indeed, the Mencius's treatment of sensory spontaneity
suggests as much. The term for response (ying ff!)-ubiquitous in
the Xunzi-is barely evident in the Mencius.20 Nonetheless, the
Mencius does value spontaneity. Instead of responsiveness, a
different spontaneous aspect of aurality and vision is evident in the
Mencius. That is, the Mencius describes spontaneous extending-
from the heartmind in the center to the borders of the
body/person.21 For example, the Mencius is critical of petty
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Am I like one of these little people? They admonish their
ruler, and when the ruler does not accept their advice, they








But while it is critical of this facial display, the Mencius is
confident that the face does in fact express what the heartmind is
feeling. Upon seeing their parents' bodies eaten by foxes and wild
cats, it says t:l!e ancients reacted in this way:
:Jtj'{flmt~rm/f'm~mtm
~F ~ A mt ~ iL\ ii ~ 00 §
Their foreheads began to perspire, and they looked
askance, unable to look. This perspiration was not due to
others. It extended from the center of their heartminds to
their faces and eyes.
(Mencius 3A5)
With its origin in the heartmind, the progression of the embodied
feeling reaches out to the extremities of the person. Thus, when
the hands and feet are set in motion, this motion is born of
emotions, which originate in the heartmind. Speaking of the shi •
"fruits" of benevolence, righteousness, knowledge, ritual, and
music, the Mencius says,
~~U~~~
Jfu ~ I'iJ B m
~ I'iJ B ltu /f' m )E z H€i Z f Z • Z
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Joy is then born, and when it is born, it is not possible to
stop it Because it can't be stopped, then, unknowingly, the
feet tap and the anns wave.
(Mencius 4A27)
The Mencius is confident that what one sees and hears in people
springs inexorably from the condition of their heartminds in their
center.
In light of this spontaneous movement, the Mencius
suggests that one can expect a certain consistency between the
heartmind and various other personal features. The Mencius is
generally sympathetic with a notion that supports viewing
physiognomy as a sign of character.22 The connection between the
heartmind's roots and its many branches is particularly evident in
relation to things that are seen and heard. The Mencius implies
that a king should look like a king:
~T~~~xili~Aa~z~~A~~zffi
~~PJT~~
Mencius went to see King Xiang of Liang. As he came out,
he said to someone, "Looking at him, he did not seem like
a ruler of the people, and approaching him, I still did not
see anything that inspires awe."
(Mencius lA6)
The Mencius also seems to think a prince should sound like a
prince:
{ii] ~ 'it z it) flt ~ itt l!t ~ ft!! '* ffi it) itt
How is it that his voice is so like that of our prince? This









In praising the most expressive part of the body, the Mencius
notes that the pupil is bright or dull in accordance with the
alignment of the heartmind in the center.24 As noted in Chapter 2,
the passage is typical of the Mencius's frequent pairings of speech
and visual manifestation as parallel expressions of their origin.25
The Mencius 3A2, which describes the ordinary custom regarding
people in mourning, also pays specific attention to their visual
manner and their sound.26 When the Mencius explains the process
of understanding, there is a movement, beginning in the heartmind,
that extends to both visual expression and soundP In order to
dissemble, the body has to struggle. The Mencius quotes Confucius's
followers as saying,
~TaftfF1f~~mrJlPEE
T~ a * ~ffij§JJll1t{giUm?&
Zengzi said, "Shrugging the shoulders and laughing
flatteringly is more strenuous than summer fieldwork." Zi
Lu said, "When people speak without being in agreement,
if you observe their complexions, they are full of blushes."
(Mencius 3B7)
Thus, it is possible to work against the connection between the
heartmind and the periphery of the body, but the Mencius expects
that some aspect of the person will reveal this struggle.28 In sum,
the Mencius seems generally confident that, in terms of a person's
heartmind and other features, the "braches" will reflect the
"roots." Even in attempts at duplicity, it expects that some
features will divulge it.
This confidence in the connection between the heartmind
and aural and visual expression results in a difference between the
Mencius's criteria for reliability and that of the Xunzi. Insofar as it
pairs vision and sound, the Mencius resembles other philosophical
texts in the period. However, the Mencius actually insists in some
places that the two need not correspond. These passages are
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puzzling, both because the text seems to contradict them
elsewhere, and because they are at odds with the "common sense"
of the period. However, in light of that common sense position,
we can see the uniqueness of the Mencius in its peculiar confidence
in the heartmind's relation to the periphery of the person. The
Mencius understands the aural/visual parallels to be rooted in the
heartmind, hence it expects them to manifest the heartmind in a
reliable manner.
Comparison of the Laozi and tbe Zhuangzi
The Laozi and the Zhuangzi seem to recognize and deliberately
critique parts of the shared understanding of the senses in other
Warring States philosophical texts. Most obviously, the Laozi
acknowledges the view that the senses desire excessively, but it
challenges common sense in the way that it opts to thwart this
tendency. For its part, the Zhuangzi clearly recognizes the
significance of the eye and ear in producing reliable knowledge, and
describes a method of undermining it. Thus, in different ways, both
texts reject the standard approach to the senses. This section will
focus on an aspect of their respective positions that illuminates
the difference between the two texts. That is, both the Laozi and
the Zhuangzi present methods of escaping life's confines and
achieving a kind of boundless inexhaustibility. The difference in
their methods is manifest in their respective proposals for
subverting the ordinary use of the senses. I will argue that in the
Laozi this is achieved by prohibiting sensory excess, in order to
boundlessly expand satisfaction in moderation. In the Zhuangzi, on
the other hand, this is achieved without recourse to prohibitions,
by opening up the senses and clearing them out.
The Laozi
The Laozi's comments on the senses emerge in the context of a
critique of desire and a program to escape its exhausting effects.
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The Laozi seems to view the senses as dangerous because of their
tendency to stimulate desire. The Laozi implies that the senses'
"correlates" present a health hazard-that is, according to the
Laozi, the sense functions are destroyed by their respective
correlates:
1i1g~A§~
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The five colors cause people's eyes to go blind. Riding and
hunting cause people's heartminds to go crazy. Goods that
are hard to obtain cause people's actions to be obstructed;
the five colors cause people's mouths to miss the mark.
The five tones cause people's ears to go deaf. Therefore,
the sage's government is for the stomach, and not the eye.
Thus, he rejects that and takes this.
(Laozi 12)
It is not immediately clear what threat is contained in things like
the five colors and tones, or what it means to be "for the stomach,
and not the eye. If However, the reference to "goods that are hard
to obtain" may be a clue. The passage compares the richness of
colors, sounds, and tastes with the richness of rare objects and
riding and condemns it all. Thus, we may infer that the Laozi
considers colors, sounds, and tastes to be somehow like rare
objects, and rare objects to be somehow like riding and hunting.
What all of these items seem to have in common for the Laozi
may be illuminated by its other comment about riding. In Chapter
46, the Laozi connects using racing horses to till the land with
knowing how to restrict desire:29
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When the world has the way, the racing horses are
withdrawn for dung.
When the world lacks the way, war horses are bred on the
borders.
No crime is greater than being desirable.
No misfortune is greater than being insatiable.30
(Laozi 46)
Hence, riding and hunting stimulate desire, which the Laozi
condemns along with richness of the senses' desires. This is
confirmed by the Laozi's other references to the stomach, wherein
the sage empties the heartminds of the people and fills their
bellies.
~ PJ ~ A L m1ft
~ :!t Ie., If :!t HI
5¥J:!t~iMi:!t'ft
Therefore, in the government of the sage:
He empties their heartminds, and fills their bellies,
Weakens their ambition, and strengthens their bones.
(Laozi 3)
Assuming some consistency between these chapters, the point of
being "for the stomach and not the eyes" seems to be that the
Laozi favors minimizing desires and avoiding stimulating
attractions.31 Along with emptying the heartmind and filling the
belly, Laozi 3 recommends weakening ambition, while
strengthening bones. With a full stomach and strong bones, but
little ambition or desire, one is in a position to be hearty, healthy,
and content.32 In other words, pacified senses are not
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threatening-the senses are only dangerous insofar as they
stimulate desires.
Indeed, it is generally apparent that the Laozi views desire
itself as dangerous. Although there are instances in the Laozi of
unproblematic desire, in the cases where the Laozi explicitly
comments on desire, it speaks against it.33 The Laozi associates
desire with crime:
mL~*1ft PI ~
Ofcrimes-none is greater than being desirable.
(Laozi 46)
According to tJIe Laozi, the sage "causes the people to be without
knowledge and without desires" (it ~ 1!!€ m1!!€ ~ in, Laozi 3). If,
however, desires still arise, the sage subdues them:
ffij~fl:-fr~i'tz
If desires are created,
I would subdue them.
(Laozi 37, Wang Hi edition)
In some cases, the Laozi says that one should merely not desire to
the extent of fullness:
f+tl!tm:~/f'~Ei
One who nurtures this way does not desire fullness.
(Laozi 15)
On the same lines, the Laozi recommends curtailing desire and
reducing self-interest:
&fL.~
Reduce self-interest and make few your desires.
(Laozi 19, Wang Hi edition)
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However, in other cases, the Laozi advocates being constantly
without desire ('& ~ ~ Laozi 1 and 34) and desiring not to desire:
~ PJ ~ A. ~ l' t:lX
mi l' It JiIH~ z J\l
Therefore, the sage desires not to desire and does not value
things that are hard to obtain.34
(Laozi 64)
Because the latter prohibition (eliminating all desires) inevitably
runs into paradox, we may consider it hyperbolic and follow the
former interpretation (viewing the Laozi as endorsing minimizing
desires). That is, because it is impossible to eliminate all desire, we
may take the text as simply encouraging the reduction of desire.
But why does the Laozi view desire as dangerous? The
Laozi is clearly not opposed to all forms of physical satisfaction,
because it "fills people's bellies" and is "for the stomach."
Moreover, it speaks with praise for people who relish simple foods
and find beauty in plain clothing (Laozi 80, discussed below). If
desire's fault is not its physicality, then some other explanation
must be sought.
On the basis of what it says about the senses, it seems that
the Laozi considers desire to be dangerous because of the way it
leads to extremes. This is apparent from the Laozi's indictment of
extreme forms of sensing-for example, the Laozi's criticism of
hearing points to its excess and the exhaustion that results from it:
~1UJ1t~
1';fi~1Rrp
Much hearing: frequent exhaustion. It is not as good as
preserving within.35
(Laozi 5)
The Laozi's dao itself seems to be restricted in terms of taste,
sight, hearing, and "completion." The notion that each of the
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senses desires to know the fullest of its correlates (as described in






Therefore, of the way's emitting speech, we say:
Bland! its lack of flavorP6
When you look at it, there is not enough to see;
When you listen to it, there is not enough to hear;
When 'you use it, it's not possible to finish.
(Laozi 35)
In other words, its way is deliberately bland, barely visible, and
barely heard.
For other evidence of such muted sensory stimuli, we might
consider the Laozi's comments about "great images" and "great
tones." The Laozi refers to these in the context of describing
"great squares" and "great vessels," claiming that a great square has





A great square has no comers;
A great vessel avoids completion;
A great tone barely sounds;
A great image lacks form.
The way is great without a name.
Only the way is good at beginning and good at completion.
(Laozi 41)
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Each of these things is a standard-square, vessel, sound, shape,
and way.37 But each standard lacks something. The example of the
vessel not being finished precludes the possibility that the Laozi is
saying these standards lack their defining characteristics.
Moreover, the Laozi does not seem to be describing standards that
exist in some ideal realm (as it might be if the lines read something
like, "There is a great square and it has no comers"). Instead, it
seems to be objecting to a certain kind of standard and promoting
another kind. The point appears to be that the Laozi recommends
a standard of incompletion (the vessel example) or a standard that
is reversed in some way (the sound example). Although the
standard is thus muted in some fashion, according to the last line,
this muting is, in fact, the very way to be good at both ends of an
action-beginning and completion.38 Thus, the Laozi's depiction of
sensory moderation has bearing on its rejection of desire. The
senses stimulate desire, and desire leads to excess; therefore, the
Laozl~S sensory model is moderate or stunted.
The Laozi's frequent prohibition of excess confirms this
notion that desire should be avoided as a result of its tendency
toward excess. The rejection of excess is a common theme in the
text. For example, the sage "dismisses the extreme, the grand, and
the excessive" ('* If '* *- '* ~, Laozi 29). The Laozi says the
sage should limit rather than fill, and stop rather than create
extremes (sharpen):
fifffif~1'~~e
fffij ffif *}L~ l' ~ ~*
To uphold and fill it,
Is not so good as ending it.
If you pound it into a point,
It won't be preservable for long.
(Laozi 9, Wang Bi edition)
Thus, the reason desire is problematic is that it is interminable and
leads to exhaustion.
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In reaction to the threat of exhaustion presented by excess
of sensory desires, the Laozi recommends something like a sensory
program of non-action. The Laozi critiques visual forms of excess,
when the sage warns,
*ffij1'~
Be bright but do not dazzle.
(Laozi 58)
In the context of dao, the Laozi talks about looking without
seeing, listening without hearing, and so on.39 In the most explicit
example, the Laozi recommends that the sage "taste without
tasting," along with the more familiar wei wuwei (act without
acting, do without doing, or be for without being for):





Each of these cases involves a two-part action, only one part of
which is acted out, the other remaining withheld.40 The Laozi's
metaphor of blocking holes seems to be a variation on this theme
of half-performed sensory actions. Although it never explicitly
connects the holes to the senses, the association seems justified.41
In the first case, after mentioning blocking holes, the Laozi makes
one of its seemingly paradoxical statements of reversal about the
senses:
~ :!t $l M:!t r~ ~ ~ l' JJJ
f#J:!t$ltlf:!t$ ~~1'~
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6. As far as can be ascertained, orgamzmg texts into
schools began only with a bibliographer in the second century RCE.
A. C. Graham describes this development as it appears in the work
of Sima Tan (d. 110 RCE.) and a late chapter of the Zhuangzi. A.
C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argumentation in
Ancient China (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), 376.
7. A great many archaeological discoveries, occurring over
the course of this century, have radically changed traditional
understandings of early Chinese history. The trend to interpret
classical Chinese philosophical texts as layered accretions or
accumulations is just one aspect of the new historiography
developing in sinology. See, for example, the work of Bruce and
Taeko Brooks. Bruce Brooks and Taeko Brooks, The Original
Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His Successors (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1998).
8. We cannot expect the texts to exhibit the degree of
internal coherence and consistency that single authorship is often
thought to guarantee. Recognition of multiple authorship may
even be a boon, because it liberates interpretation from any
attempt to reconstruct the fixed ideas present in the author's mind
at the one moment of writing's conception. Instead, we can
attempt to reconstruct how the language in these texts functioned
in the general historical period.
9. I take the first half of this characterization of
"philosophy" from Joel Kupperman's argument for including
thinkers like Confucius as philosophers. Joel Kupperman, Learning
from Asian Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),
13. The reference to ethical and political reform I derive from
Nathan Sivin's argument that rejects the idea that Chinese thinkers
should be evaluated in terms of a modem definition of philosophy.
Sivin, Medicine, Philosophy, and Religion in Ancient China, 13.
Conclusion
Block up the holes; close the doors;
And till the end of your life you won't work.
Open the holes; meddle in affairs;
And till the end of your life you won't be saved.
Seeing little is called "clarity."
Preserving weakness is called "strength."
(Laozi 52, Wang Hi edition)
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In the second case, prior to mentioning blocking doors, the Laozi
criticizes speaking (which involves opening the mouth). Moreover,
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One who knows doesn't speak; one who speaks doesn't
know.
Block one's holes, close one's doors,
File down one's sharp points, untie one's tangles.
Harmonize one's light, and grind one's dust.
(Laozi 56, Wang Hi edition)
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Don't leave the door, [and yet] know the world;
Don't peer out the window, [and yet] see heaven's way.
The farther you go, the less you know.
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Therefore, the sage knows without acting [lit. walking],
Names without seeing,
And completes without doing.42
(Laozi 47, Wang Bi edition)
These hole-blocking metaphors imply that closing off, or at least
partially limiting, the senses is the proper way of action. Like the
"non-acted" sensory acts described above, these allusions to the
senses generally suggest a method of avoiding sensory extremes.43
With regard to the senses, the practical application of this
half-performed method seems to amount to returning to simple,
moderate sensory discriminations. For example, Chapter 80
endorses the. value of simple tastes, in the context of small,
isolated social units. The passage hints that the senses should be
subject to reduction and simplicity:
{!!!A~~tMffijmz
tt;tt*~;tt1R~;tt~~;ttm
~ ~ ffi :~~nl :7\: Z ~ ffi 00
~~~7E~ffitt*
Cause the people to return to knotting cords and using
them, finding sweet their food, finding beautiful their
clothes, Imding joyful their customs, finding security in
their lodgings.
Nearby states look to one another, the sounds of chickens
and dogs hear one another, [yet] the people arrive at old
age and die without comings and goings among one
another.
(Laozi 80, Wang Bi edition)
When read in this light, the muted and stunted sensory acts in the
rest of the text may be seen as attempts to return to the
enjoyment of simple sensory pleasure. Tasting "no taste" and
exhibiting brightness without being dazzling might be achieved by
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appreciating simple foods and clothes. Thus, the danger of desires
would be conquered by cutting off sensory pleasure before it
reaches an extreme.
The sense reactions of infancy seem to be another
metaphor for this blunted form of sensory pleasure. The Laozi's
vivid description of the newborn babe, in addition to showing that
weakness is strength, establishes an analogy between an infant and
one who is full of de (charisma/virtue) (Chapter 55). Moreover,
the Laozi specifically describes the sage as "taking nourishment
from the mother" (Chapter 20). Hence, the sage resembles an
infant feeding at its mother's breast. At the same time, the eyes
and ears of the common people also seem infantile in their lack of
agency-while the sage takes their heartmind as his own (adopts
their concerns?), the common people "make their eyes and ears
belong to him" ()1ft £} § ~), watching and listening to him alone
(Chapter 49). Thus, the non-active tasting, hearing, and seeing
recommended by the Laozi also appear to be like those of an
infant. Presumably the infant, like the simple social beings in
Chapter 80, finds satisfaction in its very moderate sensory
pleasures.
The shared view in the Warring States philosophical texts
that sense-desire is excessive situates the Laozi's program within a
larger context. The Laozi recognizes the standard view that desire
tends to be interminable, unless properly checked. The Laozi's
solution of rejecting sensory excess and thereby finding
inexhaustible resources for satisfaction is typical of its general
theme of non-action. Making the most of the prohibition (the no
in not-acting), it restricts and returns to isolated primitive groups
(at the social level) or to infancy (at the individual level).
The Zhuangzi
Like the Laozi, the Zhuangzi reacts against the status quo in its
treatment of the senses. However, in the Zhuangzi, the senses are
not blocked or checked in order to escape danger. Instead, the
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Zhuangzi contains many cases of "externalizing," which seems to
necessitate opening the senses for circulation. This open model of
sensing points to a significant difference between the two texts. In
the Laozi, the motivation for restricting the senses is grounded in
an attempt to avoid desire, because desire leads to excess and
exhaustion. The Laozi seeks a kind of boundlessness within the
context of prohibiting excess of sensory desires-for example, a
limitless appreciation of flavor gained by keeping to simple
flavors. By contrast, the Zhuangzi focuses less on the topic of
desire. The Zhuangzi also seems less troubled by excess. In the
Zhuangzi, the senses are open, like hoIlows and cavities blown
about by the wind, and permit access to things like spirits and qi. In
this way, the. senses suggest boundless exposure and boundless
freedom. Thus, while the Laozi prohibits excess in order to gain
boundless freedom from exhaustion, the Zhuangzi describes a
boundlessness that involves no restrictions. These different
subversions of the senses suggest a larger contrast, in which the
Laozi discovers boundlessness through prohibitions and the
Zhuangzi discovers it without them.
The Zhuangzi associates the senses with spaces that can be
open or closed, empty or full. There are a number of ways in which
the Zhuangzi does this. With the human body as a microcosm of
the universe, the Zhuangzi caIls caves and cavities of the earth
nostrils, mouths, ears, and sockets that are piped by the wind:
wtf~~f***8~zi'l(7c
{PJ .. {PJ 0 {PJ J} {PJ m
In the crevices of mountain forests, the hollows from huge
trees a hundred spans around are like mouths, like ears, like
sockets.
(Zhuangzi 2/5-6)
In addition to labeling these "ten thousand hollows" (M" iJ() of the
earth as senses, elsewhere it calls the senses themselves "hoIlows."
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That is, when evaluating the bodily parts, it refers to the senses as
"nine hollows" (ft. Jil( 2/16). And in the Hun Dun passage, Hun
Dun's friends-who want to do him the favor of making him like
humans-drill him seven holes that kill him:
A~#tJil(~m~~~~~~#.~~~
B~-il{tBffii~reJE
Everyone has seven holes in order to look, listen, eat, and
breathe. This one alone does not have them. Let us try
boring them. Each day they bored one hole and on the
seventh day, Hun Dun died.
(Zhuangzi 7/34-35)
Such passages serve to indicate that, for the Zhuangzi, the senses
are nodal points-holes or openings of the person.
In the Zhuangzi, as in the Laozi, a number of passages
suggest that the sensory openings expose the person to danger. In
addition to confirming that the body's senses are holes, the Hun
Dun passage cited above also conveys the impression that such
holes are dangerous.44 Moreover, in another passage, the awakened
form's openings (leai 1m) to the world create contacts that "drag"




B p). IL' rJ
When it is sleeping, the hun spirits cross.
When it wakes, the form opens.
[Things it] has contact with become pulls [on it].
Each day we use our heartminds to quarrel.
(Zhuangzi 2/10)
Given that the eyes (and also the ears, in a different way) are
closed during sleep, this seems to say that the eyes and ears open
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when the fonn awakens and lead the heartmind to quarreling.45
Thus, opening the senses is a source of trouble.
But in the Zhuangzi, this danger posed by the senses being
open is framed less in tenns of the problem of desire (as in the
LaOZ1) than in tenns of inappropriate emission or admission.
When the Zhuangzi discusses holes, there is often a
complementary structure wherein something entering (ru }..)
coincides with something exiting (chu tfj).46 For instance,
Zhuangzi 5/45 (discussed in Chapter 4) says changes of
circumstances (like life and death, survival and loss, and so on)
should not "enter" the "spiritual residence," while peace and joy
should not be lost through openings.47 On the same lines, in
preparation for contact with a dangerous person, one of Zhuangzi's
characters suggests rectifying the body, which it depicts as the
fonn approaching without entering, and the heartmind having
peace without emitting (chu ill) (see Zhuangzi 4/56-58, page
105). Thus, the danger of keeping the senses open is that, in
accordance with certain things entering, other things like peace
and joy might be lost.
In the Zhuangzi, the emission of knowledge is a
particularly prominent danger posed by opening the senses. The
Zhuangzi specifically opposes emitting (chu an knowledge, which
it associates with the loss of de:
~~~~x~~~~ffi~~~~tfj~AA
~~~;g~tfj~~
;g itt ~ ffi fL (!flL) itt
mitt~*~~iQ=~~~
~F ~ PJ mff i!!
Besides, do you after all realize that what dissipates de is
what activates knowledge to come out? De is dissipated
over names [fame]. Knowledge is emitted over
competition. Names are things that subvert one another.
Knowledge is something that is an instrument of struggle.
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The two of them are inauspicious weapons, and not that by
which one might perfect one's actions.
(Zhuangzi 4/5-7)
The Zhuangzi does not say that knowledge is emitted through the
use ofthe eyes and ears, but its injunctions to expel knowledge are
often preceded by dismissing the eyes and ears. The Zhuangzi
rejects the eyes and ears together as a pair four times, and in three
of these cases this precedes a rejection of the heartmind or
knowledge. The Zhuangzi dismisses the eyes and ears of the
common people-one of the Mohist criteria for evaluating
knowledge (see Zhuangzi 6/69-71, page 58). This expelling of the
eyes and ears seems to be a precondition for getting rid of
knowledge and uniting with a greater current (see Zhuangzi 6/92-
93, page 58). Along the same lines, the Zhuangzi also describes
certain sages as dismissing the individual's eyes and ears, and
unknowing the starting point for measuring (see Zhuangzi 6/69-71
in Chapter 2). Thus, if getting rid of knowledge requires expelling
the eyes and ears, it is likely that, ordinarily, the emission of
knowledge involves using the eyes and ears. In other words, the
Zhuangzi seems to be referring to the "tallying knowledge" of the
ears and eyes. Hence, a significant cause for concern in opening
the senses would be that, as this passage says, de is dissipated by the
emission of knowledge and, as it implies, the emission of this
knowledge takes place through the eyes and ears.
Nevertheless, in spite of these potentially dangerous
emissions, the Zhuangzi does not propose blocking the sensory
holes. Instead of closing the holes, the Zhuangzi emphasizes
something called "externalizing" (wai ji.), which seems to require
keeping them open.48 Whereas the Zhuangzi criticizes emitting
knowledge through the eyes and ears, it speaks positively of
externalizing knowledge. As mentioned above, in the Zhuangzi,
there are many complementary structures involving entering and
exiting. In this case, the process of externalizing knowledge seems
to be counterpoint to following the inwardly circulating
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movements of the eyes and ears (see Zhuangzi 4/32-33, page 59).
To pennit the arrival of the ghostly and spiritual (as well as the
departure of knowledge), it seems that these inward channels must
be open for circulation.49 In fact, far from closing off
communication at the borders of the ears and eyes, the Zhuangzi
recommends externalizing the bones and body-which amounts to
externalizing the eyes and ears themselves.50 It is not clear what
externalizing bones and body actually entails, but it seems to
promise liberation beyond all boundaries: Confucius explains that a
group of men who externalize their own bones and body (;;. ;!'t ID
~) manage to roam outside all direction (fang 1f), whereas he
merely roams inside direction.51 By "following the channels
inward" and "externalizing," the Zhuangzts characters both roam
freely and facilitate communication with the spirits.
The notion that the senses must be left open for the
spiritual elements is confinned by the Zhuangzi's opposition to
externalizing the shen. This is the one type of externalizing that
the Zhuangzi explicitly condemns. The Zhuangzi criticizes Hui Shi
in this way:
~~;;'-'f~z:fItJ~-'f~z;fi!f
Now you keep on externalizing your shen [spirits] and
overworking your jing [seminal power].
(Zhuangzi 5/59)
Presumably the shen comes in through circulating in the senses.52
In fact, it is not clear whether spiritual things originally belong
inside or outside, which is all the more reason to keep open the
sensory connections between inside and outside. In any case, as
Zhuangzi 4/43 indicates, following the currents of the eyes and
ears and externalizing knowledge seems to be the way to allow the
shen to arrive.
The importance of the spiritual aspects for sensing is
evident in the only two detailed accounts of sense discrimination in
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the Zhuangzi. One concerns seeing and the other hearing. Both
passages mention stopping the ordinary use of the senses.53 At the
point where the ordinary use of the ear and eye stops, the sense is
overtaken by what seem to be more tenuous agents. Thus, in place
of the eyes, seeing is performed by the shen.54 As Cook Ding
describes himself,
Ml § ~ m~ ~ ~ PJT j! 1!re ~F ~ -ili
::::~~~*.j!~~-ili
11 ~ ~ ~ § PJ 141 ~ ffii l' PJ § m
'Er m 11: ffii 141 ~ 1T ~ :p. 7-: ~ 1ft :*: W
~:*:fK~:Jtrm?&
When I first began carving oxen, what I saw was nothing
but oxen. After three years, I never saw a complete oxen.
Now these days, I use my shen to meet [things] and do not
look with my eyes. The senses know to stop, and the shen
desires to go. I follow heaven's pattern, cleave along the
main seams, am guided by the main hollows, and rely on
what is assuredly so.
(Zhuangzi 3/5-7)
Although perhaps not quite as spiritual as the shen, hearing is also
overtaken by something equally tenuous-the qi. In the "fasting of
the heartmind" passage, Confucius instructs Van Hui not to listen
with the ear, but with the qi, because it is empty and "awaits." The
passage is confusing (the instructions are rather vague, and
Confucius simultaneously seems to advocate and oppose listening
with the heartmind), but whatever "fasting" might really amount
to, the Zhuangzi emphasizes the emptiness of the qi:
;fi - it 1!re l'!! ~ PJ :Et ffii l'!! ~ PJ JL\
1!re l'!! ~ PJ JL\ rm l'!! ~ PJ *i.
l'! 11: ~ I:} JL\ 11: ~ rq:
~-ilit.mrm1=<f~~-ili
lIfE ill ~ t.ml!fJi ~ JL\ ~ -ili
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Unify your intention. Don't listen with your ears, but listen
with your heartmind. Don't listen with your heartmind, but
listen with your qi. Listening stops at the ear, the
heartmind stops at tallying. As for qi, it is empty and
awaits things. Only the way accumulates emptiness. The
emptiness is the heartmind's fasting.
(Zhuangzi 4/26-28)
Unlike the emptying of the heartmind in Laozi 3-which coincides
with filling the stomach-the tenuousness in these passages is not
counterbalanced by filling something else. The Zhuangzi has no
interest in keeping the common people wen fed or in tasting "no-
taste" in the sense of relishing simple foods. (The food eaten by
the "genuine people" in the Zhuangzi is simply not sweet at all-
1't ~ /f' tt, Zhuangzi 6/6.)55 Thus, instead of blocking the senses
in order to appreciate their simple pleasures, the Zhuangzi seems
to be airing them out.
Indeed, whereas the Laozi presents the infant and the
isolated community as models for proper use of the senses, the
Zhuangzl~smodels seem to be people breathing with their feet and
walking on air.56 Perhaps not arbitrarily, the Zhuangzi chooses the
loss of a foot as its example of a kind of difference sensed by
ordinary use of eyes and ears:
EJ 1't ~ 1f iJLz Iff I1fd:~ ~ iP,
EJ ~ 1m 1f tJL~ ~ ¥JJ W- iP,
X :E ?& 1f li /f' 9;D If § L pJT 1i
ffij 'IJfi IL\ ~ ~ L ~ ¥JJ m 1't PJT -
ffij1'~~PJT~m~1't,@JMjiJl±iP,
Looked at from the viewpoint of their differences, from
liver to gall is as far as from Chu to Vue. Looked at from
the viewpoint of their sameness, the myriad things are all
one. Such people do not even know what is appropriate to
the ears and eyes, and they roam their heartminds in the
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peace of de. With things, they look at that which makes
them one and do not see that which makes their losses.
They look at losing their feet like leaving behind the
ground.
(Zhuangzi 5/7-8)
As if proving that they do not know what is appropriate to the
ears and eyes, the passage notes that these characters look at
oneness. Thus, the passage suggests that what is appropriate to the
ears and eyes is looking at losses, rather than oneness. The
example of the loss (sang ~) of a foot-representing the not-
oneness sensed by the ears and eyes-may help clarifY the use of
the senses in the Zhuangzi. "Walking" (in the sense of "walk the
talk") is the basic metaphor for fulfilling speech and making it
accountable.57 That is, the "appropriate hearing and seeing"
depends in part upon being able to see someone walking. In this
passage, the walking is lost because the foot is lost. This is a
curious pun, because the character for feet (zu JE) can also be used
to mean the opposite of loss-"enough" or "sufficient." Thus,
perhaps this lost foot represents the senses' unfulfillable desire to
know satisfaction, as well as knowing what is appropriate to
tallying the ears and eyes.
The metaphorical weight of the lost foot is enhanced by
the peculiar number of foot references in the Zhuangzi. (In
Chapter 5, there are three different footless characters, and
Confucius compares a dead pig to a footless person. In Chapter 4, a
madman is anxious about having his feet wounded.) On the face of
it, lost feet refer to crimes that are punished by amputation.
However, there were other body parts that could be amputated.
Furthermore, the Zhuangzi also mentions feet even when they are
not lost-the old men of old breathe through their heels (in
contrast to the common people who talk with their throats), and
Huzi's impulses come up from his heels. With all these feet
replaced by air, none of these characters are walking on the
ground.
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Not uncharacteristically, the Zhuangzi reverses the value
of this "loss" of accountability/enough. This loss-like having the
feet filled with breath-is conducive to roaming the mists, seated
galloping, and that general sort of thing:
tiS ~ ~ ~ fj :tI!! it ....
E:ffJJ:JJ::J(ll~JJ:~Z~~JM!l
To stop leaving footprints is easy, not walking on the
ground is hard.... The blessed, the auspicious, stops the
stopping. And moreover not stopping-this I call "seated
galloping."
(Zhuangzi 4/30-32)
Thus, with this loss, the Zhuangzi's characters are free to talk and
walk boundlessly.58 The Zhuangzi replaces the ears' and eyes'
"appropriate" measurements of loss with heavenly measurements
that balance out differences (thereby producing a kind of oneness
like that which corresponds to not knowing what is appropriate to
the ears and eyes in Zhuangzi 517). DefYing boundaries in this way,
they proceed to "walk in two directions":
~ PJ ~ A {[J Z PJ ~ ~F ffij 1*~* i~
~iL~l@fj
This is why the sage smoothes things out with "That's it,
that's not," and rests on heaven's potter's wheel. This is
called "walking in two directions."
(Zhuangzi 2/39-40)
That is, by giving up ordinary hearing and seeing (or "losing the
foot"), they acquire footless walking, which is some kind of "un-
knowing knowing":
tiS ~ ~ ~ fj :tI!! it ..../iij PJ 1'f mm'1f ~
*Pf1 PJ ~mm'1f -tl!
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To stop leaving footprints is easy, not walking on the
earth is hard.... You've heard of the knowing that uses
knowing. You have not yet heard of the knowing that uses
not-knowing.
(Zhuangzi 4/30-32)
This suggests that just as walking with lost feet is unknowing, so
too having feet (or having enough) is knowing, in the sense of
using the ears and eyes to discriminate differences. By giving up
the ears, eyes, and feet/sufficiency, the characters no longer walk
on earth and are free to roam on air.
For the Zhuangzi, the senses are holes that pose dangers.
In particular, the eyes and ears pose the danger of emitting
knowledge. The Zhuangzi rejects knowledge, yet it does not advise
closing off the senses, as the Laozi does. The Zhuangzi seems to
favor keeping the senses open and using the shen and qi to sense,
while unknowing the differences discriminated by the ears and eyes.
In a way, the Zhuangzi seems to make the ears and eyes more like
the nose--empty holes where breath comes in and out. In so doing,
it allows both speech and action to extend into the infinite and
roam in the boundless.
Conclusions
The contrast between the Xunzi's emphasis on outcomes and the
Mencius's emphasis on origins has a particular explanation in
reference to sense discrimination. Both texts observe the reliability
of correspondence between hearing and vision, but the texts justifY
that reliability in different ways. True to its concern with
outcomes, the Xunzi explains aural/visual reliability as the
consequence of matching aural and visual responses. By contrast,
in keeping with its emphasis on correct origins, the Mencius
explains aural/visual reliability as the result of shared derivation. In
other words, this feature of sense discrimination is treated
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differently in ways consistent with the differences between these
two texts.
The differences between the Laozi and the Zhuangzi are
often obscured by viewing them both as Daoists. This analysis of
their treatment of sense discrimination highlights certain contrasts
between them. The Laozi and the Zhuangzi both suggest methods
of subverting the ordinary use of the senses, but they do so in
different ways. The Laozi focuses on desires and recommends
prohibiting extremes by closing off the senses. The result is a kind
of boundless sensory appreciation of simplicity. For its part, the
Zhuangzi seems to recommend dismissing the senses' knowledge, as
well as opening the senses to all kinds of potential
communications. Here too the result is a kind of boundlessness-in
this case one that is not connected with simplicity, but with
exceeding measurements.
The fact that these different texts take different positions
regarding sense discrimination-positions that nevertheless seem
to reflect some common underlying assumptions-may confirm
the value of this study. That is, one virtue of this analysis may lie
in its capacity to shed light on a common view of sense
discrimination without presuming that all of the texts agree about
all aspects of the subject.
The implications of this study could go beyond what has
been described here. The importance of aural and visual pairings
may shed light on other frequent pairings in Warring States texts.
For instance, aural and visual pairing may also map onto yue ~
(music) and Ii :m (ritual movements?). Moreover, the aural/visual
pairings may even extend beyond these texts and this period. They
certainly seem to apply to the pairing of ming ;g (title) and xing
~ (performance) in the Han Feizi. If indeed it is correct to
hypothesize that shi If is a visual pair for ming ;g in these texts,
in the future, scholars may find it worth investigating how and
when Chinese ontology altered, such that shi comes to be used to
mean something more like "substance" and "reality."
Notes
Introduction
1. The term "sense discrimination" (as opposed to "sense
perception" or "sensation") is chosen for its relative lack of
specific philosophical connotations (see Chapter I). By "sense," I
mean things like hearing and seeing, and other specialized forms of
interaction between the inside and outside of a human being (not
necessarily on the surface of the body). By "discrimination," I
mean the general operations characteristic of each of the senses.
2. By "heartmind" I mean the character xin JL', the
translation of which is discussed below.
3. The term "early China" often includes the Qin dynasty
(221 RCE.-206 RC.E.) and the Han dynasty (206 RC.E.-220 CE.);
however, this study does not extend beyond the Warring States.
4. By the "history of western metaphysics," I mean to
refer to the dominant tradition of metaphysics, as it grew from
Greek, Jewish, and Christian thought and developed in Western
Europe. The phrasing is not meant to imply that the tradition does
not include heterogeneous elements that challenge the dominant
mode.
5. These were not schools in the sense of institutions.
Nathan Sivin argues convincingly against such a notion of an
"academy" in early China. Nathan Sivin, "The Myth of the
Naturalists," in Medicine, Philosophy, and Religion in Ancient
China (Brookfield, Vt.: Variorum, 1995), 19-28.
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(The Zhuangzi counts in this sense, because, although it parodies
the desire for ethical and political refonn, it does engage the
question.) By calling these texts philosophical, I do not mean to
imply that they are not religious. Neither category applies very
well to early Chinese thought, which is one of the limitations of
these categories.
10. Actually, I accept Donald Davidson's principle that
cross-cultural understanding cannot avoid presuming that most
beliefs of the other language/culture are similar to our own. This
still leaves plenty of room for difference and error within the kinds
of theories we generate. Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and
Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
II. "Comparison requires the postulation of difference as
the grounds of its being interesting (rather than tautological), and a
methodological manipulation of difference, a playing across the
'gap' in the service of some useful end." Jonathan Z. Smith,
Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 35.
12. Ben-Ami Scharfstein, "The Contextual Fallacy," in
Interpreting across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative
Philosophy, ed. Gerald James Larson and Eliot Deutsch (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), 86.
13. The fonner was proposed by Xenophanes (c. 343-355
RC.E.), and the latter by Empedocles (c. 440 RC.E.).
14. Dallas Willard summarizes this in "Predication as
Originary Violence," in Dallas Willard, Working through Derrida,
ed. Gary B. Madison (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University
Press, 1993), 12{}-136.
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15. Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1978), 279.
16. In speaking of early Chinese 'metaphysics,' I do not
mean to imply that the period is characterized by a study of
categories of reality or being (like attributes, properties, mind, and
possible worlds) or issues of truth (as opposed to justification and
warrant). I mean the term in the broad sense that includes
cosmology and cosmogony, as well as ontology.
17. Bertrand Russell, The History of Western Philosophy
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945),45.
18. Continual change should not be taken to mean that
everything is always changing in every possible respect, but simply
that no thing remains eternally unchanged.
19. This is not to deny the organismic qualities of Greek
philosophy. Certainly there are organismic aspects to the
cosmologies of Plato and Aristotle (as Donald Munro notes), but in
seeking permanent foundational substances, their cosmologies are
not organismic. Donald Munro, ed., Individualism and Holism:
Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The
University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1985), 263.
20. Munro, Individualism and Holism: Studies in
Confucian and Taoist Values, 263.
21. Frederick Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).
22. Tu Wei-ming, in "The Continuity of Being," in
Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth,
and Humans, ed. Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong
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(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Center for the Study of
World Religions, 1998).
23. Chang describes early Chinese civilization as one of
continuity between a number of things, including nature and
culture. Kwang-chih Chang, "Ancient China and its
Anthropological Significance," in Archeological Thought in
America, ed. C. C. Lamberg-Karlovsky (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), 165. The implications of this are highly
controversial for interpretations of Warring States thought. Most
understandings of the Xunzi (particularly with regard to what is
taken to be its views on "human nature" versus ritual) rely heavily
on a nature/culture opposition. The work of Edward Machle is a
notable exception. According to Machle's reading of the Xunzi,
culture is not "unnatural"-it is the growth that perfects what we
are born with (nature?), which is incapable of ordering itself.
Machle seems to think positions of the Zhuangzi and the Laozi
come closer to a nature/culture (physis/techne) divide, but his
description of that divide sounds more like elite culture versus
simple culture. Edward J. Machle, Nature and Heaven in the Xunzi,
Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1993), 15.
24. Donald Harper, "Warring States Philosophy and Occult
Thought," in The Cambridge History ofAncient China: From the
Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C., ed. Michael Loewe and Edward
L. Shaughnessy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
831-832.
25. In the fourth and third centuries Re.E.., the Yi was not
yet interpreted in terms of broken and unbroken lines, which more
clearly signify the polar relations epitomized by yin/yang.
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26. Keightley argues that this, in addition to the absence
of any great early Chinese mythic confrontation with death (along
the lines of characters like Gilgamesh or Achilles), suggests that
death was not viewed as a tremendous rupture in the early Chinese
world. David N. Keightley, "Early Civilization in China," in
Heritage of China, ed. Paul S. Ropp (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990), 34.
27. Thus, Edward Shaughnessy writes, "by emphasizing
different aspects of the images, the Zhou Yi shows that they...were
subject to constant change." Edward L. Shaughnessy, "Western
Zhou History," in The Cambridge History ofAncient China: From
the Origins ofCivilization to 221 B.C., 341.
28. According to the LUi 47/14, the ghost souls remain
underground, while the spirit souls ascend.
29. Keightley, Heritage ofChina, 19.
30. Keightley, Heritage ofChina, 28.
31. Donald Harper notes that in the older explanation,
which persisted along with the new one, demons and naturalistic
pathogens from the outside invaded the body, causing it to
malfunction. Donald Harper, "Warring States Philosophy and
Occult Thought," in The Cambridge History of Ancient China:
From the Origins ofCivilization to 221 BC., 874-883.
32. David Chidester describes a cliche in cultural studies
going back to the nineteenth century that says Hebraic culture is
fundamentally "auditory," while Greek culture is fundamentally
"visual." David Chidester Word and Light: Seeing, Hearing and
Religious Discourse (Urbana: University of IlIinios Press, 1992).
33. See discussion ofZhuangzi 7/32 in Chapter 3.
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34. I am specifically referring to "speech," rather than
"language." I translate the character yan § as "speech" and ming
11 as "names." Early Chinese theories regarding these terms
should not be misconstrued as theories about language per se,
primarily because language, as a concept, tends to evoke notions of
representation and a gap between the real thing designated and the
inessential designation. From the perspective of a contemporary
"linguistic tum" that critiques these metaphysical notions, the
early Chinese theories regarding things like names and speech must
be understood as pre-metaphysical. This point is well made by
Hans Georg Moller. Moreover, he is certainly right to point out
that the linguistic realm in early China is discussed in terms of
tensions between a variety of elements, which makes it difficult to
isolate from among them something that functions as language.
Hans Georg Moller, "The Chinese Theory of Forms and Names
(Xingming Zhi Xue) and Its Relation to a 'Philosophy of Signs,'"
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 24: 184-189.
The complex subject of the status of writing in relation to
these auraVvisual parallels is beyond the scope of this monograph.
I hope to address it in future publications.
35. For example, Graham explains shi as "solid,"
"concrete," and "real." Graham, Disputers ofthe Tao, 140.
Chapter One: An Overview of Sense Discrimination
1. The reader should be aware that a significant portion of
the evidence for what I take to be the general view of the senses
comes from one text-the Xunzi-because this is where most of
the discussion of the senses occurs. Where the Xunzi seems to
speak uncontroversially, and where there is no overt or subtle sign
of disagreement from other texts, I often take the Xunzi's view to
represent the general view.
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2. I use the term "senses," rather than "sense organs,"
because the senses do not always seem to correspond to physical
organs, although they are sometimes identified with them.
According to John Hay, "Organs, as discrete physical
objects, barely exist in traditional Chinese medical
theory.... Instead, it identifies functions." Hay describes the early
Chinese view of the body parts as orbs and para-orbs that are
"enfoldments" of energy. John Hay, "The Body as Microcosmic
Source," in Selfas Body in Asian Theory and Practice, ed. Thomas
P. Kasulis (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993),
187.
3. Actually, there are surprisingly few references to "the
five senses" within the texts I am considering. The term occurs
twice in the Xunzi. (It also occurs twice in the external chapters of
the Zhuangzi, which are not considered in this study, because
traditionally they have been thought to be of a later date.)
4. By the Han Dynasty, this develops into a fonnalized
concept of "five processes" (wu xing Ii fj), which refer to the
phases of the cosmos as a whole. Groups of five are much more
significant in the Han, but they are manifest in Warring States
texts as well. For instance, see Laozi 12, cited in Chapter 3.
Graham proposes that groups of five, epitomized by the "five
processes," originally related to the four seasons and directions
(adding one for the middle); see Graham, Disputers of the Tao.
Chad Hansen suggests that the five fingers and toes, or the senses
themselves, are a more plausible origin (personal communication).
It is perhaps useless to speculate which is the most originary fonn
of fives. But the fact that even in early China there are other
important systems of 'fives' deserves mention in the context of
understanding the five senses.
Notes 183
5. The five colors are green, red, yellow, white, and black.
The five flavors are sweet, bitter, salty, sour, and pungent. The
five tones, according to Joseph Needham, originally differentiated
things like pitch and timbre. Joseph Needham, ed. Science and
Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1954-), vol. 4, part 1:140-141.
6. In some of the texts, there is an unfortunate dearth of
lists of the senses. In fact, no list of four or more senses appears at
all in the Lunyu, or the so-called inner chapters of the Zhuangzi.
Arguably, there is one case in the Laozi (Chapter 12).
7. As noted earlier, the term xin IL' is translated as
"heartmind," because cognition and emotion both stem from this
function.
Some of these lists of senses include the heartmind as if it
were a sensory function. The implications of this are discussed in
Chapter 3.
8. It is worth noting that there were not always five senses
in Western traditions. Constance Classen argues that five became
the proper number after some uncertainty caused by Plato's
inclusion of things like hot and cold among the senses, in response
to which Aristotle aligned the senses with the five elements.
Constance Classen, Worlds of Sense: Exploring the Senses in
History and across Cultures (London: Routledge, 1993), 2.
9. The Mozi says,
-'fJEO-'1'}
ff£ :$ tft ~ £' ~ ~ A
When hands, feet, mouth, nose, and ears are employed for
righteousness, then one will surely be a sage.
(Mozi 47/20)
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10. See Xunzi 23/25-26 cited in Chapter 3, along with
other examples where the difference goes beyond mere variation in




14 "Heaven" is not an ideal translation. The tenn tian ::k
refers to heaven, the sky, the ancestors, and/or a personal presence
with a will of its own. Insofar as it is differentiated from earth, tian
is above and sometimes dominant, but it is not transcendent.
Moreover, in the Xunzi, the tenn "heaven" often seems to be a
synecdoche for "heaven and earth"-the powers of the cosmos,
loosely associated with ancestor ghosts and spirits who dwell above
and below.
This term "heavenly officers" occurs six times in the
Xunzi, but not elsewhere in these Warring States philosophical
texts. We might take the reference to "heavenly" to mean the
"higher" faculties, but the text does not mention that they are
higher than anything else. In fact, it describes them as subservient
to the heartmind. After introducing things like desires and
aversions as "heavenly," Xunzi 17/12 introduces the senses as
"heavenly officers" and then notes that the heartmind rules over
the (other?) senses. Hence, perhaps the tian in tianguan should be
understood as simply meaning "naturaL"
15. The subject of proper governing is even indirectly
evident in the rejection of the importance of governing expressed
in the Zhuangzi.
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16. Xunzi 22/46 uses another government metaphor for
the senses-a puzzling line that praises someone for refraining
from "governing" (zhi m) the eyes and ears of the onlookers. It is
possible that the character is the result of a scribal mistake.
17. See also Xunzi 1/47 and 11/79. The clearest cases of
this are in the Xunzi, but references to the eyes' and ears' excesses
(as in Mozi 36/18) also seem to place agency in the senses
themselves. The same phenomenon occurs with the senses'
knowing (see below).
18. Se {g is a term that functions to mean "color," "face,"
"appearance," and, by extension, "sexual desire."
19. Mencius 6A7; Mozi 3212-3. Comparable comments
appear in the Lunyu and the Zhuangzi. While not mentioning
desire per se, Confucius indicts the ubiquity of desire for se {g (see
tnote 18), (Lunyu 9/18). The Zhuangzi 5/57 implies that
preferences and aversions constitute the human disposition or
condition, although it does not explicitly connect them to the
senses.
20. Xunzi 23/26; Mencius 7B24.
21. The basis of the Mozi's objection is that, when rulers




Moreover, the way that benevolent people treat the world
is not for the sake of the beauty of the eyes, the joy/music
of the ears, the sweetness of the mouth, or the comfort of
the body. By means of these the masses are deprived of
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their materials for clothing and food, thus benevolent
people are not motivated by such things.
(Mozi 32/2-3)
22. These two threats posed by sensory desires may also
account for the Mencius's warning against the danger of being
unfilial through following the desires of the ears and eyes.
According to the Mencius, the fourth form of unfilial behavior is
ftt 1} 13 ~ ~ tJ ~ x: £J: ~
following the desires of one's ears and eyes, so as to bring
one's parents to disgrace.
(Mencius 4B30)
See also Mozi 35/38-39 and Mozi 37/16-17.
23. This passage (Zhuangzi 2/17) does not refer to the
senses per se.
24. The wind plays a role in hearing, smelling, and eating
(tasting?). It is less clear whether, and to what extent, the wind
contributes to other sense functions (like seeing).
25. In the Warring States period, qi denotes a very basic
component of most things. Eventually, perhaps as early as late
Warring States, it is viewed as a component of all things. (See the
Introduction for discussion of qi.)
For its part, de seems to function as "charisma," "power,"
or "virtue," in the sense of what someone (or something-the
Lunyu 14/33 speaks of a horse's de) excels at. By extension, de
often connotes moral virtue in Warring States texts. However, it is
not limited to this usage: de can be good or bad, noble or petty.
The analysis of de here is particularly focused on identifying its
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more concrete usages, because the topic under consideration is how
de can be sensed through music.
26. As Shigehisa Kuriyama notes, the Shang divination
inscriptions asked questions like, "Will the wind come from the
east?" and "Will destructive winds arrive?" Kuriyama also contends
that the winds of the four directions were each associated with a
divinity. Shigehisa Kuriyama, "The Imagination of Winds," in
Body, Subject, and Power in China, ed. Angela Zito and Tani
Barlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 33-34.
27. This first line is a visual pun-the desire for the sound
of music is so acute that the term for 'music' (yue ~) also
functions as the term for ~oy' (Ie ~).
28. It is surprisingly rare to find mention of the qi of
specific things. There are only a few references to human and
animal qi and qi of various features of the natural world (see
Introduction).
29. The Zhuangzi describes the pipes of the earth, saying,
~*;I)lu.t~;tt£~m
The great clump of earth blows out qi, whose name is
"wind."
(Zhuangzi 2/4)
Kuriyama maintains that qi and feng are freely substituted for one
another in late Warring States texts. Kuriyama, Body, Subject, and
Power in China, 34.
30. The resonance of sound is not necessarily musical-a
similar aural qi stimulus, caused by the cry of a dying animal, also
stimulates a response in the heartmind:
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~ 1E~ :t¥ 1if ~ ,I,~J ~ ?& tft ~ ][~ iL' fl(
ml ~ *. 3i J'tU ;Q, ~ ~ ~ Z iL' JJ! Z
When an animal is dying, it does not select its sound: its qi
and breath are vicious. Thereupon, this causes a mutual
birth of fierceness in the heartmind. When subduing and
pressuring reaches too far, then you necessarily have the
response of a degenerate heartmind.
(Zhuangzi 4/50-51)
The sound of an animal seems to be identified with its qi and
breath. This sound-qi also causes the birth of something in the
heartmind, wh~ch (by analogy in the last line) is its "response."
31. The term jie frequently applies to the senses in the
Xunzi. The Xunzi uses the term to explain how sensory desires
obstruct thinking:
J+ § Z ~ ~ ~U J& =!t ,1Gl ...
When the desires of the ears and eyes make contact, the
thoughts are lost...
(Xunzi 21/62)
See also Xunzi 17/11 in Chapter 1.
32. Using similar terminology, the Mencius describes how
sensory contact precludes thinking:
J+ § z -g ~ 1Gl ffij i1& tft W
WX WJ'tU 5[z ffij B ~
Thinking is not the office of the eyes and ears, and they
are clouded by things. Things interact with things, and pull
them astray. That is all.
(Mencius 6A15)
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Qi is small enough that it may enter the person via the pores in
the skin, which are not explicitly included as senses in these texts,
except perhaps as "skin lines" (fuli Iii :@.) in Xunzi 23/26.
33. The Zhuangzi contains one passage that gives some,
albeit vague, sense of the relation between de and qi. A fictitious
Confucius tells a fictitious Yan Hui,
ll~J!1ffi[[*jiA~
;g~/f**jiAJ[}
Furthermore, to be ample in de and solid in trustworthiness
is not yet to reach someone's qi. To be heard in
name/reputation as noncompetitive is not yet to reach
someone's heartmind.
(Zhuangzi 4/7)
The passage implies that, although possessing these qualifications
is not sufficient for achieving such goals, they do contribute to
them. Thus, having ample de does help bring one close to affecting
someone's qi. Given that the same can be said of "trustworthiness,"
it is probably a mistake to infer much more about de and its
relation to qi from this passage.
34. Interestingly, in two instances, water metaphors are
employed to portray this accumulation (Xunzi 27/84 and Zhuangzi
5/46).
35. The Xunzi describes this process:
ffi IJ\ ji lit m:j( mIJ\ :::g- *. fit fJl& 11 If
~ :¥ :::g- 15 1¥ 1ft ff mffii 1ft rr1' ~
When rain is small, the Han becomes hidden. Something
that exhausts the small becomes big; something that
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accumulates the minute becomes manifest. When de
arrives [reaches completion], the face becomes glossy.
When one's actions are exhausted, one is heard from afar.
(Xunzi 27/83-84)
The wen rp~ (ask) is regularly emended to be wen IV1 (hear).
On the subject of accumulating, perhaps it is significant for
the relation of de to qi that qi also fills out the body in Mencius
2A2 ( ~ If Z 1C -tl!).
36. Stripped of its New Age connotations, "spirit" is an
adequate translation for shen. Shen is often paired with ghost (gui
JU), its earthly ·counterpart. Although working with material from
later periods, in "The Spirits of Chinese Religion," Stephen F.
Teiser reconstructs how the term was used. As Teiser explains it, in
death, shen and gui indicate the more or less light, benevolent
souls (hun ~) and the denser, malevolent souls (po ~) of dead
ancestors. But shen has other connotations as well. Teiser breaks
the term into three aspects: (1) one's psyche (hun), (2) "spirits" in
the sense of nontranscendent gods, and (3) something numinous
that exceeds categorization. Stephen F. Teiser, "The Spirits of
Chinese Religion," in Religions ofChina in Practice, ed. Donald S.
Lopez, Jr. (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1996),
34-36.
37. I treat de and tone as two separate but related things,
instead of reading de as modifying tone, because of the parallel
items in the passage, which are not adjectives modifying nouns.
38. Munro takes a different perspective on the sensory
background ofde, which, he argues, has visual roots in the Western
Zhou. Donald Munro, "The Origin of the Concept of De," in The
Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1969), 185-197.
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39. Of course, some de can be harmful instead of
beneficial. Xunzi 11/77, for example, mentions aberrant and
alienating de.
40. For some reason, here-as opposed to Zhuangzi 2/4--
the Zhuangzi contrasts wind and qi. It notes that riding on wind
remains dependent, while riding on qi does not.
41. The term wen has a dual sense of both hear and smell
in later Chinese texts. This is the only instance in these Warring
States philosophical texts that hints that wen might function as
"smell." The rarity may make "hear" a more likely translation.
42. A color patch is one possible example of what counts
as sense data, but there is less agreement about the identity of sense
data than there is about the definition of the term. D. W. Hamlyn,
Sensation and Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
Ltd., 1961), 175.
43. Some forms of representational realism argue that
sense data are "given" (immediately known) and independent of
the mind's judgment. Wilfred Sellars terms this "the myth of the
given" in Empiricism and the Philosophy ofMind.
Sellars refutes this view of foundational sensory knowledge
by contending that, insofar as someone can claim to have a
noninferential, nonverbal belief that s/he is seeing the color red,
slhe can only do so in the context of connecting that belief with a
network of other understood beliefs. As a result, even if there are
noninferential beliefs like the belief that one is seeing red, there is
no way for a noninferential belief alone to justifY a belief that has
conceptual content. Wilfred Sellars, Empiricism and the
Philosophy ofMind (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
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44. Sense data are usually thought to provide an immediate
foundation of knowledge from which perception derives. However,
it is also possible to argue that sensation and perception operate
via different functions. Nicholas Humphrey argues for the latter
perspective. Nicholas Humphrey, A History of the Mind (London:
Chatto & Windus, 1992).
45. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd
ed., trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1958), 193-
214.
46. Wittgenstein says, "Is it a question of both seeing and
thinking? or an amalgam of the two, as I should like to say?"
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 197.
47. This is not to say that the texts consider the senses
invariably reliable. For in that case, the constant tallying of what is
heard and seen (described in Chapter 2) would not be necessary.
Here I am simply denying that the texts exhibit full-blown sense
skepticism (see discussion ofXunzi 21/70 below).
48. For instance, when blind people are described as picking
out "white" from "black," "white" and "black" do not modify
certain things. They are the things being picked (see examples in
Chapter 4).
In this sense, the language of aspect perception is a little
misleading, because one is tempted to think that aspects are
aspects of some neutral thing. Perhaps it would be clearer to say
that colors, shapes, and sounds are "aspect-things."
49. Xunzi 2/40 and 4/44-45. I rely on the Xunzi here
because the other texts do not provide general descriptive terms
for how the senses act as a group.
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50. For example, in Xunzi 21/68-69, the passage does not
begin by describing what is "out there." In other words, it does not
begin by saying, "There is a tree." Instead, it starts out by saying
that a person sees a tree.
51. Graham contrasts the realism in these texts to
linguistic relativism. In explaining the position in the Zhuangzi,
Graham writes, "What the thinking... is trying vainly to pin down
in words is objectively there... he has to accept it as given."
Disputers ofthe Dao, 194.
My argument is different, in that it emphasizes that the
senses, as well as names, make discriminations (bian t;$). Because
the senses also discriminate (and because they tend to do so in
terms of desires and aversions), there seems to be an element of
human signification in sense discrimination. In that case, names
are not uniquely representative of social construction. Thus, names
would not be solely at fault for the relativistic effects of social
convention. In fact, social convention does not seem to be the
cause of relativism. Instead, the instability of perspective (and
therefore the instability of standards) seems to be the source of
relativistic concerns. Thus, the contrast to realism in these texts is
not linguistic relativism, any more than it is idealism or
nominalism.
52. Another interpretation would be, "if the five officials
record them, but the heartmind does not know them." But that
would require supplying new subjects simply because the claim
sounds odd as it stands. In fact, in these texts, there are other
references to the senses knowing, as well as references to the
heartmind speaking (more on the latter in Chapter 3).
53. Some commentators consider this shuo mto be
"explain," a less common use of the character.
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54. The Zhengming differentiates between two wo;-ds-zhi
mand zhi ~-which Knoblock takes to be a distinction between
mere awareness, which is characteristic of all sentient beings, and
knowledge, which comes from experience and facts (Knoblock,
Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, 3:123).
Knoblock claims to find support for this distinction in Graham's
reading of the Neo-Mohist Canons. But Graham actually discusses
the terms differently. He notes a distinction between a faculty of
knowledge (which he sometimes calls awareness) and its use, which,
unlike the faculty itself, is capable of error. Thus, unlike Knoblock,
Graham is not discussing a distinction between simple, animal
awareness and ~xperience-based knowledge.
The distinction in the Zhengming passage sounds like a
distinction between the means of knowing that are in people and
knowledge being united with something:
FfT J:.A m~ tE A ~ 1m ~m
m~JiJT~1m~~
Of the means of knowing, those that are in people [zai ren
zhe ]: we call zhi [knowing?].
Knowledge having its union: we call zhi [understanding?].
(Xunzi 22/5)
The section appears to be describing the "assorted names" that can
be "applied to people"-zai ren zhe :tE A ~ -as opposed to the
ten thousand things. The phrase zai ren zhe appears repeatedly in
the section. It seems to emphasize aspects of things that are
located within people. Thus, in the case of knowledge, the frrst line
seems to refer to those means of knowing that are located in
people. This would include intelligence among other things and
certainly need not be restricted to awareness. lowe this insight to
Dan Robins (personal communication).
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55. The Xunzi uses this unusual term without explanation
(see below).
56. Some commentators emend yi~ to ni ., but this does
not seem to account for the zhi ~ following bifang .It 11, which I
take to be possessive.
57. The agent of this action is unclear, but while it could be
any given individual, the larger context is still about how good
rulers would rectify names.
58. Later the chapter explains that the rulers affix the
names to what they name, suggesting that the affixed names then
evolve into habit or custom.
59. Knoblock, Xunzi 3:129. Graham initiated the proposal
that in some cases qing should be understood as "essence"
(sometimes in the sense of what a thing must have in order to be
called that thing, other times in the sense of "genuine" as opposed
to "demeanor"). A. C. Graham, "The Mencian Theory of Human
Nature," in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical
Literature, Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1990), 59-65. "Essence" is not a
good translation, however, both because there is little evidence to
connect qing to a difference between necessary and sufficient
conditions for naming things and because it places enormous
philosophical weight on qing in contexts, such as this one, where
the tenn seems to have no such significance.
The translation of the term qing in early China is
controversial, because the term is perceived to suggest, on the one
hand, objectivity, nature, and reality, and on the other,
subjectivity, emotion, and desire. One way to resolve this is to say
that some desires derive from reality (as opposed to convention),
hence qingyu 11f ~ would refer to real desires, as opposed to
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conventional desires. For example, see Chad Hansen, "Qing 1I'f in
Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought," Emotions in Asian Thought: A
Dialogue in Comparative Philosophy (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1995), 201. My position is that qing is used to
connote the feelings and emotions with which we are born, and
which comprise the human disposition. They are genuine in the
sense of being present (particularly at birth)-and not "awaiting"
(dai ~) things, as the Xunzi frequently says of sensory desires, and
Xunzi 23/26 specifically says of the qingxing (qing-nature).
Hence, when qing is sometimes used to imply genuineness in these
texts, this involves a contrast between things that are present and
things that are. not (or that await development). This can, in some
cases, amount to equating human artifice with disingenuousness (as
in the case of qingwei 'tJIf ~ in Mozi 36/2), but it is not necessarily
a contrast between nature and human convention, because nature
also contains things that await (natural) development, as the
persistent use of root and sprout metaphors in these texts reminds
us.
The association of qing with the senses does not render
qing real or factual, in contrast to convention. Like the Xunzi, the
Mozi also refers to qing in the context of the senses. In order to
settle doubts, the Mozi's recommends, among other things,
consulting the eyes and ears of the common people. The Mozi
asks,
lffi .",- Ii"t ~
.Ic"TIJ1' K:....
~~L1f§L~
How are they to be originated? They are to be checked by
the qing of the eyes and ears of the multitude.
(Mozi 3714)
In the Mozi, the eyes and ears of the common people are one of
three criteria for creating standards for judgments (also including
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usefulness and the practices of the sage kings). While the qing of
the eyes and ears plays this important role in the Mozi, unlike
reality or the facts, qing is not indubitable. For example, Mozi
31/44 seriously entertains the objection that a gentleman should
not deign to follow qing from the eyes and ears of commoners.
Having acknowledged the role of social rank in deciding a matter,
the passage concedes that even the gentleman should follow the
eyes and ears of the commoners; however, he should do so only
because they concur with what is written about the sage kings. If
the critics and the Mohists took the qing of the ears and eyes to
indicate reality, they would be unlikely to raise this criticism or
respond with this concession.
Moreover, the passage says nothing about the qing being
reliable due to its derivation in the senses, as opposed to human
convention. Instead, it implies that the qing of the multitude is
only as compelling as the multitude, which is not as compelling as
the sage kings. The association of qing with the senses does not
confer on it the persuasiveness of something certain-such as facts
or reality. Thus, it seems more likely that the qing of the senses
are their feelings or dispositions, which are genuine (in the sense
that they are immediate and do not await things), but are not as
incontrovertible as facts and reality.
For other viewpoints on the translation of qing, see
Anthony Yu, Rereading the Stone: Desire and the Making of
Fiction in Dream of the Red Chamber (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1997), 56--66; and Ong-cho Ng, "Is Emotion
(Qing) the Source of A Confucian Antimony?", Journal ofChinese
Philosophy 25: 169-190.
60. For example, Knoblock's translation reads, "Whenever
things belong to the same category of being or have the same
essential characteristics, the representation of them presented by
the senses is the same." Knoblock, Xunzi 3:129.
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61. For a more detailed version of this argument, see my
"Mencius's Hermeneutics," Journal ofChinese Philosophy 27: 93-
100.
62. I take zijian to fit the model in Xunzi 21/46-47-"see
by themselves." That is, in this circumstance, the dancer's own
eyes and ears do not see and hear it, but someone else's might. The
point seems to be that the dancer's own eyes and ears are not
controlling the order that emerges.
63. Mencius 6A 15 suggests something like this
movement-it compares the senses to things that are tugged (yin
51) by other things.
64. Although Xunzi 21170 begins by stating the importance
of keeping the heartmind settled, the heartmind is far from the
only thing that causes sensory doubts in the passage. As I argue
below, an unsettled heartmind is simply one among many
unreliable standards, like darkness, distance, and blindness.
65. This could be the number "one" or a single thing.
66. This hong is traditionally read as a mistake for a
character with a different radical, meaning "uproar." There is a
very similar mo that means "silence," but it does not have this
radical. (This mo is commonly translated as "desert.") Watson
translates the line as "dull noises will sound like a sharp din"
(Watson, Hsun Tzu, 134), and Knoblock says "silence seem[s] like
a clamor," (Knoblock, Xunzi, 3:109). Because both mo and hong
are emended to produce this reading, I do not follow them. Perhaps
the point is simply that the words m 0 and hong sound different.
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67. An earlier line in the passage refers to mistakes in
seeing due to darkness, but these particular lines focus on looking
and listening.
68. It may be significant that other, less controllable,
forms of sense discrimination do not have special terms to indicate
the effort of using the sense. That is, there is no effort term in
English or Chinese to apply to, say, the attempt to smell or taste.
(The relation of feel to touch might count.)
69. Commentators disagree about the translation of yii 9¥
here--the character normally refers to a "reed pipe organ," which
does not fit the context.
70. There is some disagreement among commentators
about these characters (Mf IW! 7W ~ xing sao sa suan) and the
specific smells indicated here.
71. This combination (:J* Jf jiyang) also occurs in Xunzi
4/45. It seems that most commentators emend yang ff (nourish)
to yang 11 (itch). I translate it this way because the rest of the
items distinguished by the form and body here (and in 4/45) consist
of opposite terms. Moreover, Xunzi 9/5 presents yang as the
opposite of this term for illness:
ll*J:.J&ffffftz
Those with the five illnesses should be raised up and
collected in order to nourish them.
(Xunzi 9/5)
72. The inclusion of speech and cause (or "reason") here is
remarkable and difficult to explain. This character shuo ID?
(translated as "speech" here) might also be read as shui
"persuasion" or yue "pleasure." Neither option seems to make the
line any easier to understand. "Pleasure" fits the pattern, but seems
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redundant, and it does not, in any case, eliminate the problem of
translating gu ;1&.
As it stands, the line suggests that speech and causes
(persuasions and reasons?) are related to things like happiness and
sadness. Moreover, this relation is in some way comparable to
things like hot, cold, and fragrant smells.
73. The presence of the heartmind in the list of
differentiating senses will be discussed in Chapter 3.
74. Paul Rakita Goldin makes the comparison between
"distinguish" (yi :W) in this passage and Wittgenstein's "seeing as."
I think this is useful. However, Goldin also worries about the
incoherence of the view he attributes to the Xunzi passage, which,
he fears, seems to present each sense as if it "apperceives"
independently of the others. He concludes that the Xunzi "cannot
mean" that the five senses apperceive separately, "but that the
five senses, collectively apperceive reality." Unfortunately, the
Xunzi passage says nothing about the five senses working
collectively (although it does say that the heartmind depends on
the senses in order to verify knowledge). Paul Rakita Goldin,
Rituals of the Way: The Philosophy of Xunzi (Peru, Ill.: Open
Court, 1999), 97.
75. This part of the passage does not mention objects at
all. Moreover, the idea of differentiation evokes a system in which
identity is constituted by contrasts, not by properties of objects.
76. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie
and E. Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962),207.
77. This might be a case of what the Zhengming calls the
senses' "recording their kinds, but not knowing."
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78. See Laozi 14 and 35, cited in Chapter 2 footnote 12.
79. The tenn zheng Mmay be translated as "verifying" or
"summoning." Aside from mentioning the eyes and ears, the
passage provides no other clue for how the heartmind goes about
doing it. Discussions of knowledge frequently seem to involve
tallying and measuring, thus "verifying" may be more appropriate
here.
For reasons presented in Chapters 2 and 3, I suspect the
process refers to something commonplace: the attempt to match
things like what a person says with what he/she does.
80. I think form and sound are singled out here because
they are the first items in the list of the things differentiated by
the ears and eyes. Here they seem to function as a synecdoche for
the kinds of aspects the ears and eyes differentiate.
81. It is possible to interpret eyes and ears here as standing
in for all of the senses, but the prominent role of the eyes and ears
in other descriptions of knowledge makes this less likely. For a full
discussion of the role of seeing and hearing in knowledge, see
Chapter 2.
82. Considering its awkwardness, it is also possible that this
last line was originally an editorial comment that made its way into
the text by mistake.
83. In his discussion of the Zhengming chapter of the
Xunzi, A. S. Cua refers to chaotic "sense data," which, he says, are
transformed by the mind into "evidential grounding for our
knowledge." A. S. Cua, Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsun
Tzu's Moral Epistemology (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1985), 31. Watson's translation of the passage cited above (Xunzi
22/19-21) also invokes sense data. "Because of this over-all
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understanding, it [the mind] may rely upon the data of the ear and
understand sounds correctly....But this over-all understanding must
wait until it has received new data from the senses and matched it
with the data already recorded in the mind concerning a particular
class of objects, before it can arrive at a correct understanding of
the objects." Watson, Hsun Tzu, 142-143.
Knoblock translates the section along the same lines,
alluding to "sense impressions" as performing an evidential role in
knowing. "Only when it rests on the evidence provided by the ear
is it possible for this awareness of the defining characteristics to
know sound... the mind's awareness of defining characteristics
necessarily requires that the sense organ be impressed by the type
of thing to which that sense organ [is sensitive]." Knoblock, Xunzi,
130.
84. Such a reading produces the following interpretation of
this part of the passage. It seems to say that because there is
verifying knowledge it is possible-by virtue of the eyes and ears-
to have knowledge of form aspects and sounds aspects. In other
words, verifying knowledge makes knowledge of form and sound
aspects possible, which is perhaps a way of saying that verifying
knowledge is knowledge of sound and form aspects in tandem.
(Note that together "hear and see" [wenjian /jfJ Ji!.] means "know"
or "understand." See Chapter 2.) This verifying knowledge of form
aspects and sound aspects appears to be undercut in some way by
the fact that it "awaits" (depends upon?) some activity of the
"heavenly officials" (a term that seems to include the heartmind
itself because it too forms "intentional things" in Xunzi 22/1 6).
This dependence seems to be restated in the next line in the form
of one of the two requirements for the attribution of knowledge
(i.e., the attribution of verifying knowledge?).
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85. That is, there is a pragmatic feature to this kind of
knowing that differentiates it from perception: the heartmind can
verify sound aspects and form aspects, but unless it can articulate
or explain things, no one will credit it with knowledge.
Chapter Two: Hearing and Seeing
1. See also Xunzi 21/62, page 20.
2. Again, the character se can be translated as "color" (as
in "the five colors"), "face," or "sex." It is, in any case, visual.
Here it seems to function as "looks," specifically those that are
appealing, hence the translation. See below for an extended
discussion of sounds and looks.
3. Yu is one of the legendary virtuous kings of Chinese
prehistory.
4. See also Mozi 36/18 for a similar passage.
5. The passage is noteworthy for its strange claim that the
noble person's heartmind is small. Some commentators emend the
text for this reason, but that seems unnecessary, because their
heartminds are relatively small in relation to the things that their
way can achieve.
6. The characters I translate as "knowledge" (zhi ?n) and
"understanding" (zhi ~) seem quite close in use and appearance.
Xunzi 22/5 explains them in terms of one another (see Chapter 1,
footnote 54.) This explanation seems to say that the term
"knowledge" applies to something located in people and the term
"understanding" applies to knowledge that is in some sense unified
with something.
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7. This is an echo of the Lunyu 7/8, where the teacher
holds up one comer and the student must be able to respond with
the other three.
8. The reason for my translation of er mu zhi shi as
"products of the ears and eyes" is provided in Chapter 4. The texts
do not say what the ears and eyes produce, but my contention is
that it is neither data nor reality.
9. In another version of this, the terms change slightly.
Standards are "originated" by "checking" the qing (conditions?





How are they to be tested? They are to be tested on the
deeds of the early sage kings. How are they to be
originated? They are to be checked by the qing of the eyes
and ears of the multitude. How are they to be applied?
They are to be applied by being adopted in government and
observing their effects on the masses.
(Mozi 37/3-4)
10. I translate this xun as "accord." Graham seems to
translate it as "through"-"If the channels inward through the eyes
and ears are cleared." Graham, Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters~
69.
11. Perhaps the point is to contrast "according" with the
channels to manipulating them in some way. Or perhaps the
inward direction is a reversal of the normal outward direction of
hearing and seeing.
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12. On similar lines, the Laozi describes its dao via an
inability to hear and see. Although the relevant passages also
mention an inability to taste, use, and obtain it, they stress hearing
and seeing slightly more. For example, see Laozi 35 (in the
Conclusion). The other series speaks of dao in terms of a failure of




We look at it without seeing it;
We name it, saying "minute."
We listen to it, but without hearing it;
We name it, saying "sparse."
We grasp it, but do not obtain it;
We name it, saying "leveL"
(Laozi 14)
(The ming i5 in the first line is supplied from Text A.) These
two examples confirm that the pairing of hearing and seeing
extends to the Laozi, but the inclusion of taste, use, and grasping
makes them less significant for this argument.
13. The passage reads,
~1Z\ l' ~ ~ ~J!Ji[~~ ~ ~~
1} 13 1'Ii!~~JJt1'~5$
§ l' f£J ~ ~ l' " *"~ 1Z\ ~ &' ~ fl9 ;l't 1} 13 L Ii! ~
~ JJt L ~ !Mi !it L f£J ~ J§ L " *"
[To strike the bells] one must not employ the aged or the
young. Their ears and eyes are not keen and bright, their
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arms are not strong, their sound is not harmonious, and
their [visual] expression does not change quickly.
One must employ those in the prime of life, because of the
keenness and clarity of their eyes and ears, the strength of
their limbs, the harmony of their sound and the quick
changes in their [visual] expression.
(Mozi 32/21)
The terms I translate as "visual expression" are different in the
two instances-the first is "clarity" and the second is "eyebrow."
Because both refer to visual things, and seem to parallel the
reference to sound, I do not translate them as referring to the bell's
expression, bui to the expression of the people themselves.
14. One Ii equals .415 kilometers.
IS. The Xunzi argues in favor of focusing, noting that one




One who walks both branches of a road does not arrive,
one who serves two lords does not please them, the eye
cannot look at two things with clarity, the ear cannot hear
two things with keenness.
(Xunzi 1/22)
16. The Laozi contains something that might count as
another example, although it is not clear that desire is at issue. In
its pronouncements about the nature of things, the Laozi seems to
categorize the world in terms of squares, vessels, tones, and (visual)
images (see Laozi 41 in the Conclusion).
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17. In one particularly difficult to interpret case, the
Mencius clearly distinguishes sheng ~ (sound) from yan §
(speech), saying sheng is the more powerful of the two. This might
be variously understood as distinguishing speech from music, from
reputation, or from tone. The line from the Mencius says,
t§::ftmt~zAA~-ili
Humane speech does not compare to humane sheng in how
deeply it enters into a person.
(Mencius 7A14)
18. The counterexamples that match speech with a
different form of visual appearance are the Lunyu 1/3 and 12/20,
cited above (see page 66).
19. The Xunzi also says,
~ 1!l€ IJ\ rrn ::f ~
fT1!l€Klrrn::f~
No sound is so small that it is not heard,
No action is so hidden that it does not have [visible] form.
(Xunzi 1/25)
20. I leave the translation vague as to whether the petty
person watches the noble person while he walks the way. That
sense is not demanded by the original text, but it seems likely,
since I take it that the way is not something that exists except
insofar as it is enacted by someone.
21. This knowledge of speech and action does not apply to
heaven, which, we are told, does not need to speak (Lunyu 17/19;
Mencius 5A5).
22. According to the Mozi, the two are causally related:
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§::fffi~ff::f*
If one's speech is not trustworthy, one's actions will have
no results.
(Mozi 2/9)
23. The Mozi instructs its readers to emulate the district





Dismis~ what is not good to say, and learn what the head of
the district considers good speech. Dismiss what is not good
to do, and learn what the head of the district considers
good action.
(Mozi 11/14--15)
24. The character discussed here is xian Ii, but my claim is
about virtue in a general sense.
25. The passage refers to Lunyu 11/3, where "study of
culture" is a third category for evaluation.
26. The passage is a restatement of Lunyu 11/3, where
Zaiwo and Zigong are credited with good speaking skills (yanyu §
~), and the other three are credited with virtuous action (dexing
1itii /.-)ve;; 1T .
27. Perhaps for this reason, Van Hui (Lunyu 11/14) chose
not to speak much and the Mozi values wisdom over plenitude of
speech (Mozi 2/13).
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28. The Xunzi makes a similar claim. See Xunzi 27/50 in
footnote 33.
29. The metaphor of speed in speech and action also
appears in Mozi 2/12, which criticizes those who work at speech,
while being slow to act (see page 79).
30. Xunzi 12/94-95 mentions that the eye sees only as far




l' r1J l' ~ 9ll -tl!. ....
ll§LJ!ij~~;!t~-tl!.
A±L~R]~~;!tJJi-tl!.
The eye does not see outside the compound walls. The ear
does not hear beyond the village. Yet the ruler's guidance
and governance cannot fail to have a general knowledge
that goes as far as the world and as near as the boundaries
of the state....The clarity of the ears and eyes is that
narrow, the guidance and governance of the ruler is that
immense.
(Xunzi 12/94)
In reference to a filial person, Xunzi 27/87-88 describes speech as
what persuades those in the distance, while movement or "action"
("walking," which it correlates with the eye) is what
persuades/delights those who are near.
210 On the Epistemology of the Senses
Because speech can be heard, therefore it delights the far.
Because action can be seen, therefore it delights the near.
(Xunzi 27/88)
Together these passages suggest that the sounds we hear (perhaps
including hearsay) are not as easily confmed as the shapes we see.
31. The passage appears in two versions:
§ )E PJ jI fj ~ 'ffi' ~
l' )E PJ jI fj ~m'ffi'
l' )E PJ jI fj ffij 'ffi' iL ~ $j; 0 -tP.
If there. is speech that can modify action, take that as your
constant. If it is not sufficient to modify action, then do
not take it as your constant. If it is not sufficient to
modify action and yet you take it as your constant, that is
wasting your mouth.
(Mozi 47/18-19)
The other version changes the term "modify" to "repeat" and
"initiate":
§ )E PJ 1l fj ~ 'ffi' ~
l' )E PJ ~ fj ~ 0/] 'ffi'
If there is speech that can be repeated in action, take that
as your constant. If it is not sufficient to initiate action,
then do not take it as your constant.
(Mozi 46/37-38)
32. The Xunzi passage is an exhortation to utilize worthy
people:
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Saying that you will use the worthy is mouthing [words].
Rejecting the worthy is action. This is the mouth and the
action opposing one another.
(Xunzi 14/14-15)
33. The passage reads,
D§~~1T~~~Z
7El ~ ~ ...~;!=t ~
When people's mouths speaks of good, but their bodies act
badly, the state demonizes them. Those who govern the
state...cast off its demons.
(Xunzi 27/50--51)
34. There may be some ambiguity as to whether this means
looking inside through the pupil or looking at the pupil itself.
However, because the issue is the pupil's brightness or dullness, this
seems to be a case of looking at the pupil, where the interior of the
person manifests itself.
Chapter Three: The Heartmind's Relation to the Senses
1. I focus on pondering here because, although the
heartmind is said to "think" as well as "ponder," "pondering" is its
more well-described function.
2. Again, the term qing is ambiguous, hence the
translation. (See Chapter 1, footnote 59.)
3. The Zhuangzi also mentions self-selecting as part of the
image of how heaven motivates movement. When asked about
something called the "pipes of heaven," a character replies:
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~~131&~~~mE$
Who is it who impels things by puffing out the ten
thousand differences, by controlling their self-ending, and
stimulating their self-selecting?
(Zhuangzi 2/8-9)
The Xunzi also refers to an instance where the heartmind picks
people (for office):
PJ ~ nr mz Ii:.\ 1& A.
~U irm:m A.
If you select people by using the [kind of] heartmind that
affinns the way, then you will unite with people of the
way.
(Xunzi 21/33)
Even this inconsequential looking selection for office seems worth
noting, because it belongs to this pattern of the heartmind
selecting.
4. In order to make sense of the line, "pupil" here is
traditionally taken to mean "look down, n "scrutinize," or "stare
at. "
5. As I argue elsewhere, Graham's reconstruction seems to
depend crucially upon an unconvincing scheme that he created to
explain the structure of the Canons. It is possible that some of his
translations are reliable, but the reconstruction as a whole depends
upon a faulty foundation. Thus, any individual piece of it should be
used with caution and be subject to critical reassessment. See my
"Critique of A. C. Graham's Reconstruction of the Neo-Mohist
Canons," Journal ofthe American Oriental Society 119 (1): 1-11.
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The passage cited here is from A. C. Graham, Later Mohist
Logic, Ethics and Science (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press,
1978).
6. The line reads,
tf~f!lJmffii/f~£
The blind person looks up, but does not see the stars.
(Xunzi 21/72-73)
7. It is not clear what the heartmind "obtains." However,
both Canon A4 and Mencius 6A15 refer to "obtaining it." The
metaphor comparing what the heartmind obtains to a needle seems
to preclude interpreting "obtain" as something abstract, as in
saying the heartmind "realizes" or "achieves."
If pondering itself is the selection of qing (as Xunzi 22/3
suggests), and pondering is different from knowing (as Xunzi 24/2
suggests), then knowing must be something other than just
selecting qing. Perhaps it is the "arrival" at qing referred to in
Xunzi 21/47.
8. See also Mencius lA7 and Mozi 16/54-55.
9. For example, Mencius 5Bl.
10. The inclusion of speech within a list of things
distinguished by the senses may not be as unusual as it seems. As
Constance Classen points out, the Christian interpreter Philo
considered speech to be one of the five senses. Classen, Worlds of
Sense, 2.
11. See pages 44-45 for another discussion of this passage.
12. See page 48 for a fuller citation of this passage.
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13. There is a close connection between ming ffrJ and ming
:g. The initial reference to the process uses the character ming
€p (ran hou sui er ming zhi 1& fit ~ ffiJ €p Z, "Thereupon,
follow and decree names for them If), but, as the Xunzi begins to
elaborate on the details of how ming €P should work, it is clearly a
matter of applying names (ming :g). Xunzi 22/21-25.
14. After describing the heartmind as empty, in spite of its
storage of aims, the passage says that knowledge requires sameness
and difference:
JL\ ~ ffiJ :f'j ~ ~ ffiJ :f'j ~ ~ ih fj ~ If.J ~ ~ z
~1f.J~~zmih
1& ffiJ :f'j PfT m-
/f tJ :;k: - ~ I!t - mz ~
Once the heartmind is born, there is knowledge, once there
is knowledge, there are differences. Differences are
collectively known at one time. Things collectively known
at one time are multiple [lit. "two"]. And yet it has what
can be called unity. Not letting "that one" damage "this
one" is called "unity."
The passage ends with a comment about dreaming:
JL\ ~ JW ~ fifij ~IJ § 1T 'fiE z ~IJ ~ iiZ JL' *1i /f iJJ tf1
1&ffiJ:f'jffim'JiW
/f tJ ~ 111 ~L ~mz iW
When the heartmind sleeps, it dreams. When it is not
occupied, then it goes off on its own. When it is put to use,
then it plans. Therefore, the heartmind never stops
moving, and yet it has what can be called calmness. Not




15. The Mozi says,
;it iL' l' ~ ;it ~ ffij w;it ~
The heartminds of [the rulers] share their favor [with
certain people] without examining their understanding.
(Mozi 9/37)
16. Lao Kan, "The Early Use of the Tally in China," III
Ancient China: Studies in Early Civilization, ed. David T. Roy and
Tsuen-hsuin Tsien (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978).
This ancient conception seems to carry over to the present day in
China with the expression for asking whether something is correct:
ff l' ff [lit. "Does it match or not match?"].
17. The passage reads,
IL\ff~~
~~~U
f.~ :Ej: ffij ~ ~ PI t!1
~§ffij~~PIt!1
There is verifying knowledge; thus, because of [lit. caused
by] the ear, it is possible to know sounds; because of
[caused by] the eye, it is possible to know forms.
(Xunzi 22/19)
18. The passage says,
ie" :fr ~ ~ :g t!1
The heartmind is the ruler of the form.
(Xunzi 21/44)
19. The term tian 72:. here contrasts to human. See Chapter
1, note 14.
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20. Watson's translation makes no sense of the shi 'fie, so it
substitutes a hi "jf& instead, making the last line read "How much
more so with a man whose mind is obsessed!" Watson, Hsun Tzu,
122.
21. Xunzi 22/19.
22. Two passages from the Xunzi note that the senses
cannot substitute for one another: Xunzi 17/11 and Xunzi 12/61
(see page 19).
23. In other cases, like the Zhengming and Xunzi 10/61-
63, the passage lists the heartmind along with the senses, but
distinguishes it as well. (Xunzi 10/63 uses a different tenn preceding
the heartmind from the tenn it uses for the other senses.)
24. Again, I am translating the Mawangdui edition of the
Laozi here, unless otherwise noted, but for the readers'
convenience, I am using the more familiar Wang Bi chapter
numbers.
The order of the items in the Wang Bi edition places the
heartmind last.
25. The Mozi contains a list of what could be senses, but
the subject of the passage is not desire. Even if it is not a sense list,
it is noteworthy that, once again in relation to the person as a
whole, the heartmind's place is not necessarily at the high point of
the list (see Mozi 12/65-67, page 26).
26. Xunzi 22120.
27. In other words, vision and hearing operate best at close
range.
28. See discussion ofwind in Chapter 1.
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29. It does not store represented images or sense data.
30. The passage says,
A IL\ WtlO ~ 71< lE ~ ffff o/J IJJ
~U m~ tE T ffff tR SA tE J:.
~U ..@ tJ ~ • f§ ffff ~ :I!I! ~
~j.\~iZm~IJJ-¥TtR~lll~J:.
~lJ ~ I'iJ tJ 1~ *- Jf3 iZ lE -tQ
The human heartmind is like a pan of water. If you place
the pan upright and do not move it, then heavy muddiness
will be at the bottom and clear brightness will be at the top.
Then it will be sufficient to see the hair and eyebrows and
examine the [facial] lines. [But if] a slight wind passes it,
then the heavy muddiness moves on the bottom, and the
clear brightness is disordered on the top. Then you cannot
even obtain [from it] a large form's alignment.
(Xunzi 21/55-56)
It is noteworthy that wind is what disturbs the heartmind's
operations. The person is like water in this regard: wind is a potent
cause of transformation, both positive and negative. (See the
discussion in Chapter 1 where de fills the person like a body of
water.)
31. Another way to read the passage is to take the first line
as "Strange forms and alienated heartminds." I translate it this way
because the jiao ~ in the next line is the same term used in
Mencius 6A15 to describe the operations of the senses in relation
to things.
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32. It is not clear how exactly this peace manages to be
emitted, but the same verb is used to describe how speech exits
from the mouth in both the Lunyu 4/22 and Xunzi 20/26.
33. I take this first line as a reference to "rectifying" one's
actual physical body, hence I read the "enter" as being like the
strange sense of "entering someone's enclosure [body?]" in
Zhuangzi 4/29. This translation is ambiguous, but it resembles the
original that is also not so clear about what would enter what when
the form approaches. Watson does not take the zheng ru shen as
concretely referring to rectifying one's physical body. He
translates it as :'make sure you yourself are in the right" (Watson,
Chuang Tzu, 62). This allows him to take the thing approached to
be the other person's behavior and translate ru A. as "pulled in with
him." Graham's translation of the first line could be taken to refer
to the physical body: "Get your own person rightly adjusted!" but
he too translates jiu as "get close" and ru as "drawn in" without
indicating to what (Graham, Chuang-tzu, 72).
Cbapter Four: Names and Tbeir "Filling"
1. The Zhuangzi indicates that "names and shi" demarcate
a fundamental division. Zhuangzi 7/23-24 tells a story of a teacher
making fun of the practice of reading physiognomy. The teacher
performs a process that seems like regression, in which he "shows"
himself to the physiognomist at certain primal states. Along the
way, he reaches a very basic state wherein "names and shi have not
entered, but impulses come up from his heels" (1; 'If /f' A. ffii tm
~ m: B).
2. The glosses in the ShUD wen are not presented as
definitions (i.e., the essence of a term, in the form of its
meanings). Rather, the glosses are lists of how the character is
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used, from which one may infer its meanings (in the sense of how
the character functions within the language of the texts).
3. In the Mencius, shi appears twice in conjunction with
chong 1f, (fill). Mencius 7B25 and 7B31.
4. For example, this use appears in Laozi 3.
5. See J. L. Austin's Sense and Sensibilia for an analysis of
the many ways we employ the term "reality." J. L. Austin, Sense
and Sensibilia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).
6. Although shi is contrasted to a variety of things, only
emptiness can truly be considered its opposite, in the sense that a
thing cannot be simultaneously empty and shi.
Other terms contrast to shi without quite being opposites.
Names are often the pair term for shi-a relation that is more
parallel than oppositional (as I will argue below). The Xunzi
contains a case of shi being juxtaposed to ci ~ (phrases). The
Xunzi 22/39 explains the character ci mas "an amalgam of names
for different shi, laying out one intent.":
m:TIfi~mffii:fm •....
S3m~Zmmrna~
Huizi is clouded by phrases and does not know shi [fruition?
fulfillment?]. ...
Ifyou address things by starting from phrases [lit. "if your
'call' on things starts from phrases"], then the way will be
entirely about sorting.
(Xunzi 21/22-26)
The Zhuangzi refers to a similar kind of relation in a passage
juxtaposing shi to wen )c. Using a sexual metaphor, the Zhuangzi
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implies that the fruit is like the male half of a pair, which is
required to fill out the form, so that something can be born:
:efw&m;~:)(*m;~.
ffifIm~lliW
mJHiE ffif 1!!€ 1i$ ffif X ~ Jj~ ffii
With you I have exhausted the form, but not yet exhausted
the fruits: how could you have a sure grasp of the way?
With so many hens but no cock, what eggs can you expect
from them?
(Zhuangzi 7118)
7. In the Mozi, qing and shi are interchanged in reference
to reliable conditions, as well as in reference to ears and eyes (for
the latter, see Chapter 2). The Mozi indicates something worthy of
trust via "fullness" (shi) and being rooted 10
"conditions/dispositions" (qing):
~*r ZJ: 0*A ±;gTWfJf1f~M~ ~ ~C.
Now, if the rulers and the gentlemen of the world qing [by
condition/disposition?] desire to enrich their country...
(Mozi 12/74-75)
~* r Z ±;gT'~ .~* r Z M...
Now, if the gentlemen of the world sincerely and shi [fully]
desire to have the world be rich...
(Mozi 35/46)
The sincerity that is connected to these terms may relate to being
in alignment with the center of the heartmind (or, the center that
is the heartmind). The use of zhong ,~ in the first example
switches with zhong $ "central" in other passages (assuming that
we should sooner translate zhong as "central" than "inside" in the
context of heaven). For example,
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;E=~~ep./f~lIt~ii1.
If heaven did not centrally and shi [fully] love the
people...
Mozi 28/25
However (apropos of the discussion of authenticity and emotions
below), even if qing is interpreted as "dispositions" or "feelings,"
this is not to say that sincere emotions are private entities located
inside a center (the heartmind) and not manifest on the outside.
Sincere authenticity need not derive from being located inside the
heartmind, but simply from being aligned with its centrality.
It is worth noting that, although qing 'tI'f and shi • seem
interchangeable in such contexts, their use still implies something
slightly different. Qing seems to refer to what is present
particularly from birth (Xunzi 23/26), whereas shi seems to
indicate a fulfilled product. This point was clarified for me by Chris
Fraser (personal communication).
8. The following evidence IS the basis for my
characterization of heaven and earth: Zhuangzi 4/88 notes that
earth is heavy. In a story in Zhuangzi, Huzi contrasts earth to
heaven in a way that suggests the earth is damp and cold, whereas
heaven is hot and bright (Zhuangzi 7/21 and 7/23). When it rains,
heaven can become yin ~, but this is not its usual state (Mencius
2A4). Heaven is described as bright (Zhuangzi 2/29; Xunzi 20/29;
and Mozi 48/50, although the reference is to its intelligence).
Heaven is associated with the sun and/or the moon or light and
darkness inXunzi 17/40, Mencius 5A4, and Zhuangzi 6/21.
The question of superiority is only a matter of degree,
because heaven and earth form a continuum, but heaven usually
seems the more imposing of the two.
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9. As Norbert Elias points out, there is some confusion in
the way we speak of emotions. We speak of them both in a broad
sense--as having somatic, behavioral, and feeling components---
and in a narrow sense, as if they were only the feeling component.
The latter is implied when we speak of "expressing emotions,"
which Elias notes "is representative of a human self-image
according to which the true self of a person is hidden deep inside--
one cannot quite be sure inside of what." According to Elias, this
"common sense" concept of emotion reflects an inadequate image
of human beings. Norbert Elias, "On Human Beings and Their
Emotions: A Process-Sociological Essay," in Theory, Culture, &
Society 4: 355-356.
We should be cautious lest that common-sense concept of
emotion not be shared by early Chinese texts. Zhuangzi 3/18
mentions that one should not let sadness and happiness enter:
~ ffi'¥ ffij ~ IIWi :R ~ l' fi~ A it!
If one is content with the times and following on the
course, sadness and joy cannot enter.
(Zhuangzi 3/18)
This "entering" makes no sense if one takes emotions to be
private entities/events. However, if emotions include their public
expression, the passage could refer to protecting oneself from
being affected by the (expressed and manifest) emotions of others.
For an argument against the existence of inaccessible
psychological states in the Lunyu, see Herbert Fingarette,
Confucius-The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper and Row,
1972), 37-56. See also Mary Bockover's argument that "the line
between internal and external feelings is...arbitrary," as well as her
use of Robert Solomon's claims that emotions are like actions,
insofar as they are intentional or "about something." Mary I.
Bockover, "The Concept of Emotion Revisited: A Critical
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Synthesis of Western and Confucian Thought," in Emotions in
Asian Thought: A Dialogue in Comparative Philosophy, 163.
10. An alternate translation, even more favorable to my
reading, takes dui 5t as yue mand reads the line as "make it so that
harmony and ease circulate, but there is no loss in joy."
11. The reader may be reminded of the Warring States
understanding of health as dynamic movement, referred to in the
Introduction.
12. The passage chastises Hui Shi for letting something like
emotions (likes and dislikes) harm him on the inside. Contrasting
Hui Shi to sages, the character Zhuangzi says,
moW ~ &l F:. oW ~ 1f} ~ PJ ff ~ j7g ~ ~ :!1t
~Tjf.~TiZ1$~~T~~
~Wffii ~ iJAHf.H~nffi ~
F:. :m T iZ 1f} T PJ ~ B Pi
The way gives such people their manner, heaven gives
them their shape.
They do not use likes and dislikes to inwardly wound their
bodies.
Now you, sir, keep on externalizing your shen [spirits] and
overworking your jing [seminal powers], with your
intoning, while you lean on a tree, and dozing, while you
lean on your study desk.
Heaven selected your shape, but you use "hard" and "white"
to chirp.
(Zhuangzi 5/58-60)
13. Instead of testing against the five senses, there are
occasional instances of something like "seeing for oneself'-
perhaps because the eye sees what is near and close in time. Most
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often, the eyes, ears, and heartmind play the verifying role that
one might expect to be played collectively by all of the senses. It
is true that when the Xunzi explains how the five senses function,
it mentions that verifying knowledge depends on the heavenly
officers fitting their kinds. However, the Xunzi seems to think
only the heartmind's dependence on the eyes and ears merits
elaboration (Xunzi 22/19-20). (For more discussion of this topic,
see Chapter 3)
14. The passage then points out the "beauty" of names,
which could refer to their visual aspect, but the term wen )( can




When a name is heard and a shi is understood, that is the
function of names.
When names are bound and become ornate, that is the
beauty of names.
Obtaining both the use and the beauty of names, [we] call
this "knowing names."
(Xunzi 22/38)
15. For the connection between ming;g and ming trI, see
Marcel Granet, La Pensee Chinoise (Paris: Albin Michel, 1968),
366, and Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 199.
16. This is an example of a translation by Graham, with its
characteristic emendations based on his proposed structure for the
Canons. The reader should be warned that the translation involves
emending three characters (indicated by the asterisks). The
translation of hi &:' (must) as "necessarily requires" reflects
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Graham's (to my mind erroneous) view that this portion of the
Canons belongs to the realm of necessary, atemporal logic.
It is not clear to me what name Graham means by "the
name" in the last line.
17. William Boltz writes that from 500 B.C.E. on-until zi
¥: replaced it-"the term ming £ is used meaning 'word' of either
the spoken or written language of equal force." William Boltz, The
Origin and Early Development ofthe Chinese Writing System (New
Haven: American Oriental Society, 1994), 138. Although I am not
sure I understand what Boltz means by "of equal force," I suspect
my argument disagrees with his claim, that is, my impression is
that ming rarely refers to writing in these texts, and if it
occasionally does, the writing of ming implicitly refers to a record
ofsounds, because ming is predominantly oral/aural.
Boltz's own argument is concerned with the actual history
of writing (rather than the early Chinese perception of it). Still, as
a whole, Boltz's argument highlights the oral/aural aspects of mingo
Boltz notes that the character ming £, in its origin, is a picture
of a mouth, to which the 11 graph (which, he argues, is pronounced
ming in this case) is added to specify the pronunciation. See The
Origin and Early Development ofthe Chinese Writing System, 105.
He himself hints that the sense of ming as writing is an extension
of its aural/oral sense. He argues that the graph ming ~ developed
later than ming £ as an attempt to specify an inscribed name.
Thus, his argument suggests that the character ming ~ does not
testify to the visuality of ming £. On the contrary, it implies
that ming £ referred to sounds, while ming ~ referred to
inscribed sounds. See The Origin and Early Development of the
Chinese Writing System, 70.
18. I do not understand why Graham translates qi ming as
"making a name for yourself." His translation reads,
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I shall tell you. You are capable of entering and roaming
free inside his cage, but do not be excited that you are
making a name for yourself. When the words penetrate,
sing your native note; when they fail to penetrate, desist.
(Zhuangzi 4/29; Graham, Chuang-tzu, 69)
19. Because of the pattern of the texts using expressions
like "hear without listening" and "see without looking," the
reference to "naming without seeing" in the Laozi 47 might appear
to indicate a visual aspect of naming. However, the line prior to
"naming without seeing" reads "knows without going," rather than
"knows without thinking/pondering." Thus, the completed actions
in that chapte·r do not have the kind of automatic cause-effect
relation that would establish seeing as the ordinary causal prelude
to naming.
20. The Xunzi contains an example of the former type:
~ ff Jt 1'; ffii il3L ;!t fJ
[Certain people] want to nourish their names [fame], but
instead they disorder their actions.
(Xunzi 22/83)
21. In other instances where shi is the pair term for
speech, both "reality" and "action" may seem like equally plausible
translations. For instance, shi functions as a pair term for speech
(yan) in the Zhuangzi 5/49. The Zhuangzi relates a story of a ruler
saying this to "Confucius":
M1 ift -ef P) M 00 ffii ;g 7( r
t4 ~ Z ~ ffii i'f Jt JE -ef EJ P) ~ ~ jiJi *
h- :E. I'm ~ I ~ 7?" :rJL :E. :fm: :tt m
--, l=t I..EH .:::±::. /\.. K- I=f IG' I=I ~l\' ..,; -... .w.
~ffl-ef:!1tffiiLJt~
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Earlier, I thought I had ultimate understanding of facing
south, being lord of the world, controlling the regulation of
the people, and worrying about their deaths.
Now I have heard the speech of an "ultimate-person." I
fear I lack your [or "its"] shi, have lightly treated my
person, and will lose my country.
(Zhuangzi 5/48-49)
While "reality" is a possible translation, the use of shi as the pair
term for speech argues for translating shi as a form of action. On
such a reading, the king hears Confucius's speech and realizes that
his prior acts of controlling and worrying have not been in accord
with it. On my reading, rather than lacking the reality or substance
referred to by Confucius's speech, the king lacks the actions that
correspond to it.
22. Compare Lau's translation:
Words without reality are ill-omened, and the reality of the
ill-omened will befall those who stand in the way of good
people.
(Mencius 4B17; Lau, Mencius, 130)
There is no zhe if to justifY supplying a "the" before "iIJ-omened."
Technically, if the shi is "reality," then it should read "the reality
of being ill-omened."
As I argue below, the greater disseminating power of speech
perhaps accounts for why the Mencius refers to yan without shi as
inauspicious, without saying that shi without yan is inauspicious.
23. See Zhuangzi 4/49-50 (page 73).
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24. While it does not pair shi with yon, a passage from the
Zhengming is equally well served by interpreting shi as an act of
fulfillment, rather than reality:
;g 11!€ lm 11: f!J z PJ $
f!J;E%P.XmiZ1l:
~ 1ft f!J ~U mi z :if' 11:
;g 11!€ lm .. f!J z PJ $ ..
f!J;E%p'x~Z.. ;g
Names have no original appropriateness. Bind them by
decree/ordaining. When the binding settles and a habit
forms, call it appropriate.
If it is ·different from the habit, then call it inappropriate.
Names have no original shi [fulfillment?]. Bind them by
ordaining shi. If the binding settles and a habit forms, call it
a shi name [a full name? a fruitful name?].
(Xunzi 22/25-27)
For those who interpret shi as "real," this passage seems to say
that names have no original reality. Sticking to the grammatical
pattern, the second claim sounds like a rephrasing of the first
("names have merely conventional appropriateness" and "names
have merely conventional reality"). But this redundancy seems out
of place, because the next line is not at all redundant. Instead of
saying that names have merely conventional goodness, it asserts
that names have original goodness, which gives the impression that
the passage is not simply repeating the same thing in different
forms.
Translating shi in terms of an act that brings something to
fruition helps resolve the problem. By such a reading, after noting
that names have merely conventional appropriateness, the passage
adds that names have no original filling. In other words, not only is
the appropriateness of names themselves conventional (i.e., what
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sounds count as names), but the fulfillment of names (i.e., what
actions/events count as filling a name) is also conventional.
25. Although a significant amount of the evidence for this
part of the argument derives from the Mozi, that does not, I think,
argue for restricting its conclusions to the Mozi. Unless there is
explicit evidence to the contrary, it seems safe to assume that
ideas about the sensory nature of fundamental categories of
experience-such as the notion that ming/shi is an aural/visual
pair-are not likely to belong to isolated texts.
26. Discriminating the wu is the visual counterpart to using
the names. The qi~ before wu 4o/J refers back to ming in the prior
line.
27. Breaking up the line differently points to an alternate
reading: "They are not able [to pick]. It is a matter of knowledge."
28. It is interesting to note that some scholars argue that,
during the Shang dynasty, wu 4o/J was originally a color term, as well
as a term used to mean "to select on the basis of color." Wang
Tao, "Color Terms in Shang Oracle Bone Inscriptions," Bulletin of
the School ofOriental and African Studies 59: 82.
29. This line is part of the corrupted chapters known as
the Neo-Mohist Canons. While the line I cite involves no
changing of the text, Graham's reconstruction of the passage as a
whole is emended in places:
A 80 ;n * Pfl ~~ i5 .. .g- ~
(;n ) ft 1t L flU iQ 1J ~ * it ~ iQ
~ Il~ ~ iQ ffT tJ mi5iQ ffT m.. iQ
i5Jf~.g-iQ~1T~iQ
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C. Chih (know). By hearsay, by explanation, by personal
experience. The name, the object, how to relate, how to
act.
E. Having received it at second hand is knowing by
'hearsay.' Knowing that something square will not rotate is
by 'explanation.' Having been a witness oneself is knowing
'by personal experience.'
What something is called by is its 'name.' What is so called
is the 'object.' The mating of name and object is 'relating.'
To intend and to perform are 'to act.'
(Graham, Later Mohist Logic Ethics and Science, 327)
.
Note that the three uses of "by" in the first line are not indicated
in any way in the Chinese. The reader should also be aware that the
two asterisks represent two emendations. The second emendation
that produces "something square will not rotate" seems particularly
unconvincing. Graham thinks that the Canons contain four main
sections, one of which is "necessary knowledge" or logic. Given
that knowledge is the topic of the Canon, he may have felt
obliged, or at least encouraged, to locate some kind of logical
necessity in this Canon. Thus, this phrase attached to shuo ~
(speech/spoken explanation}-which contains an unidentifiable
character-is manipulated to sound like logic.
30. The topic of each Canon is supposed to be indicated by
the first word.
31. See Fingarette's discussion of performative language
and the rectification of names (Fingarette, Confucius-8ecular as
Sacred, 15). For the theory of rectifYing names in the Lunyu in
light of a prescriptive view of language, see Hansen, Daoist Theory
of Chinese Thought, 65-71. See also Carine Defoort's
categorization of various interpretations of rectification of names
in the Lunyu. Carine Defoort, The Pheasant Cap Master: A
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Rhetorical Reading (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1997), 168-177.
32. The rectification of names passage in the Lunyu (13/3,
cited below) does not mention shi.
33. It also calls it "chaotic" (Xunzi 22/1 I).
34. Even with the alternate reading, "names are the reason
that shi are met and bound," the element that needs binding still
seems to be the shi.
35. Given other Zhuangzi passages that imply that the
heartmind dies (2/20) or that a living person cannot know whether
the heartmind dies (2/80-85), Confucius's claim here that the
heartmind never dies may be an indication of his less-than-
complete understanding (assuming that there is consistency in the
viewpoint in the Zhuangzi in this regard). In any case, whether or
not the passage reflects the position of the authors of the
Zhuangzi, Confucius supplies what he supposes to be an easily
recognizable example. Thus, the priorities reflected in his example
appear to be commonplace.
36. The earlier lines of this passage say that names are
bound. Now this line says that ordaining binds shi. This implies
that there is a difference between binding names to shi and just
binding names. My guess is that "binding names" refers to binding
sounds to one another, which will thenceforth count as names.
37. This last claim comes as a surprise-what is the
difference between appropriateness and goodness, such that names
lack original appropriateness yet possess original goodness? The
passage does not elaborate on the nature of "appropriateness." It
explains "goodness" as directness and ease, as well as absence of
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contrariness. However, these things seem as descriptive of
appropriateness as they are of goodness.
Interpreting the entire passage in terms of writing rather
than sounds in no way alleviates the confusion. Whether one
"binds" sounds or elements of written characters, the passage still
fails to address why something that is good, easy, and not contrary
should not be called "originally appropriate" if it is going to be
called "originally good."
Perhaps the reason names have original goodness is that
some things, like simplicity, always help in naming, regardless of
whether habit succeeds in making the name appropriate.
.
38. Graham's translation is extremely suspicious in this
regard. For the second question, he substitutes shi for "guest," and
translates it so that it reads, "Would it be for the sake of the
substance?" (Graham, Chuang-tsu, 45). His translation implies that
the second motivation would be more appealing than the first. In
this way, he alters the tone of the passage entirely, making it
sound like a critique of names as "mere" guests of substances.
39. In Mozi 28/39 and Xunzi 22/1, names are "appended."
In Xunzi 22/2, names are "located in."
40. The Xunzi describes this as the condition under the
reign of good rulers:
;g~ffif.m
Names are settled, and thereupon shi are distinguished.
(Xunzi 22/7)
41. This is probably a reference to Van Hui.
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42. Just as names have the potential to be empty, so too
speech has the potential to be flowery. The Xunzi associates
speech with flowers, also contrasting speech to action:
.1R'g~~
.1R'fJ~fXfS
A person who disperses his/her speech is flowery.
A person who disperses his/her actions is showing off.
(Xunzi 29/26)
For more on plant metaphors in early China, see Donald Munro's
"The Family Network, the Stream of Water, and the Plant" in
Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoism
Values, 259-292.
43. Lau and Ames translation modified. D. C. Lau and
Roger T. Ames, trans., Yuan Dao: Tracing Dao to Its Source (New
York: Ballatine Books, 1998), 80.
44. The passage simply says that names "hang," but
another passage from the Xunzi constructs an analogy between
names and measurement standards, which argues for this reading.
The Xunzi says,
ittf1T~mfFi1
tJ iiiL IE i1
UE~iE~
A~mrm
JfU tiW z 7\: ~
~~~~NlIil!t:m:z~ift
itt ~ m~ J& ~ ~ ~ ~ tJ iiiL IE i1
To be sure, those who split phrases and, on their own
authority, create names in order to disorder correct names,
make people suspicious and confused and increase people's
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debates and disputes. Hence, this is called great treachery,
and their crime is [treated] like those who violate tallies or
weights and measures.
Hence, [the true ruler's] people do not dare to make up
strange phrases and disorder correct names.
(Xunzi 22/7-9)
An individual who threatens the orderly relation of names to shi, is
like someone who tampers with weights and measures, hence the
metaphor of names "hanging" might be that of a standard of
measure.
45. However, spoken names presumably would not
penetrate as deeply as music, because, according to one
interpretation, Mencius 7AI4 seems to say that "tone" is much
more effective than the speech itself (see Chapter 2 note 17).
Chapter Five: Conclusion
I. Like Knoblock, I take xing ~ to be ~ "instructions."
Knoblock, Xunzi, 2:19.
2. According to Kenneth DeWoskin, in early Chinese
music theory, music functions by mutual resonance rather than one
side being the cause and the other exhibiting the effect. Describing
how music functions in the Book ofMusic, DeWoskin writes,
The 'Book of Music' defines a process that is closer to
sympathetic resonance than to causation. Confounding
attempts at definitive translation, the verb kan ~ means,
on the one hand, to 'impinge,' 'affect,' or 'move' and, on
the other hand, 'perceive,' 'feel,' or 'sense'; ... the 'Book of
Music' notes the significant concurrence of 'coarse sound'
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and a 'mind moved to anger' without attempting to
establish the agency, or causality, of the concurrence.
Kenneth DeWoskin, A Song for One or Two: Music and the
Concept of Art in Early China (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for
Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1982), 97.
3. Interestingly, the Xunzi does not always describe the
road as straight, although usually it does.
4. When Xunzi expresses its concern about resonating with
inappropriate desires, it calls it "complying" with the desire of the
ears and eyes, rather than "responding" to them, but it does not
explain the difference (see Xunzi 23/2, page 51).
5. The Xunzi describes the response as inexhaustible:
n!~/f'WJ
~~A~m~-tn
Responding to changes without limit:
Such is the discussion of the sage.
(Xunzi 5/60)
6. The phrasing here is reminiscent of wuwei ~ ~, and it
particularly resembles the way it is applied to sensory contexts in
the Laozi.
7. The term I translate as "well-spoken" here is Man ~
(discuss, debate). The comparison with the senses suggests that oral
discussion simply is what the scholar does, just as the eye sees.
The phrase lou zhi 11 m"bend a finger" is not clear.
8. In this case, the character qu ffB, which most often
appears in contrast to zheng 1£ "straight," hence meaning
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"divergent" or "crooked," may be better read as "sprouts" or "small
things."
9. Aside from implying that too much effort of the eyes
and ears is impractical, the Xunzi also criticizes the unseen and
unheard because, by not providing anything auditory and visual,
they make resonance impossible (as in 18/1 [above], where the
Xunzi compares the ruler to a singing master).
10. Again, what I am translating as "acting" is a character
that also means "walk," "go," or "proceed." That "acting" is
connected with "walking" has to be important in a context where
the ultimate goaris to follow the proper dao, "way" or "path."
11. A similar passage in the Shuo Yuan has slightly
different elements. Knoblock notes that in the Shuo Yuan version,
the hand is best. "The ear's hearing something is not as good as the
eye's seeing it; the eye's seeing it is not as good as the foot's
treading upon it; the foot's treading on it is not as good as the
hand's differentiating it" (Knoblock, Xunzi, 2:289).
12. Perhaps the closeness of seeing might refer to the
sense of being able to "see for oneself." The Xunzi never mentions
"seeing for oneself' as a particular asset of visual sensation, but the
Mencius does (Mencius IB8). On the other hand, perhaps this is
not something that the Xunzi views as exclusive to the visual
modality-it is also possible to hear for oneself.
13. The emphasis on body here suggests the embodied
person and should not be seen in terms of a contrast to the
heartmind.
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14. The translation of gu in this context is difficult. In
other contexts, it functions as 'reason,' 'cause,' 'fonnerly,' and 'to
die.'
15. The Xunzi often describes the aim of knowing in
pragmatic tenns. It does not speak of knowing as being correct for
its own sake, but speaks instead of resolving doubts (Xunzi 12/104),
responding to ten thousand changes (Xunzi 12/103), and avoiding
the misfortune of the heartmind's aims not being clear (Xunzi
22/53). According to the Xunzi, the ancients examined knowledge
and thinking on the basis of their completion, just as they
measured action and repose on the basis of ritual (Xunzi 12/74).
16. Having said that speech need not aim to rectify action,
Mencius 7B37 still criticizes people whose speech and action do
not take note of each other (presumably in order to rectify one
another). In fact, in Mencius 3B9 (see page 106), Mencius is said
to view his own speech as aimed at stopping the heterodox speech
and action of other thinkers.
17. This might be read as simply ranking trust and
productivity below doing what is right, but such a reading requires
ignoring the specific tenninology-bu bi xin here and bi xin in
7B33.
18. The implicit contrast to "broad" learning argues for
translating this yue as "concise," rather than "bound" as in the
Zhengming.
19. This metaphor of bu xia dai, which I translate as
"below the belt," is rendered "below the girdle" by Legge (The
Works ofMencius, 495) and "below the sash" by Lau (Mencius,
201). I do not know whether the same connotations as "below the
belt" apply here.
238 On the Epistemology of the Senses
20. When it does appear, it refers to a response to a
question (Mencius 2B8, 2B11, and 6B1).
21. This extension from center to periphery suggests that
the emotion is not entirely subjective and intrapersonaI. Thus,
when the Mencius 6A4-5 debates whether humaneness and
rightness are internal or external, being internal does not seem to
mean completely private. It is more like beginning internally.
22. As Kwong-Ioi Shun notes, "...Mencius probably
regarded the physical form as having some kind of ethical
dimension... one's ethical qualities are inevitably manifested in
one's physical form-it is because they are so manifested that they
can be discerned by others and can have a transformative effect."
Kwong-Ioi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1997), 162-163.
23. In this case, the origin of the similarity is the person's
position, rather than the heartmind; however, the principle is the
same, insofar as the origin functions as cause.
Another possible reading of the passage is that the princes'
accents sound alike because they grew up in the same area.
However, this reading seems to make the Mencius's point
needlessly banal.
24. See Mencius 4A16 (page 82). Because the issue is the
pupil's brightness or dullness, this seems to be a case of the central
part of the person manifesting itself in the pupil, rather than a
matter of looking inside a person through their pupils.
25. The Mencius considers only one instance of a
duplicitous person, who says that he will do something but does not
follow through. The Mencius does not seem to see any particular
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problem in this. The advisors of the prince in question simply
recognize the situation and depart (see Mencius 6B14, page 75). In
addition to this disparity between speech and action, the Mencius
also considers a case of incongruity of speech and complexion.
(See Mencius 3B7, below.)
26. See Mencius 3A2 (page 66).
27. See Mencius 6B15 (above page 65).
28. This recognition of a possibility of tampering with the
connection from the heartmind to the body's periphery makes the
Mencius seem less naive. In spite of its confidence in the principles
of physiognomy, the Mencius gives more credence to treatment of
others than to tone and visual demeanor:
~ if l' ff,j A ~ if l'~A
ff,j~AZ;gm~1'm~~
~~~~~
$ ~ 1t. QJ PJ 5f if~ ~ ~ ~
Those who are respectful do not insult people.
Those who are restrained do not rob people.
A ruler who insults and robs people fears only that they
won't obey. How could he achieve respectfulness and
restraint?
Respectfulness and restraint: how can these be obtained
from tone of voice and a smiling demeanor?
(Mencius 4A17)
The heartmind may tend to express itself aurally and visually, but
because visual expression and tone can be manipulated, in this case,
the Mencius values treatment of others more highly.
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29. Although this is the only example of speeding horses in







One who feasts in dreams, wakes up in the morning and
cries and weeps. One who cries and weeps in dreams, wakes
up in ~e morning and goes hunting. Now, while dreaming,
we do not know we are dreaming, and in the midst of a
dream we can again interpret a dream. Only after waking
do we know we were dreaming.
(Zhuangzi 2/81)
30. The que W is supplied from Text B.
31. An alternative possibility is suggested by Tateno
Masami, who argues that the stomach may refer to the focus of
meditational practice-indicating the withdrawal of consciousness
during training. Tateno Masami, "A Philosophical Analysis of the
Laozi from an Ontological Perspective," in Religious and
Philosophical Aspects ofthe Laozi, ed. Mark Csikszentmihalyi and
Philip J. Ivanhoe (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1999), 178.
32. Of course, at the political level, this also reduces the
risk of revolt.




:ef J! Jt 9t f~ B
Of those who desire to take the world and act on it-I see
that they will not obtain it.
(Laozi 29)
(The de yi ~ B is supplied from Text B.)
~ ~ fi1 z £' it 5ft z
~~5P1Z£,iti]~z
If you desire to shrink it,
You must certainly stretch it.
Ifyou desire to weaken it,
You must certainly strengthen it.
(Laozi 36)
(The hi gu £' it is supplied from Text B.)
*'ffl~1'~~~tfA
IJ\ 'ffl ~ l'~ ~A $ A
All that the large state desires is to unite and rear others;
all that the small state desires is to enter and serve others.
(Laozi 61)
~ ~J ~ A z ~ 1:~ if!
£\~JJt gr Z
Jt~*~if!
£' ~J Jt :!it ~ Z
Therefore if the sage desires to be above the people,
He must in his speech be below them.
And if he desires to be in front of the people,
He must in person be behind them.
(Laozi 66)
(The min ye ~ ift is supplied from Text A.)
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34. The phrase "desire not to desire" occurs again in Laozi
57 in the Mawangdui text:
~tx~txffij~13~
I desire not to desire, and the people make themselves
uncarved.
(Laozi 57)
It does not recur in the Wang Hi edition, which simply says, "I
have no desires."
35. The· Wang Hi edition has yan § for wen, but the Xiang
Er edition also has wen.
36. The Wang Hi edition reads mz ill 0 ~ f ~ 1!t€ '*
"The way's coming out of the mouth-bland, its lack of taste!"
37. There is a concern for a rectification of standards,
including compasses and squares, in the synoptic Mozi, the Neo-
Mohist Canons, and the Xunzi. Given its interest in the "uncut," it
is possible that the Laozi, like the Zhuangzi, objects to the cutting
involved in the application of these sensory standards:
13.5t:~~tilIi
m~ffij1E~
:fE!: ~U ~ '11 ~ ili
Using hook and line, compass and square to make things
straight, this is scraping away its xing.
(Zhuangzi 8/13)
38. The series of accomplishments in Chapters to and 27
are also examples of this not completing both parts of an action:
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7( r, 1m IJJ ijg ~ JIlt *
gij EJ 1m ji ijg ~ ~*
In regulating the po-spirits and embracing the one, can you
do it without leaving?
In concentrating the qi and arriving at softness, can you be
like a baby?
In cultivating and removing from the profound mirror, can
you make it without blemish?
In loving the people and governing the state, can you do it
without using knowledge?
When the gates of heaven open and close, can you act the
female?
In clarifying the four reaches, can you do it without acting?
(Laozi 10, Wang Hi edition)
Henricks argues convincingly that the first word in line I belongs
to the prior chapter. I take wu ~ in the fifth line to be wei ~
(Henricks, Laozi: Te-Tao Ching, 209).
Chapter 27 in the Wang Bi edition reads,
~.r.-:1lIE;f;I;f,@
I=t 1J Jl\" M m
~~:1lIEllE~
)::::::I i=i .JH" Jtx mi"iJ
~J& l' ifHI *
~ M~ !!JHI ffii l' i1J 00
~Mi~.tt-Jffii1'i1JfW
A good walker leaves no treads behind.
A good speaker lacks flaw or fault.
A good counter does not use tallies or chips.
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A good closer does not shut the bolt, yet the door cannot
open.
A good tier ties without rope or cord, yet the knot cannot
be untied.
(Laozi 27, Wang Hi edition)
39. The Laozi does express confidence in the "great
¥A:;}(~~Ttt
Grasp the great image, and the world will come to you.
(Laozi 3?)
However, the Laozi 41 says, "the great image lacks shape."
On the basis of parallels to other lines, the tian ~ in the
Mawangdui version is probably supposed to be da :;}( .
40. The Laozi 14 presents a similar series of half-
performed acts of discrimination.
41. In addition to the textual connections that I cite here,
the use of common terms like chu l:f1 "exit" (or "emit") and ru A
"enter" to describe both doors and sense discrimination also
establishes a connection between them. The Laozi's only use of
chu in relation to sense discrimination refers to the dao coming
out of the mouth (35), but other texts of the period establish the
association. Zhuangzi 2/5 connects holes (Jil{ 7\) with noses,
mouths, eyes, and ears. Xunzi 25/28 implies that the ears and eyes
are doors and windows. Also, the Yu Lao chapter of the Han Feizi




Holes and cavities are the doors and windows of the
shenming [spirit brightness?]. The ears and the eyes are
exhausted by sound and color. Jingshen [seminal spirit?] is
exhausted by outward manners.
(Han Feizi 7/4)
42. In this case, the sage does "complete" an action, but
completes without doing. This makes me hesitant to say the point
is particularly aimed at not completing. Instead it seems to be a
matter of doing one part of an action without the other (thereby,
in some way, not "exhausting" oneself or the act).
43. The only exceptions that do not praise some form of
sensory "incompleteness" are two instances of sensory knowing-
knowing the whiteness (28) and knowing beautiful and ugly (2)-
and two references to the dao being heard.
44. I take it that Hun Dun represents the human condition.
By another reading, however, the drilling may have killed Hun Dun
precisely because he was not human.
45. The nose remains open allowing breathing, which
might also permit the continued interaction of hun-spirits during
sleep.
Because the Zhuangzi states in a different place (1131) that
it is not just the "form and bones" (xing hai 1B ~) that have
blindness and deafness (the heartmind has them, too), there is
reason to believe that the phrase "form and bones" includes the
eyes and ears (not simply the external shape). Another link
suggesting that the senses in general are the part of the form that
opens in this particular passage is the character jie ~, which is
often used of the senses. See Chapter 1 note 31.
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46. A less literal interpretation of chu tfj might read this
as "manifesting"-that is, "embodying" rather than "letting out"
from openings. However, chu is commonly used for speech being
"emitted" (presumably through the mouth), although there is only
one instance of this in the Zhuangzi itself. It says,
4-T~PJT1&*1!t1C1:iftffij1i'!itfj§~~
1'W\~iJZ
Now, the person you've selected as the most eminent is our
teacher-and yet you emit speech like that? Isn't that also
a crime?
(Zhuangzi 5118)
Along the same lines, Zhuangzi 2/13 says the emotions are
"emitted" like music (piped through the body?) and like breath that
forms mushrooms in the "hollow" between night and day.
47. The passage reads,
lit l' )E PJ mfa l' "iiJ A. iJZ 111&
~ ~ f[I ~ jjj ffij l' ~ ~ ~ ...
Therefore they are not sufficient to disturb one's harmony.
They cannot enter one's spiritual residence.
To make it so that harmony and ease circulate, but are not
lost in openings...
(Zhuangzi 5/44-45)
48. Graham also translates the term as "externalize"
(Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 198). At the risk of anachronism,
it seems to mean something like the opposite of "internalize"-
that is, placing something aside where it need not provoke
concern. One of the Zhuangzls characters teaches another to
externalize the world, things, and life itself. She says,
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B Jf. 7( r * -f!L>Z. ~ Z
-t B ffij ~ ijg Jf. 10/)
BJf.1o/)*~)Z.~z
1L B ffij ~ I'm Jf. ~
B Jf. ~ * ffij ~ ~ ijlJj ••••
After three days, he was able to put the world outside him.
When he had got the world outside him I still kept at him,
and by the seventh day he was able to put things outside
him. When he got things outside him, again I kept at him,
and by the ninth day he was able to put life outside him.
Once he had got life outside him, he could break through to
a new morning...
(Zhuangzi 6/39-41)
49. Laozi 10 mentions the po ~ (spirits) in the context of
something not leaving, although it is not clear whether the person
does not leave the po or vice versa.
50. Zhuangzi 1/31 notes that the bones and body "have
blindness and deafness," hence the bones and body include the eyes
and ears.
51. This indicates that roaming outside direction and
externalizing form and bones is different from roaming inside
direction However, even the outside/inside distinction seems to







248 On the Epistemology ofthe Senses
I have been roaming with the Master for nineteen years
now and never knew myself as a person with a chopped
foot. Now you and I are roaming on the inside of form-
and-bones, yet you haul me out to the outside of form-and-
bones. Don't you think that is also a crime?
(Zhuangzi 5/22-24)
The term wai 1f- also appears once in the Laozi, and there too the
body is externalized. However, it is done for a different purpose.
The Laozi juxtaposes "externalize" (wai 1f-) to the term
"preserve" or "survive" (cun f¥.), saying that the sage preserves his
self/body precisely by "turning it out" or placing it outside of his
concerns. Thus, in the Laozi, one actually seeks to preserve the
body/self, and therefore "externalizes" it.
52. Zhuangzi 4/32-33 suggests that this occurs through the
ears and eyes, but Zhuangzi 2/1 0 implies that the hun ~ travels
through the nose, as it remains open during sleep.
53. However, the "fasting of the heartmind" passage might
simply state that they stop:
~ 11: ~ If JL\ 11: ~ rf
Listening stops at the ear. The heartmind stops at tallying.
(Zhuangzi 4/27)
54. Yet, seeing does still occur, as the jian ~ In the
following line demonstrates. After mentioning that the senses




However, whenever I come to something interlocked, I see
where it will be hard to handle and cautiously prepare
myself, my looking stops, my action slows down...
(Zhuangzi 3/10)
55. In fact, rather than promoting finding sweetness In
simple foods, the Zhuangzi implies that sweetness has no standard
and' hence undermines the possibility of simple sweetness
(Zhuangzi 2/68).
56. In contrast to the repetition of this theme in the
Zhuangzi, only one reference to "walking without a trace" appears
in the Laozi, in Chapter 27, which notes that someone who is good
at walking leaves no tracks.
57. The heartmind measures the ear against the eye (and
vice versa). Thus, in some sense, feet (now standing in for what
the eye sees) serve as the standard against which speech can be
tallied. The tallying of walking feet (seen by the eye) and speech
(heard by the ear) seems to be what constitute knowledge.
This bears comparison to the Ode quoted in Mencius 5B7,
in which the superior person literally treads a dao, while lower
people look on. It is also related to Mencius 7A38, where the feet
are the measure for one's words, because the sage alone is able to
"tread" his shape (xing ~).
58. The Zhuangds characters speak in a way that is iIl-
suited for measurement and correspondence:
E..f!!I~"0+.ft.m--l--rl;;1IIE-'
1=1 I-EH r:::I IJ":" j!;( ./ ..... A IIU "1\,, M
I heard Jie Yu's speech-huge and not corresponding.
(Zhuangzi 1/27)
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~~=1'~~Tz§*ffii~mmffi~**
Said Hui Shi to Zhuangzi, "I have a great tree, people call it
ailanthus. Its trunk is too squeezed and swollen to measure
with an inked line, its little branches are too curly and
crooked to measure with a compass or an L-square. Stand it
up in the. road, and a carpenter wouldn't give it a glance.
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